# Coloniality Kritik

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## 1nc Shell

#### The spread of neoliberal market mechanisms by the US is part of a colonial strategy that attempts to control Latin America for the benefit of modernist structures.

[Mignolo](http://muse.uq.edu.au.vortex3.ucok.edu:2050/journals/american_literary_history/v018/18.2mignolo.html#authbio) 2006 [Walter D. Mignolo, Professor of Cultural Studies at Duke University, Citizenship, Knowledge, and the Limits of Humanity American Literary History 18.2 (2006) 312-331]

I will describe the veiled connections as the logic of coloniality, and the surface that covers it I will describe as the rhetoric of modernity. The rhetoric of modernity is that of salvation, whereas the logic of coloniality is a logic of imperial oppression. They go hand in hand, and you cannot have modernity without coloniality; the unfinished project of modernity carries over its shoulders the unfinished project of coloniality. I will conclude by suggesting the need to decolonize "knowledge" and "being" and advocating that the (decolonial) "humanities" shall have a fundamental role to play in this process. Truly, "global citizenship" implies overcoming the imperial and colonial differences that have mapped and continue to map global racism and global patriarchy. Changing the law and public policies won't be of much help in this process. What is needed is that those who change the law and public policy change themselves. **[End Page 312]** The problem is how that may take place if we would like to avoid the missionary zeal for conversion; the liberal and neoliberal belief in the triumphal march of Western civilization and of market democracy; and the moral imperatives and forced behavior imposed by socialism. As I do not believe in a new abstract universal that will be good for the entire world, the question is how people can change their belief that the world today is like it is and that it will be only through the "honest" projects of Christians, liberals, and Marxist-socialists that the world could be better for all, and citizenship will be a benediction for all. The changes I am thinking about are radical transformations in the naturalized assumptions of the world order. The naturalized assumptions I am thinking about are imperial–colonial, and they have shaped the world in which we live in the past five hundred years when Christianity and capitalism came together and created the conditions for the self-fashioned narrative of "modernity." Hence, the transformations I am thinking about require an epistemic decolonial shift. Not a "new," a "post," or a "neo," which are all changes within the same modern colonial epistemology, but a *decolonial* (and not either a "deconstruction"), which means a delinking from the rules of the game (e.g., the decolonization of the mind, in Ngugi Wa Th'iongo's vocabulary) in which deconstruction itself and all the "posts-" for sure are caught. Delinking doesn't mean to be "outside" of either modernity or Christian, Liberal, Capitalist, and Marxist hegemony but to disengage from the naturalized assumptions that make of these four macronarratives "une pensee unique," to use Ignacio Ramonet's expression.[2](http://muse.uq.edu.au.vortex3.ucok.edu:2050/journals/american_literary_history/v018/18.2mignolo.html#FOOT2) The decolonial shift begins by unveiling the imperial presuppositions that maintain a universal idea of humanity and of human being that serves as a model and point of arrival and by constantly underscoring the fact that oppressed and racialized subjects do not care and are not fighting for "human rights" (based on an imperial idea of humanity) but to regain the "human dignity" (based on a decolonial idea of humanity) that has and continues to be taken away from them by the imperial rhetoric of modernity (e.g., white, Eurocentered, heterosexual, and Christian/secular). The conditions for citizenship are still tied to a racialized hierarchy of human beings that depends on universal categories of thought created and enacted from the identitarian perspectives of European Christianity and by white males. In the Afro-Caribbean intellectual tradition—from C. L. R. James to Frantz Fanon, Sylvia Wynter, and Lewis Gordon—the very concepts of the *human* and *humanity* are constantly under fire.[3](http://muse.uq.edu.au.vortex3.ucok.edu:2050/journals/american_literary_history/v018/18.2mignolo.html#FOOT3) Would indeed a black person agree with the idea that what "we" all have in common is our "humanity" and that we are "all equal" in being "different"? I would suspect that the formula would rather be of the type advanced by the **[End Page 313]** Zapatistas: "[B]ecause we are all equal we have the right to be different."[4](http://muse.uq.edu.au.vortex3.ucok.edu:2050/journals/american_literary_history/v018/18.2mignolo.html#FOOT4) The universal idea of humanity, believe me, is not the same from the perspective of black history, Indian memories, or the memories of the population of Central Asia. The humanities, as a branch of knowledge in the history of the university since the European Renaissance, have always been complicitous with imperial–colonial designs celebrating a universal idea of the human model. The moment has arrived to put the humanities at the service of decolonial projects in their ethical, political, and epistemic dimensions; to recast the reinscription of human dignity as a decolonial project in the hands of the *damnes* rather than given to them through managerial designs of NGOs and Human Rights Watch that seldom if ever are led by actors whose human dignity is at stake. Decolonial projects imply downsizing human rights to its real dimension: an ethical imperative internal to imperial abuses but not really a project that empowers racialized subjects and helps them to regain the human dignity that racism and imperial projects (from the right, the left, and the center) took away from them.

#### The modus operandi of the affirmative’s economics is the historical drive behind colonization and mass violence against Latin America culminating in wars, violence and genocide in the name of their economic ideals

Escobar 2004 [Arturo, Beyond the Third World: Imperial Globality, Global Coloniality, and Anti-Globalization Social Movements, Third world quarterly 2004. www.nd.edu/~druccio/Escobar.pdf‎]

One of the main consequences, for Santos, of the collapse of emancipation into regulation is the structural predominance of exclusion over inclusion. Either because of the exclusion of many of those formerly included, or because those who in the past were candidates for inclusion are now prevented from being so, the problematic of exclusion has become terribly accentuated, with ever growing numbers of people thrown into a veritable “state of nature.” The size of the excluded class varies of course with the centrality of the country in the world system, but it is particularly staggering in Asia, Africa and Latin America. The result is a new type of social fascism as “a social and civilizational regime” (p. 453). This regime, paradoxically, coexists with democratic societies, hence its novelty. This fascism may operate in various modes: in terms of spatial exclusion; territories struggled over by armed actors; the fascism of insecurity; and of course the deadly financial fascism, which at times dictates the marginalization of entire regions and countries that do not fulfill the conditions needed for capital, according to the IMF and its faithful management consultants (pp. 447-458). To the former Third World corresponds the highest levels of social fascism of these kinds. This is, in sum, the world that is being created by globalization from above, or hegemonic globalization. Before moving on, it is important to complete this rough representation of today’s global capitalist modernity by looking at the US-led invasion of Iraq in early 2003. Among other things, this episode has made at last two things particularly clear: first, the willingness to use unprecedented levels of violence to enforce dominance on a global scale; second, the unipolarity of the current empire. In ascension since the Thatcher-Reagan years, this unipolarity reached its climax with the post-9/11 regime, based on a new convergence of military, economic, political and religious interests in the United States. In Alain Joxe’s (2002) compelling vision of imperial globality, what we have been witnessing since the first Gulf War is the rise of an empire that increasingly operates through the management of asymmetrical and spatialized violence, territorial control, sub-contracted massacres, and “cruel little wars,” all of which are aimed at imposing the neo-liberal capitalist project. At stake is a type of regulation that operates through the creation of a new horizon of global violence. This empire regulates disorder through financial and military means, pushing chaos to the extent possible to the outskirts of empire, creating a “predatory” peace to the benefit of a global noble caste and leaving untold poverty and suffering in its path. It is an empire that does not take responsibility for the wellbeing of those over whom it rules. As Joxe puts it: “The world today is united by a new form of chaos, an imperial chaos, dominated by the imperium of the United States, though not controlled by it. We lack the words to describe this new system, while being surrounded by its images. ... World leadership through chaos, a doctrine that a rational European school would have difficulty imagining, necessarily leads to weakening states –even in the United States—through the emerging *sovereignty* of corporations and markets.” (2002: 78, 213). 7 The new empire thus operates not so much through conquest, but through the imposition of norms (free-markets, US-style democracy and cultural notions of consumption, and so forth). The former Third World is, above all, the theatre of a multiplicity of cruel little wars which, rather than barbaric throwbacks, are linked to the current global logic. From Colombia and Central America to Algeria, sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East these wars take place within states or regions, without threatening empire but fostering conditions favorable to it. For much of the former Third World (and of course to the Third World within the core) is reserved “the World-chaos” (107), free-market slavery, and selective genocide. In some cases, this amounts to a sort of “paleo-micro- colonialism” within regions (157), in others to balkanization, in yet others to brutal internal wars and massive displacement to free up entire regions for transnational capital (particularly in the case of oil, but also diamonds, timber, water, genetic resources, and agricultural lands). Often times these cruel little wars are fueled by Mafia networks, and intended for macro-economic globalization. It is clear that this new Global Empire (“the New World Order of the American imperial monarchy,” p. 171) articulates the “peaceful expansion” of the free-market economy with omnipresent violence in a novel regime of economic and military globality –in other words, the global economy comes to be supported by a global organization of violence and vice versa (200). On the subjective side, what increasingly one finds in the Souths (including the South within the North) are “diced identities” and the transformation of cultures of solidarity into cultures of destruction.

#### The question of this debate is how best to challenge colonial institutions and foreground the lives of marginalized populations – this is an ethical imperative.

Mignolo 2009(Walter Mignolo, 2009, Epistemic Disobedience, Independent thought, and deconlonial freedom, <http://waltermignolo.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/epistemicdisobedience-2.pdf>, Walter Mignolo is a semiotician and Professor at Duke Univeristy, who has published extensively on semiotics and literary theory, and worked on different aspect of the modern and colonial world, exploring concepts such as global coloniality, the geopolitics of knowledge, transmodernity, border thinking, and pluriversality)

De-colonial thinking presupposes de-linking (epistemically and politically) from the web of imperial knowledge (theo- and ego-politically grounded) from disciplinary management. A common topic of conversation today, after the ﬁnancial crisis on Wall Street, is ‘how to save capitalism’. A de-colonial question would be: ‘Why would you want to save capitalism and not save human beings? Why save an abstract entity and not the human lives that capitalism is constantly destroying?’ In the same vein, geo- and body-politics of knowledge, de-colonial thinking and the de-colonial option place human lives and life in general ﬁrst rather than making claims for the ‘transformation of the disciplines’. But, still, claiming life and human lives ﬁrst, de-colonial thinking is not joining forces with ‘the politics of life in itself’ as Nicholas Rose (2007) has it. Rose’s ‘politics of life in itself’ is the last development in the ‘mercantilization of life’ and of ‘bio-power’ (as Foucault has it). In the ‘politics of life in itself’ political and economic strategies for controlling life at the same time as creating more consumers join forces. Bio-politics, in Foucault’s conception, was one of the practical consequences of an ego-politics of knowledge implemented in the sphere of the state. Politics of life in itself extends it to the market. Thus, politics of life in itself describes the enormous potential of bio-technology to generate consumers who invest their earnings in buying health-promoting products in order to maintain the reproduction of technology that will ‘improve’ the control of human beings at the same time as creating more wealth through the money invested by consumers who buy health-promoting technology.

#### Our alternative is to reject the affirmative – when confronted with colonial projects the only ethical response is radical negativity. We are compelled to be disobedient to modernity.

Mignolo 09 [Walter D. Mignolo, Epistemic Disobedience, Independent Thought and Decolonial Freedom, Theory and Culture 2009, published 2009]

ONCE UPON a time scholars assumed that the knowing subject in the disciplines is transparent, disincorporated from the known and untouched by the geo-political configuration of the world in which people are racially ranked and regions are racially configured. From a detached and neutral point of observation (that Colombian philosopher Santiago Castro-Gómez (2007) describes as the *hubris of the zero point*), the knowing subject maps the world and its problems, classifies people and projects into what is good for them. Today that assumption is no longer tenable, although there are still many believers. At stake is indeed the question of racism and epistemology (ChukwudiEze, 1997; Mignolo, forthcoming). And once upon a time scholars assumed that if you ‘come’ from Latin America you have to ‘talk about’ Latin America; that in such a case you have to be a token of your culture. Such expectation will not arise if the author ‘comes’ from Germany, France, England or the US. In such cases it is not assumed that you have to be talking about your culture but can function as a theoretically minded person. As we know: the first world has knowledge, the third world has culture; Native Americans have wisdom, Anglo Americans have science. The need for political and epistemic delinking here comes to the fore, as well as decolonializing and decolonialknowledges, necessary steps for imagining and building democratic, just, and non-imperial/colonial societies. Geo-politics of knowledge goes hand in hand with geo-politics of knowing. Whoand when, why and where is knowledge generated (rather than produced, like cars or cell phones)? Asking these questions means to shift the attention from the enunciated to the enunciation. And by so doing, turning Descartes’s dictum inside out: rather than assuming that thinking comes before being, one assumes instead that it is a racially marked body in a geo-historical marked space that feels the urge or get the call to speak, to articulate, in whatever semiotic system, the urge that makes of living organisms ‘human’ beings. By setting the scenario in terms of geo- and body-politics I am starting and departing from already familiar notions of ‘situated knowledges’. Sure, all knowledges are situated and every knowledge is constructed. But that is just the beginning. The question is: who, when, why is constructing knowledges (Mignolo, 1999, 2005 [1995])? Why did eurocentered epistemology conceal its own geo-historical and bio-graphical locations and succeed in creating the idea of universal knowledge as if the knowing subjects were also universal? This illusion ispervasive today in the social sciences, the humanities, the natural sciences and the professional schools. Epistemic disobedience means to delink from the illusion of the zero point epistemology. The shift I am indicating is the anchor (constructed of course, located of course, not just anchored by nature or by God) of the argument that follows. It is the beginning of any epistemic decolonial de-linking with all its historical, political and ethical consequences. Why? Because geo-historical and bio-graphic loci of enunciation have been located by and through the making and transformation of the colonial matrix of power: a racial system of social classification that invented Occidentalism (e.g. IndiasOccidentales), that created the conditions for Orientalism; distinguished the South of Europe from its center (Hegel) and, on that long history, remapped the world as first, second and third during the Cold War. Places of nonthought (of myth, non-western religions, folklore, underdevelopment involving regions and people) today have been waking up from the long process of westernization. The anthropos inhabiting non-European places discovered that s/he had been invented, as anthropos, by a locus of enunciations self-defined as humanitas. Now, there are currently two kinds or directions advanced by the former anthropos who are no longer claiming recognition by or inclusion in the humanitas, but engaging in epistemic disobedience and de-linking from the magic of the Western idea of modernity, ideals of humanity and promises of economic growth and financial prosperity (Wall Street dixit). One direction unfolds within the globalization of a type of economy that in both liberal and Marxist vocabulary is defined as ‘capitalism’. One of the strongest advocates of this is the Singaporean scholar, intellectual and politician Kishore Mahbubani, to which I will return later. One of his earlier book titles carries the unmistakable and irreverent message: Can Asians Think?: Understanding the Divide between East and West (2001). Following Mahbubani’s own terminology, this direction could be identified as de-westernization. Dewesternization means, within a capitalist economy, that the rules of the game and the shots are no longer called by Western players and institutions. The seventh Doha round is a signal example of de-westernizing options. The second direction is being advanced by what I describe as the decolonial option. The decolonial option is the singular connector of a diversity of decolonials. The decolonial paths have one thing in common: the colonial wound, the fact that regions and people around the world have been classified as underdeveloped economically and mentally. Racism not only affects people but also regions or, better yet, the conjunction of natural resources needed by humanitas in places inhabited by anthropos. De colonial options have one aspect in common with de-westernizing arguments: the definitive rejection of ‘being told’ from the epistemic privileges of the zero point what ‘we’ are, what our ranking is in relation to the ideal of humanitas and what we have to do to be recognized as such. However, decolonial and de-westernizing options diverge in one crucial and in disputable point: while the latter do not question the ‘civilization of death’ hidden under the rhetoric of modernization and prosperity, of the improvement of modern institutions (e.g. liberal democracy and an economy propelled by the principle of growth and prosperity), decolonial options start from the principle that the regeneration of life shall prevail over primacy of the production and reproduction of goods at the cost of life (life in general and of humanitas and anthropos alike!). I illustrate this direction, below, commenting on ParthaChatterjee’s re-orienting ‘eurocentered modernity’ toward the future in which ‘our modernity’ (in India, in Central Asia and the Caucasus, in South America, briefly, in all regions of the world upon which eurocentered modernity was either imposed or ‘adopted’ by local actors assimilating to local histories inventing and enacting global designs) becomes the statement of interconnected dispersal in which decolonial futures are being played out. Last but not least, my argument doesn’t claim originality (‘originality’ is one of the basic expectations of modern control of subjectivity) but aims to make a contribution to growing processes of decoloniality around the world. My humble claim is that geo- and body-politics of knowledge has been hidden from the self-serving interests of Western epistemology and that a task of decolonial thinking is the unveiling of epistemic silences of Western epistemology and affirming the epistemic rights of the racially devalued, and decolonial options to allow the silences to build arguments to confront those who take ‘originality’ as the ultimate criterion for the final judgment.1

# Links

## Link – Cuba

#### **Expanding globalization to Cuba is part of an imperial strategy to displace revolutionary potential in Cuba. The outcome of the expansion of globalization is environmental destruction and inequality.**

Bliss 2005 (Dr. Susan Bliss: Director of Global Education, 7/5/2005, “Sustainability of Modern Cuba’s post revolution globalisation process”,)

Globalisation is not a new phenomenon in Cuba, evolving from the 16th century with the first expansion of European capitalism and accelerating from 1870-1914 with increased transport of goods. But while the world became more globalized driven by falling trade barriers (1950-1980) and deregulation of financial institutions (1980s) Cuba experienced restricted globalisation because of US imposed sanctions (1960s- 2005). Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989, ushering in perestroika and glasnost, globalisation has threatened to engulf Cuba that has responded by developing a unique blend of both globalisation and localisation (glocalisation) emphasising heterogeneous development and cultural exclusiveness transforming the economy and society from late 19th century. Many Cubans still fervently adhere to strict egalitarian values of the revolution (Stokes, 2003) arguing that western, materialistic globalisation ignores its dysfunctional aspects, such as environmental degradation, loss of community, social inequality and needs to look at possible multiple, eclectic approaches to societal development (Toffler, 1990) for the development of a more sustainable, equitable future. For Castro, the global economy is an uneven playing field holding many dangers for small, developing countries, like Cuba, as it works towards a difficult blend of global market and restricted state and civil society economic management. For Cubans globalisation has a substantive meaning (transcontinental circuits of capital, trade and production) but an ideological use (neo-liberalism) that grew with the demise of the socialist bloc in early 1990s and had profound effects on the legitimacy of Cuban socialism, as an alternative to capitalism. Most Cuban socialists support anti-globalisation as they envisage the US as the main driving force advocating financial imperatives and the rule of the strong. In contrast Cubans believe it should be replaced with a socialist system that promotes equality and shared values of humanity and markets that are ‘free and fair’, equitably structured and immune from corporate power.

#### Cuban elites manipulate the plan to enjoin cuba to neoliberalism the alternative msut ethically refuse neoliberalism as inevitable in cuba

Perez 2012, Yenisel Rodriguez The Ideological Success of Neoliberalism in Cuba, april 29, 2012 <http://www.havanatimes.org/?p=68708#sthash.AH2iVn39.dpuf>

HAVANA TIMES, April 29 — The economic and social failure of neoliberalism is an established fact. In the economic sphere it has led the world into a deep crisis, while socially it has generated greater inequality than any previous economic model. These effects are reported daily by the official Cuban media. Despite this, we know that the Cuban government has affected a neoliberal shift in its reform policies. Nonetheless, even today it’s difficult to find a direct connection between the socioeconomic “reforms” implemented by the government and fundamentals of international neoliberalism. The similarities, which clearly exist, fail to form a definite pattern of neoliberal-style economic and social policy. This is why it’s so difficult to follow the economic moves of the political elite in their desperate retreat toward the deregulation of the economy. However at the ideological level, this complicity is apparent. It’s at this level that neoliberalism has become hegemonic in Cuba. The ideological foundations of neoliberalism have achieved a tremendous success in the sphere of the government on the island. The authorities have proclaimed the deregulation of Cuba’s economy as inevitable, as they quietly accept the consolidation of inequality as well as decreased social spending and the renunciation of full employment as a goal. These are basic principles of neoliberalism, ones reflected by measures which they say should guide economic policy over the times to come. The government is convinced that neoliberalism has won the ideological battle on the field of international relations, despite its economic and social failures. Because of this they are paving the way for a future of the radicalized application of its principles of economic deregulation and social inequality. Given this, the proposed real alternatives to the neoliberal model will remain the responsibility of the Cuban people and non-official social movements that are consolidating themselves across the country. Those on top will continue to sell out the country to the highest bidder, which will always be some empire at the world scale.

#### Capital expansion into cuba replicates a segregation of the Cuban population against the western voyeur

Julie Mazzei 2012 , Department of Political Science, Kent State University, USA, Negotiating domestic socialism with global capitalism: So-called tourist apartheid in Cuba, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Volume 45, Issues 1–2, March–June 2012, Pages 91–103, In Search of Legitimacy: Post-Soviet De Facto States Between Institutional Stabilization and Political Transformation

The expansion into the civilian economy, particularly capitalist components of it, and its oversight of joint ventures procured an enviable role for the FAR in the Cuban economy. Many assess that high ranking and retired members of the FAR have become a class of individuals with access to “jobs and privileges” not available to average Cubans, and that these individuals have “become the privileged interlocutors with foreign capital and perhaps an embryonic proto-capitalist class” ([Mujal-León and Buzón, 2008](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.ou.edu/science/article/pii/S0967067X12000049?np=y#bib43): 411–412).[Klepak (2005](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.ou.edu/science/article/pii/S0967067X12000049?np=y#bib31): 85) indicates that members of the FAR had access to goods via the TRDs or “*Tiendas de Recuperacion de Divisas*," or foreign currency recovery stores, also managed under the military system, that average Cubans did not, though he also indicates that the advantages while real are probably not extreme (91). [Aranda (2010](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.ou.edu/science/article/pii/S0967067X12000049?np=y#bib2): 206; [Mastrapa and Armando, 2000](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.ou.edu/science/article/pii/S0967067X12000049?np=y#bib36): 431; [Mora, 2004](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.ou.edu/science/article/pii/S0967067X12000049?np=y#bib42)) argues that the system has created a group of elite comparable to the “national and international bourgeoisie class that helps account for foreign capital and investment in the [Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism] regime…” One could conclude that the military as an institution and its leaders as individuals have generally benefited from the dual economy period. Thus in Cuba there is a dominant group in the military/party, but Cubans were not segregated from that dominant group (neither the military nor the party). This is not to say that the power elite in Cuba did not or do not continue to have privileges that “average” Cubans do not have; but this in and of itself does not constitute apartheid (and, in fact, can be seen in a range of different political systems, as “the 99%” occupying Wall St. might argue). In too many authoritarian regimes particularly, the state utilizes policies unquestionably debilitating for some members of their population, policies that repress dissent, restrict rights and outright oppress. Does this indicate a system of apartheid? Certainly it does not. Apartheid is a particular type of authoritarianism. Furthermore, as noted extensively above, apartheid is a particular form of segregation; not all segregation constitutes a system of apartheid. Segregation in Cuba did not separate the power elite from the “other,” defined by some identity-based collectivity, as in apartheid. Rather, Cubans were denied access to facilities reserved for a separate, unorganized, extra-state and powerless group: tourists. Segregation did not empower tourists, nor put them in a position of dominance over the prohibited group, as in an apartheid system. Indeed, tourists represented an additional actor not present in the apartheid system, an actor external to the domestic socio–economic and political equation. This is indicative that something quite different was actually at play.

#### Encouraging more foreign investment in Cuba will only increase poverty and massive social problems by increased exposure to the neoliberal market

Reyes 2000 [Hector Reyes, Cuba: The Crisis of State Capitalism, International Socialist Review Issue 11, Spring 2000, http://www.isreview.org/issues/11/cuba\_crisis.shtml]

Since the revolution, the U.S. has continuously attempted to undermine the Cuban state. The most recent act of economic sabotage, the 1995 Helms/Burton law—which penalizes countries and companies that do business in Cuba—confers on the U.S. president the prerogative to define what constitutes democracy in Cuba. Nothing could be more arrogant and hypocritical given the overt support the U.S. has provided to every kind of murderous dictator in Latin America, from Nicaragua’s Somoza to Chile’s Pinochet. This is why we celebrate the Cuban Revolution, because it gave U.S. imperialism a black eye—proving that it could be defeated in its own backyard. But defending Cuba against American domination is not the same as identifying with Castro’s regime. **Cuba’s crisis is not separate from the severe economic recession that currently affects nearly 40 percent of the world.** In country after country, the political parties traditionally associated with reforms—social democrats and liberals—have proven unwilling and incapable of effecting significant reforms. On the contrary, they have presided over extensive attacks on their working classes. **Cuba’s population is facing a situation similar, but much sharper, to that of workers in Britain, Germany and the U.S., who are suffering from drastic cuts in the welfare state**. The strategy of the guerrillas-turned-bureaucrats has always been playing the international market—a dead end for the Cuban working class. For in order for the Cuban economy to compete favorably in that market, continuous increases in productivity are demanded from its workers—in the form of longer working hours, speedups and lower wages. Even in their own terms, the bureaucracy’s goals of national development and of overcoming the dependence on sugar have failed wretchedly. There is a different road. It involves not playing the market, but fighting to end the international capitalist system that relies on that market. **Cuba’s working class needs to fight its struggle on two fronts simultaneously. One is to defend its living standards against the impositions of its ruling class organized in the CCP. The other is against U.S. imperialism**. Cuba’s fate has showed that there cannot be an island of “socialism” in a capitalist world. Even at its best, the conception of international revolution espoused by some revolutionaries in Cuba—such as Che Guevara—amounted to no more than a collection of nationalist revolutions that could come together to resist the policies of the advanced countries.59 That was in the 1960s. Such rhetoric has been abandoned by the Cuban leadership for many years. The liberation of the Cuban working class will come by means of a different strategy—through its own self-activity, defending its own interests and joining the workers of the world in a common fight to end the international system of capitalism, which causes misery in Cuba and imperialist siege and wars and destruction everywhere.

## Link – Mexico

#### Mexico-US economic engagement is the lynchpin and proving ground of neoliberalism – the affirmative aides the global success of neoliberal exploitation

Mexico Solidarity Network 2012 [Mexico- A neoliberal Experiment, http://www.mexicosolidarity.org/programs/alternativeeconomy/neoliberalism]

The United States and Mexico have been central to the development of the neoliberal model. We share a 2,000 mile border, the only place in the world where the Global North meets the South. The US-Mexico border is unique, and the relationship between the two nations is equally unique. In many ways, this geographic marriage represents the most important relationship in the world - a laboratory that is defining the neoliberal model. Three historical markers stand out as central to the development of neoliberalism: the establishment of free trade zones and maquiladoras in 1965, Structural Adjustment Programs initiated by the International Monetary Fund in 1982, and the signing of the North America Free Trade Agreement in 1994. The US-Mexico relationship has been the proving ground for the practical realities of the Washington consensus: production-for-export replacing production for internal consumption, the use of debt as a lever to force structural adjustment programs, loose investment rules that allow hot money to cross borders in seconds, and a trade agreement (read NAFTA) that is the model for a new legal framework that expands the rights of corporations at the expense of civil society. Experiments that "work," from the perspective of transnational capital (and all of the above-mentioned experiments "worked") are exported to other countries. This implies a complete restructuring of the economies, politics and cultures around the world, to make them consistent with the neoliberal vision. Nearly everything is on the table for reform: economic policy, public subsidies, social programs, industrial policy, government procurement, intellectual property rights, patents, banking and financial services, agricultural policy, foreign direct investment, energy policy, labor regulations, environmental protection, public education and health care - and the list goes on. Twenty-first century neoliberalism is a project for world domination, and the US and Mexico are at the center of the vortex.

#### The expansion of neoliberalism to mexico is touted according to rationales of pragmatism and inevitability which cover the history of violence from NAFTA, the plan is a liberal ploy to continue the economy

ROB URIE 2012 [Rob, artist and political economist in New York. Free Trade and Economic Imperialism Economic Progress Toward Ecological Suicide WEEKEND EDITION NOVEMBER 30-32, 2012]

Likewise, political ‘liberals’ have been the primary facilitators of the ascendancy of the radical right in both academia and politics. In academia liberals have functioned much like progressives in an earlier age, producing ‘reasoned’ rationales in their economics for economic imperialism. And in politics liberals play three essential roles: to insist political differences are matters of degree to be ‘worked through’ rather than the irreconcilable differences of competing interests; to derail meaningful political action until a ‘better time’ in the future that never arrives, and to claim the political center no matter how far the rightward march has taken it. In the dimensions of economics and the environment ‘reason,’ both academic and political, is producing unreasonable outcomes for most people. The ‘managed’ neo-liberalism of academic economics pays lip service to the looming catastrophe of global warming that its own radical capitalism produces. If economic ‘growth,’ as measured by traditional metrics like GDP (Gross Domestic Product), is desirable and it represents the output of industrial capitalism contributing to global warming, as it does, then ‘solutions’ to global warming are simply attempts to clean up the catastrophes and dislocations that capitalists and their academic apologists create. But as is becoming increasingly obvious, these catastrophes never get cleaned up. For example, about a decade after NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) was passed in the early 1990s [cheap American corn flooded Mexico and destroyed the peasant agriculture](http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/Mexico-s-corn-farmers-see-their-livelihoods-2515188.php) that had sustained millions of peasant farmers for generations. Their livelihoods destroyed, those ‘freed’ from the land went to work either in Maquiladoras, factories established by multi-national corporations in Mexico to exploit cheap labor, or migrated to the U.S. in search of work. Most of the corn exported to Mexico is ‘genetically modified’ and cross breeds (pollinates) with domestic strains to render the traditional food supply suspect. Subsequent U.S. policy diverted U.S. corn from the food supply to ethanol production causing its price to rise just as Wall Street began ‘financializing’ agriculture through dedicated investment in agricultural ‘commodities’ funds. The result was that people whose indigenous economies had been destroyed by cheap agricultural imports instantly faced starvation as the imported food that consumed most of their incomes became unaffordable. In the U.S. the ‘financial crisis’ and global recession caused by de-regulated finance was then exploited by cynical and / or ignorant politicians to scapegoat for domestic economic travails the displaced peasant farmers from Mexico who had come to the U.S. looking for work. The circumstances of these economic refugees thus diminished, many now feed the detention and deportation ‘industries’ as new and ever more intrusive ‘free-trade’ agreements are negotiated in secret and to the exclusion of those affected by them.

## Link – Venezuela

#### And the foundation of colonial politics in the Americas traces itself to Venezuela. The US and European governments used economic tools as policing mechanisms upon Venezuela. The Monroe Doctrine became emblematic of all engagement in the Americas. The US took a unilateral approach to controlling economic exchanges between Latin American nations and punished those who rebelled against its Imperial control.

Mignolo 01 [Walter D. Mignolo, Professor at Duke University, Coloniality at Large: The Western Hemisphere in the Colonial Horizon of Modernity]

If the idea of the "Western Hemisphere" found its moment of emergence in the independence of Creoles in both Americas, its moment of consolidation can be found almost a century later, after the Spanish-American War and during the presidency of Theodore Roosevelt, at the dawn of the twentieth century. If histories need a beginning, then **the history of the strong re-articulation of the idea of the Western Hemisphere in the twentieth century had its beginning in Venezuela** when armed forces from Germany and England [End Page 37] initiated a blockade to pressure for the payment of foreign debts. The Spanish-American War (1898) had been a war for the control of the seas and the Panama Canal against the threats of the well-established imperial nations of Western Europe, a danger that was repeated with the blockade against Venezuela. The intervention of Germany and England was a good moment to revive the call for autonomy for the "Western Hemisphere," which had lost strength in the years prior to and during the American Civil War. The fact that the blockade was against Venezuela created the conditions for the idea and ideology of the "Western Hemisphere" to be revived as not only a question of U.S. jurisdiction, but also of the jurisdiction of Latin American countries. The Argentinean Luís María Drago, Minister of Foreign Affairs, made the first step in that direction in December of 1902 (Whitaker 1954: 87-100).Whitaker proposes, in a broad outline, an interpretation of these years of international politics that helps us to understand the radical change in the imaginary of the modern/colonial world system that took place at the beginning of the twentieth century with the Rooseveltean reinterpretation of the idea of the "Western Hemisphere." According to Whitaker, Luís María Drago's proposed resolution to the embargo on Venezuela (now known as the "Drago Doctrine") was in reality a sort of "corollary" to the Monroe Doctrine from a multilateral perspective that involved, of course, all of the states of the Americas. Whitaker suggests that Drago's position was not well received in Washington because, among other things, the United States considered the Monroe Doctrine a doctrine of national politics and, indirectly, unilateral when applied to international relations. Contrary to U.S. views on the Monroe Doctrine, Drago interpreted it as a multilateral principle valid for the whole Western Hemisphere that could be executed in and from any part of the Americas. The second reason that Washington shunned the Drago Doctrine, according to Whitaker, was a consequence of the first: if, in fact, a corollary had been necessary to extend the effectivity of the Monroe Doctrine to international relations, this "corollary" should have come from Washington and not Argentina, or any part of Latin America, for that matter. This was, according to Whitaker, the road Washington followed when, in December of 1904, Roosevelt proposed his own "corollary" to the Monroe Doctrine. Although similar to Drago's proposal, Roosevelt's had important [End Page 38] differences. Whitaker enumerates the following points of similarity: (a) both "corollaries" were designed to solve the same problem (European intervention in the Americas) and were based on the same premises (the Monroe Doctrine and the idea of the Western Hemisphere); (b) both "corollaries" proposed to solve the problem through an exception to international law in favor of promoting the Western Hemisphere; and (c) both proposed to achieve this solution through an "American policy pronouncement, not through a universally agreed amendment to international law" (Whitaker 1954: 100). The differences, however, were what reoriented the configuration of the new world order: the "ascent" of one neocolonial or postcolonial country to the group of imperial nation-states—a change of no small measure in the imaginary and structure of the modern/colonial world. The differences between Roosevelt and Drago, according to Whitaker, are found in the manner of implementing the new international politics. Roosevelt proposed to do it unilaterally, from the United States, while Drago proposed a multilateral action, which would be democratic and inter-American. The results of Roosevelt's "corollary" are very different from what could be imagined to have happened if the Drago Doctrine had been implemented. However, Roosevelt claimed for America the monopoly of rights of the administration of autonomy and democracy in the Western Hemisphere (Whitaker 1954: 100). The Monroe Doctrine, rearticulated with the idea of the "Western Hemisphere," introduced a fundamental change in the configuration of the modern/colonial world and the imaginary of modernity/coloniality. Whitaker's conclusion on this chapter of the modern/colonial world is apt: "As a result [of the implementation of the "Roosevelt corollary" instead of the "Drago corollary"] the leader in Washington and those in Western Europe came to understand each other better and better as time went on. The same development, however, widened the already considerable gap between Anglo-Saxon America and Latin America" (Whitaker 1954: 107).

## Link – Mexico Immigration (Borderlands)

#### The US separated indigenous persons from their homeland and then created conditions and challenges to return. Immigration is both necessitated by conditions created by the US and exploited by US companies.

#### **Anzaldua 1987 [Gloria Anzaldua, Professor of Chicana Cultural Theory, Borderlands/La Frontera: The New Mestiza, published 1987]**

La travesia. For many mexicanos del otro lado, the choice is to stay in Mexico and starve or move north and live. Dicen que cada mexicano siempre suena de la conquista en los brazos de cuatro gringas rubias, la conquista del pals poderoso del norte, los Estados Unidos. En cada Cbicano y mexicano vive el mito del tesoro territorial perdido. North Americans call this return to the homeland the silent invasion. "A la cueva volverlan" -EI Puma en la cancion '''Amalia'' South of the border, called North America's rubbish dump by Chicanos, mexicanos congregate in the plazas to talk about the best way to cross. Smugglers, coyotes, pasadores, enganchadores approach these people or are sought out by them. "¿Que diam muchachos a echarsela de moiado?" "Now among the alien gods with weapons of magic am I." -Navajo protection song, sung when going into battle. We have a tradition of migration, a tradition of long walks. Today we are witnessing la migracion de los pueblos mexicanos, the return odyssey to the historical, mythological, Aztlan. This time, the traffic is from south to north. El retorno to the promised land first began with the Indians from the interior of Mexico and the mestizos that came with the conquistadores in the 1500’s. Immigration continued in the next three centuries, and, in this century, it continued with the braceros who helped to build our railroads and who picked our fruit. Today thousands of Mexicans are crossing the border legally and illegally; ten million people without documents have returned to the Southwest. Faceless, nameless, invisible, taunted with "Hey cucaracho" (cockroach). Trembling with fear, yet filled with courage, a courage born of desperation. Barefoot and uneducated, Mexicans with hands like boot soles gather at night by the river where two worlds merge creating what Reagan calls a frontline, a war zone. The convergence has created a shock Culture, a border culture, a third country, a closed country. Without benefit of bridges, the "mojados" (wetbacks) float on inflatable rafts across el rio Grande, or wade or swim across naked, clutching their clothes aver their heads. Holding onto the grass, they pull themselves along the banks, with a prayer to Virgen de Guadalupe on their lips: Ay virgencita morena,. mi madrecita, dame tu bendicion. The Border Patrol hides behind the local McDonalds on the outskirts of Brownsville, Texas or some other border town. They set traps around the river beds beneath the bridge. 14 Hunters in army-green uniforms stalk and track these economic refugees by the powerful night vision of electronic sensing devices planted in the ground or mounted on Border Patrol vans. Cornered by flashlights, frisked while their arms stretch over their heads" los mojados are handcuffed, locked in jeeps, and then kicked back across the border. One out of every three is caught. Some return to enact their rite of passage as many as three times a day. Some of those who make it across undetected fall prey to Mexican robbers such as those in Smugglers' Canyon on the American side of the border near Tijuana. As refugees in a homeland that does not want them, many find a welcome hand holding out only suffering, pain, and ignoble death. Those who make it past the checking points of the Border Patrol find themselves in the midst of 150 years of racism in Chicano barrios in the Southwest and in big northern cities. Living in a no-man's-borderland, caught between being treated as criminal and being able to eat, between resistance and deportation, the illegal refugees are some of the poorest and the most exploited of any people in the U.S. It is illegal for Mexicans to work without green cards. But big farming combines, farm bosses and smugglers who bring them in make money off the "wetbacks'" labor-they don't have to pay federal minimum wages, or ensure adequate housing or sanitary conditions. The Mexican woman is especially at risk. Often the coyote (smuggler) doesn't feed her for days or let her go to the bathroom. Often he rapes her or sells her into prostitution. She cannot call on county or state health or economic resources because she doesn't know English and she fears deportation. American employers are quick to take advantage of her helplessness. She can't go home. She's sold her house, her furniture, borrowed from friends in order to pay the coyote who charges her four or five thousand dollars to smuggle her to Chicago. She may work as a live-in maid for white, Chicano or Latino households for as little as $15 a week. Or work in the garment industry, do hotel work. Isolated and worried about her family back home, afraid of getting caught and deported, living with as many as fifteen people in one room, the mexicana suffers serious health problems. Se enferma de los nervios, de alta presion. La mojada, la mujerindocumentada" is doubly threatened in this country. Not only does she have to contend with sexual violence, but like all women, she is prey to a sense of physical helplessness. As a refugee, she leaves the familiar and safe homeground to venture into unknown and possibly dangerous terrain. This is her home this thin edge of barbwire

## Link – General

#### Latin America is regarded by the plan according to a historical binary that devalues Latin America and naturalizes western economics and power relationships over the recipient country

Taylor 2013 [Lucy, Department of International Politics, Aberystwyth University, Wales, UK, 2013, Southside-up: imagining IR through Latin America, <http://millenniumjournal.files.wordpress.com/2010/09/taylor-lucy-southside-up-imagining-ir-through-latin-america.doc>.

Let me return to the issue that I started with – the sense that Latin America is irrelevant to IR in its own right and appears as the object of US fears and/or as the subject of US interventions. On the one hand, the Americas are understood as a binary, divided by the Rio Grande. This split emerged during the mid-nineteenth century and was vocalised by the French intellectual Michel Chevalier. He drew on European understandings of themselves as being divided between the Latin, Catholic, southern, (poorer), countries and the Teutonic, Protestant, northern, (richer) countries[[1]](#footnote-1). This basic distinction was transposed onto the Americas, setting up a binary through which Canada is lumped in with the USA and the Caribbean is excised. This sense of a binary in the Americas has been astonishingly enduring; the role of Latin America is to act as an ‘other’ and it plays a pivotal role in the making of US identity through imperialism. Yet on the other hand, Latin America’s position in the global order is not as a ‘Third World other’ but rather as an extreme manifestation of the Occident, of Europe. This view was established at the outset, as Walter Mignolo explains: “During the sixteenth century, when ‘America’ became conceptualized as such by... intellectuals of the North..., it was implicit that America was neither the land of Shem (the Orient) nor the land of Ham (Africa) but the enlargement of the land of Japheth”[[2]](#footnote-2). This idea derived from the assumed superiority of the conquering classes who saw native Americans as being incapable of developing the full potential of the Americas, which legitimised their appropriation of the territory. Indeed, these supposedly primitive peoples were (and still are!) often considered to be more a part of the exploitable natural world than the human one[[3]](#footnote-3). The notion that it was the Europeans who ‘made’ the Americas (both north and south) is still an operational assumption and is one of the foundations of Manifest Destiny. This intriguing doubleness – European sameness/difference – lies at the ambiguous heart of the Americas, but it is much more plain to see in the South. This is partly because indigenous peoples are far more prominent – numerically and politically – in the South, but also because the extreme success of the USA makes it very hard to argue against as a model for the ‘good life’. Yet if we take the long view from 1492, and if we start our thinking about the Americas from the south, the USA begins to look very different. This in turn has some big implications for IR. The face which the US presents to the world is one of a reconciled and settled settler society and its economic and social ‘success’ justifies the right to pronounce on the political and economic fitness of countries, to set global policy agendas or to intervene, where deemed necessary. It is precisely because Latin America is the United States’ alter-ego – its self and other, its disreputable cousin – that it is a perfect foil for the US when looking from the top-down, making obvious the development, sophistication and success of the country. If we turn this relationship on its head, though, and look from the bottom-up, the southern Americas become ideally placed to parochialize the global hegemon, and to reveal the injustice, contingency and sheer *coloniality* of the USA[[4]](#footnote-4). Foregrounding the intimate connection between coloniality and modernity invites us to open the ‘hidden’ colonial side of the US, a place which not only had colonial relationships back then but also reflects colonial experiences right now*.*

#### The affirmative’s depiction of Latin America identifies the US acting upon a passive country framed around depictions of poor economics, drugs, or chaos as its savior. This threatening frame secures a violent relationship between the actors

Taylor 2013 [Lucy, Department of International Politics, Aberystwyth University, Wales, UK, 2013, Southside-up: imagining IR through Latin America, <http://millenniumjournal.files.wordpress.com/2010/09/taylor-lucy-southside-up-imagining-ir-through-latin-america.doc>.

I want to argue that Latin America is invisible to IR, and that taking the region seriously unsettles the discipline in two key ways, especially if we embrace an explicitly Latin American postcolonial perspective. Firstly, it places early colonial and slave experiences at the heart of international relationships. This questions IR’s enduring emphasis on state sovereignty and inter-state war by foregrounding what I call inter-polity relationships and recognising inter-polity struggles. Secondly, reading IR through Latin America – from the south-side up – gives us a different perspective on the USA, one which reveals its coloniality in the past, and (more importantly) in the present. I argue that the very special relationship between Latin America and the USA, so often understood as being simply imperialistic, might be thought of as a complex mix in which Latin America is both different and the same, both ‘other’ and ‘akin’. Recognizing this complex relationship opens new ways of thinking about the region – and international relations. It is intriguing that International Relations hardly talks about Latin America at all – be it conventional IR or indeed more postie or constructivist approaches[[5]](#footnote-5). Most coverage of the region is about the United States doing something to or in Latin America and such activities are framed either as a ‘legitimate security concerns’, or as reflecting a barely concealed imperialism. The contextual or historical work focuses on US interventions (such as Chile, Guatemala or Nicaragua) and Latin America is deployed in cautionary tales about issues such as economic instability, political corruption, violent societies and the drugs trade. Latin Americans also become international actors if they are migrants, but only if they attempt to set foot on US soil. These issues are mostly dealt with as being US foreign policy concerns and the impact on Latin Americans themselves is seldom considered. This emphasis on US actions and its foreign policy anxieties is on one level very understandable, given the prominence of the USA in global politics and its unerring assumption that it holds the position as regional leader. It is also perhaps explained by the dominance of US scholarship in IR more generally, and of US scholarship about Latin America in particular – this is their intellectual backyard as much as their geopolitical one[[6]](#footnote-6). Especially for conventional approaches to IR, Latin America’s importance lies in its position on the Whitehouse or CIA agenda and as such, it is mostly seen as a place of threat (or pity), as a caricature of barbaric danger, characterised by violence, terror, economic chaos, and drugs. In this way, Latin America is portrayed as a passive recipient of US actions, or if it is an agent, it is a dangerous one. The region is unnervingly dangerous because its threats are under-hand and not inter-state wars - one of the curious characteristics of the region is that remarkably few inter-state wars have taken place over the last 200 years. This renders Latin America invisible as an agent (because making wars or peace is a key-sign of agency for IR) yet visible as a shadowy, menacing presence. The region is therefore a place to be known about because it was feared, not as a place to warrant investigation on its own terms, a source of policy solutions or where significant and different knowledge might be generated. It seems that bad economics, corruption and demagoguery is what IR – or at least the conventional sort – is pre-programmed to take notice of. This makes it impossible for IR to ‘see’ Latin America, which in turn undermines its claim to make sense of the world.

## Link – Hispanophobia/Generic

#### **History has defined itself along a colonial matrix of power – Western Europe and Islamophobia gave way to the USA and Hispanophobia as the rising challenges of the 20th century. Racial divisions were categorized along a hierarchy of being that privileged white and Christian bodies over their brown or indigenous counterparts.**

Mignolo 2006 [Walter D. Mignolo, Professor of Cultural studies at Duke University, Islamophobia/Hispanophobia: The (Re)Conﬁguration of the Racial Imperial/Colonial Matrix, Human Architecture, 2006]

In the United States, the specter of Islam at a global scale has been accompanied by the rising specter of Hispanophobia. Interestingly enough, Samuel Huntington has been the ideologue that connected both in two inﬂuential books timely published. The ﬁrst one, that is more well-known, The Clash of Civilizations (1995), was published after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The second one, Who Are We? The Challenges of America’s National Identity (2004), was published after 9/11 which gave the U.S. an excuse to intensify the politics of national security. A chapter of Huntington’s second book was prepublished with the title “The Hispanic Challenge.” How are these two historical sequences and social imaginaries linked in the imperial global designs? Neither of the two historical sequences and social imaginaries are objective or “natural happenings” but invented and placed in a map of global designs. How then does the Western imperial imaginary manage to connect Islamophobia and Hispanophobia as a challenge (or a threat?) to the West and to the U.S. respectively? I suggest some answers to these questions in the following pages. There is a common history that links Western and Eastern Christians. The division between Rome and Constantinople, between Western and Eastern Christians, is well known in the history of Christianity. Eastern Christianity unfolded collectively in Greece, the Balkans, and Eastern Europe. Western Christians (or Christendom) were located in the territory that eventually became secular Europe. The differences between both were based on languages, theological principles, and political projects. Religious divisions and distinctions were complemented by ethnicity. The Slavic peoples are deﬁned by their linguistic attainment of the Slavic languages. They inhabited—since the 6th century, about a century before the emergence of Islam—what is today Central Europe, Eastern Europe, and the Balkans, while in the West Latin language became the trademark of Christianity and inhabitants’ ethnicity. Anglo-Saxons occupied the territories to the west of Slavic peoples. For the people inhabiting the northeast of the Mediterranean Sea (from Greece to Spain) there is not a single name but several: Hispania, Gaul, Italia (originally Vitalia). Thus, Western and Eastern Christians in religion and the variegated ethnicities that embraced Christianity in its various Eastern and Western versions all confronted the other religions of the book, Judaism and Islam

## Link – Economic Engagement

#### Economic engagement universalizes a colonizing epistemology that reinforces the hierarchy that perpetuates ways of knowing that privilege the white heterosexual male

Baker 2009 [Michael, [University of Rochester](http://rochester.academia.edu/), [Warner Graduate School of Education and Human Development](http://rochester.academia.edu/Departments/Warner_Graduate_School_of_Education_and_Human_Development), Graduate Student, Situating Modern Western Education within the Modern/colonial World System, Unpublished Paper ,June 2009 , academia.edu

This interpretation of modernity as intertwined with coloniality of power offers an original critique of the Eurocentric production of knowledge and subjectivity, global racial formation, and their interrelated links in the history of the world capitalist system. Modern epistemology and modern economic ideology are intertwined in the relation between a subject and an object, and the economical relation between a subject and its private property (Quijano, 1999). Western epistemology “runs parallel to the history of capitalism” (Mignolo, 2002, p. 78) and is complicit with racism, sexism, and universalism. The subject-object western epistemological model that organizes mentalities and lives in the modern world grew out of the historical process of colonial and economic dominance and has, in turn, provided an ideological justification for this dominance (Quijano, 2000; Dussel, 1993; Mignolo, 2000a). The philosophical foundation of Eurocentric modernity was built on the knowing subject that was constructed from the prototype of White, heterosexual, European male. This particular ethno-cultural way of knowing the world was universalized as the only or best way of being. Consequently, knowledges and experiences of all those who are *not* White, heterosexual, European men were and are excluded, unless they are willing and able to acculturate (Mignolo, 2005, p. 138). This Eurocentric conception of knowledge provides the powerful justification for assuming the inferiority of all other knowing subjects who are not White, heterosexual, male, and European (or of European descent) (Mignolo, 2005, p. 139). Coloniality essentially names the hegemony of European knowledge and being through the hierarchical incorporation of all other cultures into a Eurocentric cultural project. The incorporation of such diverse and heterogenous cultural histories into a single world dominated by Europe signified a cultural and intellectual intersubjective configuration equivalent to the articulation of all forms of labor control around capital, a configuration that established world capitalism. In effect, all the experiences, histories, resources, and cultural products ended up in one global order revolving around European or Western hegemony. Europe’s hegemony over the new model of global power concentrated all forms of the control of subjectivity, culture, and especially knowledge and the production of knowledge under its hegemony. (Quijano, 2008, pp. 188-189) Coloniality of power is thus a principle and strategy of control and domination that is constitutive of western modernity as a long series of political, economic, cultural and educational projects. “The concept of coloniality has opened up the re-construction and the restitution of silenced histories, repressed subjectivities, subalternized knowledges and languages performed by the Totality depicted under the names of modernity and rationality” (Mignolo, 2007, p. 451). The critique of coloniality must therefore entail the critique of its epistemic nucleus (Eurocentrism), that is, a critique of the type of knowledge that contributed to the legitimation of European colonial domination and its pretenses of universal validation. Understanding Eurocentrism within the history of its emergence in the sixteenth century calls forth the creative inclusion and integration of subaltern knowledges and corresponding ways of being in the post-Eurocentric curriculum. In summary, the *modern world-system* can thus be characterized in part as a structure of exploitation and domination, conceptualized and legitimized within the epistemic framework of Eurocentrism and the rhetoric of modernity. The history of the modern world-system has been in large part a history of the expansion of European states and peoples into the rest of the world. This has been an essential part of the construction of a capitalist world-economy. The expansion has involved, in most regions of the world, military conquest, economic exploitation, and massive injustices. Those who have led and profited most from this expansion have presented it to themselves and the world as justified on the grounds of the greater good that such expansion has had for the world’s population. The ususal argument is that the expansion has spread something variously called civilization, economic growth, and development, and/or progress. All of these words have been interpreted as expressions of universal values, encrusted in what is often called natural law. Therefore, it has been asserted that this expansion was not merely beneficial to humankind but also historically inevitable. The languge used to describe this activity has been sometimes theological and sometimes derived from a secular philosophical worldview. (Wallerstein, 2006, p. 1)

#### The plan is a continuation of ideological pushes to impose colonial violence upon countries designated as third world

Escobar 2004 [Arturo, Beyond the Third World: Imperial Globality, Global Coloniality, and Anti-Globalization Social Movements, Third world quarterly 2004. www.nd.edu/~druccio/Escobar.pdf‎]

1. At the level of imperial globality, novel types of coalitions, either regionally based (e.g., the Andean countries; West Africa) or networked according to other criteria (e.g., size, existence of a large technocratic elite and economic and technological basis; for instance, a coalition of some of the larger countries in the former Third World, even at the level of reformist elites vis à vis the excesses of imperial globality). By novel I mean complicating the nation-state and regional economies, for instance. Is it unthinkable to imagine, for instance, a pan-Andean confederation of autonomous regions drawn on cultural-ecological considerations, rather than traditional geo-political concerns? This would be a confederation without nation-states, of course. Given the current role of many states within imperial globality it is not unthinkable that the former Third World could be better off in a world without states, with the proviso that both local/regional and 19 meta-national forms of structuring and governance be created that avoid the most dreadful traps of the nation-state while creating new forms of protection and negotiation. 2. It is clear by now that the Argentinean crisis was caused not by insufficient integration into the global economy but rather because of an excess of it. Even dutifully following the neo-liberal advise of the IMF or homegrown economists did not save this important country from a profound crisis. Why can’t we dare to imagine the unaimaginable, that Argentina could have a better chance by stepping somewhat outside and beyond imperial globality, rather than staying fully within it? Can partial delinking –selective delinking and selective reengagement—offer an alternative path, perhaps at the level of world regions (e.g, Southern Cone), or network of world regions? This means that it would be possible to rethink the proposal of delinking introduced by Samir Amin in the 1970s to fit the new conditions.10 Needless to say, everything seems to militate against this possibility. The proposal for a Free Trade Area of the Americas (ALCA, as it is known in Latin America and FTAA as it is known in North America) is being pushed forward with considerable force by the United States and most Latin American leaders. And of course any country or region that dares to attempt a path of autonomy is bound to incur the ire of empire, risking military action. This is why opposition against ALCA is today indelibly linked to opposition against militarism by most activist organizations. These are just two examples of the kind of “macro” thinking that while not radical, could create better conditions for the struggle against imperial globality and global coloniality. If approached from this vantage point, they are likely to contribute to advance the idea that other worlds are possible. The social movements of the past decade are, in effect, a sign that this struggle is already under way. Imagining “after the Third World” could become a more integral part of the imaginary of these movements; this would involve, as we saw, imagining beyond modernity and the regimes of economy, war, coloniality, exploitation of people and nature, and social fascism it has brought about in its imperial global incarnation.

## Link – Trade

#### Trade is utilized by the Western powers to create financial dependency of other nations and force a colonial strategy upon those populations and embeds violence and racism in everyday political life.

Kanth 2005 [Rajani Kannepalli Kanth, Against Eurocentrism: A Transcendent Critique of Modernist Science, Society, and Morals 67-69]

The firearm, the printing press, paper, and the compass were to become the prime tools of Western domination of non-Western cultures; today, in the golden era of neoliberalist finance, one might add only commerce and credit—that is, trade and financial dependency—as the other set of allied mechanisms. The simple, if ironic, fact that all of these were originally non-European inventions must be a sobering thought to those prone to genuflect before the putative superiority, and originality, of modernist science. It might also be noted that the (putative) absence of a compass did not inhibit navigation on the part of several non-European peoples who engaged in explorations not of necessity confluent with the motives of trade and conquest. It was not a state of mind, nor a penchant for reflection, that furthered the rapid development of European natural science (although the entire effort was located within the metaphysical matrix of anthropocentrism) but rather dire industrial necessity in the context of desperate international, and internecine, rivalry and war, features that have but little changed in the modern period where most research that is amply funded is still of the strategic kind. If one but adds commercial greed, to industrial need, then we effectively sum up the driving ethos—the colossal strengths and weakness—of European science. Salutary to note, in this regard, that neither Vedic wisdom, wherein science and ethics were combined, nor Buddhist or Jain explorations in mathematics, were either provoked by, or were concomitants of, conquest and accumulation but bore a purity of ardor and endeavor that has simply no modernist European equivalent leastways in the classical period of the Enlightenment (this does not mean that the later post-Vedic tradition did not inculcate philosophy as statecraft.. Kautilya's Arthashastra, in that regard, compares favorably with, if long prior to, Machiavelli's ideas). However, the new scientific outlook of the Enlightenment was not engendered unopposed and had to fight it way over the back of older traditions of science that were far more hospitable to humbler social needs and necessities, that is, they were not driven solely by greed or power. Much as the ideas of liberalism triumphed over church ideology by virtue not of better argument or better evidence, contrary to modernist legend, but the power of better organized force (as instanced in the politics of Galileo in success, and the lost crusade of the great Paracelsus, in failure), the new sciences simply expelled the old arts and pushed them to the outer margins of existence. Superior force, organization, and iron discipline were the redoubtable tools of European mastery, but even they, in themselves, may not have sufficed to effect the supreme dominance that is visible today in all corners of the world (excepting China, which remains the least Europeanized of any modernist social formation) were this force not to be supplemented with a philosophy of domination that, to this day, has no pareil in the history of human endeavors. Non-European empires, faced with the European peril, had to learn the hard way that guns without arguments almost fail to fire altogether. Somewhere in the Renaissance, Europe possessed itself of such an inexorable ideology, a veritable manifest, of conquest of all things—and peoples. The very spirit of the ruling European (and his North-American counterparts) today is informed with this wantonly conquistadorean, carpetbagging, temper, still seeking gullible subjects cum consumers, wherever possible, still seeking to take without giving, to rule without consent, ready to cheat on treaties, renege on friends, and exact from the weak and the helpless. The craven U.S. invasion of Grenada, infamous act of state piracy apart, where the mightiest force on earth trampled on the poorest little island imaginable, and then awarded themselves a glittering gallery of medals—more than one medal each for every soldier, sailor, and marine landed (and many who never landed incidentally)—can convey but a very small appreciation of just how far from even the very simplest norms of morality European "civilization" has traversed in but a few centuries (equally linear and unbroken is the red line of infamy that connects the atrocities of the Europeans in Africa and the technology driven savagery of Americans in Vietnam). Indeed, the very word itself today has no readily agreed upon meaning or significance in modernist society—just as similarly, economics, the ruling logos of modernism, has no place for, and comprehension of, the idea of fairness or justice, terms which are literally meaningless within that discourse. With the destruction of normative ties, the social basis of morality erodes and becomes privatized (small wonder that the U.S. Supreme Court deems, with much relief, morality a local, community resource subject to local adjudications and alterations of fashioris). Morality, like ethics, becomes merely an option, among many choices, for the ordinary person, to be exercised when it involves the least cost to the practitioner; like faith, its close country cousin, it has become effectively dispensable, and quite sub-optimal, as a workable code for conduct. Once again, the United States (where bad guys win with a grim, degrading, monotony), the most degenerately advanced in these directions, is living testimony to the simple rectitude of these propositions, whose truth is confirmable by simple, direct observation alone.

## Link – Globalization/ILaw

#### Globalization and integration into global markets is expansion of the colonial project in which non-white populations are deemed backwards and justify colonial control.

Mignolo 2007 (Walter D., Department of Romance Studies, Duke University, “The geopolitics of knowledge and the colonial difference, “Coloniality: The Darker Side of Modernity,” antville.org, <http://m1.antville.org/static/m1/files/walter_mignolo_modernologies_eng.pdf>) RQ

Francisco de Vitoria is rightly celebrated mainly among Spanish and other Euro - pean scholars for being one of the fathers of international law. His treatise, Relectio de Indis is considered foundational in the history of the discipline. Central to Vitoria’s argument was the question of ius gentium (rights of the people or rights of nations). Ius gentium allowed Vitoria to put at the same level of humanity both Spaniards and Indians. He did not pay attention to the fact that by collapsing Quechuas, Aymaras, Nahuatls, Mayas, etc, under the label ‘Indians’ he was already stepping into a racial classification. So it was not difficult for Vitoria to slide smoothly into the second step of his argument: although equal to Spaniards in the domain of ius gentium , Vitoria concluded (or he knew it first and then argued it) Indians were sort of childish and needed the guidance and protection of Spaniards. At that moment Vitoria inserted the colonial difference (ontological and epistemic) into international law. The colonial difference operates by converting differences into values and establishing a hierarchy of human beings ontologically and epistemically. Ontologically, is assumed that there are inferior human beings. Epistemically, it is assumed that inferior human beings are rational and aesthetically deficient. 33 Legal scholar Anthony Anghie has provided an insightful analysis of the historical foundational moment of the colonial difference. 34 In a nutshell the argument is the following: Indians and Spaniards are equal in the face of natural law as both, by natural law, are endowed with ius gentium . In making this move, Vitoria prevented the Pope and divine law from legislating on human issues. However, once Vitoria established the distinction between ‘principes Christianos’ (as well as Castilians in general) and ‘los bárbaros’ (e.g., the anthropos ) on the other, and he made his best effort to balance his arguments based on the equality he attributed to both people by natural law and ius gentium , he turns into justifying Spaniard’s rights and limits toward ‘the barbarians’ to expropriate or not; to declare war or not; to govern or not. Communication and interaction between Christians and barbarians are one-sided: the barbarians have no say in whatever Vitoria said because barbarians were deprived from sovereignty even when they are recognised as equal per natural law and ius gentium. The move is foundational to the legal and philosophical constitution of modernity/coloniality and the principle of reasoning would be maintained through the centuries, modified in the vocabulary from barbarians to primitives, from primitives to communists, from communists to terrorists. 35 Thus orbis christianius , secular cosmopolitanism and economic globalism are names corresponding to different moments of the colonial order of power and distinct imperial leadership (from Spain to England to the United States). Anghie made three decisive points about Vitoria and the historical origins of international law that illuminate how modernity/coloniality are bound together and how salvation justifies oppression and violence. The first is ‘that Vitoria is concerned, not so much with the problem of order among sovereign states but the problem of order among societies belonging to two different cultural systems ’. 36 The second is that **the framework is there to regulate its violation. And when the violation occurs, then the creators and enforcers of the framework had a justi- fication to invade and use force to punish and expropriate the violator**. This logic was wonderfully rehearsed by John Locke in his Second Treatise on Government (1681). One can say that ‘coloniality’, in Vitoria, set the stage not only for international law but also for ‘modern and European’ conceptions of governmentality. It seems obvious that Locke did not get as much from Machiavelli as from the emergence of international law in the sixteenth century, and in the way that Vitoria, and his followers, settled to discuss both the question of ‘property’ and ‘governance’ in the interaction between Christians and the barbarians. 37 The third is that the ‘framework’ is not dictated by divine or natural law but by human interests, and in this case, the interests of Christian Castilian males. Thus, the ‘framework’ presupposes a very well located and singular locus of enunciation that, guarded by divine and natural law, it is presumed to be uni-versal. And on the other hand, the uni-versal and uni-lateral frame ‘includes’ the barbarians or Indians (a principle that is valid for all politics of inclusion we hear today) in their difference thus justifying any action Christians will take to tame them. The con - struction of the colonial difference goes hand in hand with the establishment of exteriority : exteriority is the place in which the outside (e.g., anthropos ) is invented in the process of creating the inside (e.g., humanitas ) to secure the safe space where the enunciator dwells. 38 Clearly, then, Vitoria’s work suggests that the conventional view that sover- eignty doctrine was developed in the West and then transferred to the non-European world is, in important respects, misleading. Sovereignty doctrine acquired its character through the colonial encounter . This is the darker history of sovereignty, which cannot be understood by any account of the doctrine that assumes the existence of sovereign states. Briefly stated: if modernity is a Western invention (as Giddens says), so too is coloniality. Therefore, it seems very difficult to overcome coloniality from a Western modern perspective. De-colonial arguments are pressing this blind spot in both right-wing and left-wing oriented arguments. 39

## Link – Terrorism

#### Western conceptions of globalization along with an attempt to rid the world of terrorists have created a vicious cycle by which terrorism becomes inevitable, thus reinforcing fascist violence, and making fundamentalism more prevalent

Shiva 2006 [Vandana, trained as a physicist and received her Ph.D. in philosophy from the University of Western Ontario, Canada, “Globalization, Terrorism and Vicious Cycles of Violence”]

Terror has become the code word of our times. We live in terror and fear: terror created either by the corporate hijack of our economies, resources and lives; or terror created by frustrated angry young men called terrorists who use the tools and logic of a terror system to try to pull it down while they actually reinforce it; or terror created by police states which morph all peace loving, democratic citizens into “terrorists” because these states themselves have morphed into corporate states that see their primary duty as the defence and protection of corrupt and greedy corporations and their illegitimate rights, rather than the protection of their citizens and the legitimate rights of people. Just a few years ago, the pundits of corporate globalization were telling us that globalization would herald an era of prosperity and peace. Instead, we have been thrown into unprecedented poverty and violence. The economic terrorism of corporate globalization, the political terrorism of fascist, corporate police states, and the cultural terrorism of fundamentalism and extremism feed on each other, creating vicious cycles of violence along with injustice and nonsustainability and fear. This paper is an attempt to understand how these vicious cycles are emerging and how we can create virtuous cycles of peace, hope, sustainability and justice. The “war against terror” declared in response to 9/11 was supposed to stop terrorist attacks. Instead, terrorism has increased worldwide. Bali and Moscow, Mombasa – every day there is news of new 9/11s. And smaller 9/11s have become routine. Attacks on US Targets in 2002 Nov. 24, Aqaba Pizza Hut set alight in Jordanian Red Sea resort Nov. 22, Dubai Gunman targets US military helicopter at Dubai’s al-Fujairah airport Nov. 21, Sidon US missionary Bonnie Penner killed in Southern Lebanon Nov. 21, Kuwait Two US soldiers shot while travelling near Camp Doha military base Nov. 20, Riyadh McDonald’s restaurant set ablaze near US airbase in Saudi Arabia’s Kharj province Nov. 13, Tripoli Bomb attacks on three American-style restaurants Nov. 12, Tripoli Bomb attacks on Pizza Hut restaurant in Northern Lebanon Oct. 28, Amman Gunmen kill US diplomat, Laurence Foley of the US Agency for International Development Oct. 8, Failaka One US marine killed and another injured by gunmen on Kuwaitian island Sept. 23, Beirut Small bomb in parking lot of McDonald’s restaurant May 9, Tripoli Explosion at Kentucky Fried Chicken restaurant in Lebanon.1 India, which lost two Prime Ministers to terrorism, has seen terrorism increase since 9/11. More than a million soldiers were posted on the border of Pakistan after a terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament on December 13, 2001. Thirteen persons, including five terrorists, were killed in the attack. Earlier, on October 1, 2001, soon after 9/11, twenty-two persons were killed and sixty injured when a Jaish-e-Mohammed suicide bomber blew himself up outside the regional parliament of Jammu and Kashmir State. On May 14, 2002, thirty people, mostly women and children were killed by terrorists at Kaluchak in Jammu. The police killed the attackers. On February 27, 2002, fifty-seven Hindu activists returning from the controversial Ayodhya temple on the Sabarmati Express died when the train compartment they were travelling in was torched at Godhra station in Gujarat. Over the next few months more than two thousand Muslims were brutally killed in Gujarat as a backlash. The killings continue. On September 24, 2002, two terrorists stormed into Akshardham, the Swaminarain temple in Gandhinagar, the capital of Gujarat. Twenty-nine people, including four children and their security personnel, were killed. All temples in India were subsequently put under strict security. On November 3, 2002, the eve of India’s festival of lights which celebrates the victory of Ram over Ravana in the epic Ramayana, two terrorists were killed in an encounter in the largest new shopping plaza, Ansal Plaza in India’s capital. On November 22, 2002, two suicide bombers killed six security personnel and injured nine at a Central Reserve Police Force Formation in Srinagar. On November 24, 2002, militants attacked the Raghunath temple in Jammu killing nine persons and injuring forty-two. Another terrorist attack was simultaneously launched at the Shivalaya Mandir, a few hundred metres away from the Raghunath temple. How did the land of Buddha, Mahavir and Gandhi get to be labelled the “most dangerous place on earth”? How did the cradle of creeds based on compassion, inclusiveness and peace become the land of hatred, exclusion and potential nuclear war? How did a civilization based on diversity mutate into militarized monocultures? There are no one-dimensional explanations for this tectonic transformation. But three forms of violence have converged in space and time in the Indian subcontinent: the violence of globalization, the violence of a global war, and the violence unleashed by a politics of fragmented and fundamentalist identities. Globalization is forging globally shaped, narrow nationalist identities, whilst national sovereignty and economic democracy are destroyed. Fundamentalism and terrorism are the other side of the globalization coin. The eruption of violence in India, the land of peace, is a product of the lethal mix of free trade and globalization – resulting in the impoverishment and vulnerability of the ordinary people and the death of economic democracy – and the rise of fragmenting politics based on fundamentalist ideologies, which both feed on people’s insecurities and divert political energies from the search for justice, basic needs and equality to a politics of hatred and war. The global war against terror unleashed since 9/11 – with the backdrop of the “crusades” and the “clash of civilizations” – has also contributed to the spread of the virus of hatred. Violence, war and genocide have been made the norm as corporate globalization is aided by the globalization of fascism. Fundamentalist Hindutva has gained support from the global war against terror to define Muslims as the “enemy”. As the General Secretary of the World Hindu Council, Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP), stated, “It is necessary for India, Jews and the Western world to come together and fight Islamic militants*.*”2 However, this construction removes Muslims from their home in India and treats them all as potential terrorists. 9/11 and the response to it have reshaped the contours of India’s politics and culture. They have allowed the emergence of new fascistic tendencies emboldened by the global war against terror and the criminalization of all Muslims.

#### Coloniality entails the era past colonialism that uses threats of terror to justify expansion and economic control

Escobar 2004 [Arturo, Beyond the Third World: Imperial Globality, Global Coloniality, and Anti-Globalization Social Movements, Third world quarterly 2004. www.nd.edu/~druccio/Escobar.pdf‎

Some partial conclusions: Coloniality incorporates colonialism and imperialism but goes beyond them; this is why coloniality did not end with the end of colonialism (formal independence of nation states), but was re-articulated in terms of the post-World War II imaginary of three worlds (which in turn replaced the previous articulations in terms of Occidentalism and Orientalism). Similarly, the “end of the Third World” entails a rearticulation of the coloniality of power and knowledge. As we have seen, this rearticulation takes the form of both imperial globality (new global link between economic and military power) and global coloniality (the emergent classificatory orders and forms of alterization that are replacing the Cold War order). The new coloniality regime is still difficult to discern. Race, class and ethnicity will continue to be important, but new, or newly prominent, areas of articulation come into existence, such as religion (and gender linked to it, especially in the case of Islamic societies, as we saw for the war on Afghanistan). However, the single most prominent vehicle of coloniality today seems to be the ambiguously drawn figure of the “terrorist.” Linked most forcefully to the Middle East, and thus to the immediate US oil and strategic interests in the region (vis à vis the European Union and Russia, on the one hand, and China and India in particular on the other, as the most formidable potential challengers), the imaginary of the terrorist can have a wide field of application (it has already been applied to Basque militants and Colombian guerrillas, for instance). Indeed, after 9/11, we are all potential terrorists, unless you are American, White, conservative Christian, and Republican –in actually or epistemically (that is, in mindset). This means that in seeking to overcome the myth of modernity, it is necessary to abandon the notion of the Third World as a particular articulation of that myth. Similarly, the problematic of social emancipation needs to be refracted through the lens of coloniality. Emancipation, as it was mentioned, needs to be de-Westernized (also the economy). If social fascism has become a permanent condition of imperial globality, emancipation has to deal with global coloniality. This means conceiving it from the perspective of the colonial difference. What does emancipation –or liberation, the preferred language of some of the MC authors-- mean when seen through the lens of coloniality, that is, beyond exclusion defined in social, economic and political terms? Finally, if not the third world, what? “Worlds and knowledges otherwise,” based on the politics of difference from the perspective of the coloniality of power, as we shall see in the final section. 7

## Link – Border Security

#### The questions of security are used to arouse emotional responses to justify the liberal democratic control of borders and immigration policy. The media sensationalization of the affirmative is the same analysis that justifies exclusion and xenophobia towards the foreign ‘other’

Vukov 2003 [Tamara, Concordia University in Canada, “Imagining Communities Through Immigration Policies : Governmental Regulation, Media Spectacles and the Affective Politics of National Borders”, International Journal of Cultural Studies 2003 6: 335]

A strict focus on political rationality and the governmental logics of policy discourse in much governmentality theory tends to neglect the affective dimensions of biopolitical regulation and its dispersion through media culture into the everyday common sense of national belonging. It is my contention in what follows that the affective dimensions of governance are crucial to the effective regulation of populations and the cohesion of politics with the social, particularly when questions of immigration and national boundaries are concerned. Governmentality theory suggests that the posing and dramatization of threats to the population serve a strategic role in the biopolitical interventions of state racism. However, such a strategic biopolitical process does not work through a strictly instrumental logic, a disembodied governmental rationality or a top-down process of mass persuasion. Political affect is central to the effective governmental mobilization of a sense of threat to the population. Furthermore, in contemporary liberal democratic nation states, the strategic mobilization of a sense of threat or other such affective processes cannot effectively take place outside of the mass media, particularly the news media. Mediatized threats that elicit strong affective responses are key to the ways in which media spectacles around immigration over the past 10 years have increasingly articulated immigration with criminality and terrorism. The social and political force of affect amplified through news mediacontributes to what Lawrence Grossberg calls affective epidemics (Grossberg, 1992). Affective epidemics of insecurity that proliferate through news media culture become crucial to the ways in which many states recuperate their regulatory practices and rationalize their policies (as witnessed in the US after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and during the French, Australian and Dutch electoral campaigns of 2002). As some of the recent work on affect in cultural studies claims, it is important to point out here that affect is not reducible to emotion (Massumi, 1996; Seigworth, 1999). Whereas emotions tend to refer to discrete states that are experienced as subjective moments of interiority, affect refers to a less subjective, asignifying set of resonances, sensations and intensities that circulate socially between bodies and accumulate to form a kind of backdrop or climate. Affect travels between and among bodies and populations; it is a process that cements the feel of everyday life. Affective epidemics emerge when specific resonances become particularly acute, attaining a heightened level or pitch and triggering an accelerated circulation among peoples, as occurs when media spectacles around insecurity irrupt. Indeed, media culture is a key site for the proliferation of affective epidemics because of the ways in which mass media constitute such a backdrop to daily life and because of the intensified circulation of affect that they facilitate. What can a sustained attention to affect bring to an analysis of governmentality? Affect is crucial to questions of governmentality because of its mobilizing social power, the force it carries in relation to the regulatory and structural rationalities of governance. Take, for instance, the current conjuncture in which so many liberal democratic states have adopted a position in which they need to be seen as being ‘tough’ on immigration and crime. While governmentality theory would tend to acknowledge that such biopolitical interventions by states rely on the existence of a sense of threat against which they can be seen to be securing their populations, a narrow focus on governmental rationalities and actions would be limited insofar as it took this sense of threat for granted. By insisting on the affective processes that circulate to sustain such a climate of insecurity, an analysis foregrounding affect might seek to trace how such a sense of threat has proliferated through the media, the discourses and social myths through which it has been represented and given meaning, how it has fueled particular policies, as well as the difficult task of formulating strategies to contest its recuperation for regressive governmental agendas. Attention to affect shifts the focus of analysis, on the one hand, to the ways in which governmental logics circulate in public culture through the mediation of immigration and population; and, reciprocally, to the governmentalization of affect itself. Such an approach also foregrounds and repositions media culture as a key site through which the affective dimensions of governmental policies and practices can be traced and analyzed. Indeed, immigration is central to the affective epidemics of security and insecurity that have become the focal points of media spectacles and governmental policy. The social and political force of affect resides in the way it is tied to what Grossberg calls popular ‘mattering maps’, the affective investments – from mood, to desire, to passion or will – that anchor people’s experiences in social and political formations. The ongoing irruption of media spectacles around migration speaks to the ways in which immigration evokes strong political affect around commonsense imaginings of national belonging, of who should be included and excluded in the national community. The affective amplification that news media discourses engage in (what Hall et al. [1978] call the ‘amplification spiral’) plays a crucial role in articulating immigration, criminality and fear together by means of affective resonance. Like many nations, Canada’s longstanding tradition of media spectacles around immigration dates back to historical media and cultural ‘panics’ around so-called undesirable immigrants, such as the landing of the Komogata Maru in 1914 off the coast of British Columbia (Kelley and Trebilcock, 1998: 150–2). At the same time, xenophilic media spectacles frame immigration as crucial to the nation and the governmentality of population historically (as a settler nation of immigrants), economically and for future population growth. In settler nations such as Canada, two prominent sets of public articulations of the nation and its boundaries emerge in the movement between affective epidemics around immigration and population in news media culture and the governmentality of immigration policy. In the first instance, a sexualized vision of immigration is posed as key to the life of the population and population growth (including the economy). At the same time, in the second instance, immigration is posed as a threat to the population that must be continually regulated and contained through the monitoring of security, health, sexuality and race and ethnicity. This tension underlies the oscillation in settler nations between a xenophilic, pro-immigration discourse of economic nationalism and population growth and a xenophobic, anti-immigrant cultural nationalism.4 These two articulations play a decisive role in the organization and regulation of the discursive categories of Canadian immigration policy and immigrant selection, particularly in the ways that they are racialized and sexualized. While appearing on the surface to offer contradictory responses to the desirability of immigration in terms of generosity and/or exclusion, such xenophilic and xenophobic articulations are mutually informing facets of a common policy discourse that seeks to select, regulate and produce the population for the good of the nation.

#### The focus on ports replicates legal codificiations of identities through inspection – strengthening ports becomes an apparatus for managing populations

Heyman 2004 [Josiah, department of Sociology and Anthropology, University of Texas, El Paso, Ports of Entry as Nodes in the World System, Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power, 11:3, 303-327]

When people move through ports, legal identifications are affirmed, applied, or rejected through a bureaucratic–police process called “inspection.” Inspection re- sembles Foucaldian “surveillance,” though it is not necessarily all-encompassing and effective in internal disciplining (Heyman 1999a). Rather, ports should be understood in the context of the interplay of government officers and active popu- laces. As Alan Smart has written for the pairing of state law enforcement and ille- gal practices, “we need to work from both ends simultaneously and hope that we manage to connect up in the middle” (1999: 100). Thus, in analyzing inspections, I distinguish “identifications” imposed from outside from self-assumed “identi- ties” (Heyman 2001: 130). Inspections concentrate tremendous complexity into a short moment of interaction. Understanding how inspectors and entrants orches- trate these complicated actions demands close ethnographic attention, but repays it with great insights into the making and regulation of mobility. People enter land ports in two ways, on foot and as the driver and passengers in cars. There are differences in how ports handle these two kinds of entrants, but I will concentrate on crucial elements of inspection found in both cases. The first meeting of entrant with state officer is called, not surprisingly, “primary inspec- tion.” The decision at primary is whether people and vehicles can directly proceed into the national interior or are sent to a waiting area to the side of the exit for more extended “secondary inspections.” At the latter, definite identifications are made, from admission to rejection or even arrest and prosecution. Primary inspections at this border include both examination of goods (customs functions) and people (immigration functions) and inspectors from the two federal agencies (the Cus- toms Service and the INS1) are cross-designated to share responsibility (these roles bifurcate in the secondary area). Primary inspectors make decisions under amaz- ingly tight time constraints. The management yardstick for busy ports such as El Paso or San Ysidro, which are under “elevated threat advisory” (the current nor- mal condition), is one vehicle cleared every thirty seconds on average. Although periodic “high” alert conditions dilate this time standard (e.g., by requiring physi- cal examination of at least one compartment per vehicle), there are countervailing pressures to speed up traffic clearance under normal circumstances, including the negative health and safety effects of backed-up traffic and the cross-border tour- ism, retail, and manufacturing coalitions that pressure port management to facili- tate border crossing (see Heyman 1999b on local political contexts of ports). Al- though ambiguous cases can be sent to secondary, in busy ports secondary areas become overcrowded with referrals, so there is constant verbal feedback on the availability of secondary space to primary inspectors. Hence, there is no substitute for snap judgments at primary. The problem for inspectors is that they have to make judgments at one restricted place and time about personal and legal situations ramifying backward and for- ward in time and space. For example, a person speaking English with a heavy Spanish accent declared that he was a United States citizen, returning from visit- ing his mother in Agua Prieta, Sonora, and that his residence was south Phoenix. On moving from primary to secondary, where he was questioned in detail, he indi- cated that he was born in the United States, moved with his parents to Mexico in his early childhood, and returned to the United States to live with an older sister as a fifteen-year-old, where he attended high school for two years before dropping out to work on a gardening crew. The question at stake was whether he actually was a United States citizen by birth with every right to return to his home and job in Phoenix or was making a false claim to United States citizenship. There is no definitive identification for United States citizenship, no national United States identity card, so the admission process involves a contested set of inferences about this person’s past (why he spoke English, but very poorly; why he was familiar with a high school in Phoenix) and his activities and societal involvements in two nations beyond that observable in the port itself (why he was in Sonora during the Christmas period, what rights he had or did not have to be working on a gardening crew in Arizona). He was admitted from secondary, in the space of two minutes, on the basis of his familiarity with the Phoenix high school, a reasonable and prob- ably fair but by no means certain decision. We will find crucial the means by which such decisions are made, the contexts that govern these means, the aggre- gate pattern of such decisions, and the accumulated national and world-systemic impacts of that aggregated mass of snap decisions.

## Link – Econ

#### The discourse of development and economic growth is embedded in the universal rationality of economics. These theories of science are used to shape policies that assume there is a ‘knowledge gap’ between cultures.

Elabdin in 2004 [Eiman, Associate Professor and Chair of Economics @ Franklin & Marshall College, Postcolonialism Meets Economics, edited by Eiman Elabdin and S Charusheela 30-31]

The problem of knowledge has been the object of intense reflection in the past half century. Here, I am not concerned with the nature of knowledge itself but with the role of economics (steeped in the modernist construc­tion of knowledge as universal truth, rational, instrumental, and, in a way, exclusive to Western modernity) in producing the subaltern subjectivity of underdevelopment and lack of epistemic authority.18 The question of knowledge, which underwrites both the first and second tasks of post-colonialism, is: How does the postcolonial secure sufficient epistemic authority to write its own histories and to construct its own meanings? To begin to answer this question requires examining the very way in which economic knowledge has been configured so far, and how knowledge — as a body of human cognitive relations to the world — has been structured in ways that serve hegemonic cultural purposes. The implication of knowledge in systems of power is old, at least ever since Francis Bacon proclaimed that “[h]uman knowledge and human power meet in one, for where the cause is not known the effect cannot be produced” (Kramnick 1995: 39). Postcolonial critics have underscored the manner in which knowledge about certain societies was produced and effectively deployed as instrument of dominion over them (Said 1978). Africa was invented by the academic discourses of philosophy and anthro­pology that is, produced as a field of study based on European apprehen­sions about its place in History — recall Hegel — and the cognitive characteristics of its “savage mind” (see Mudimbe 1988). The contemporary exemplar of this complex of knowledge/power is the discourse on devel­opment, which has defined the conditions of possibility of all knowledge about former colonies since the formal end of the colonial era. Development as discourse offers both the ‘scientific’ grounds for theoretically placing postcolonial societies in pre-modernity, and the consequent policy prescriptions for their modernization thereof. Development not only embodies the historicist understanding of social change and the belief in the superiority of industrial culture, it also contains knowledge as its essential component since development, as a general phenomenon, entails a learning process. The problem of knowledge, however stipulated in economics — as literacy, the acquisition and mastery of technological skills, or simply ‘human capital’ — accounts for the ‘poverty’ of any given society. The cause and effect chain between knowl­edge and economic growth (see Lewis 1955, Rostow 1960, Ayres 1962, Rodney 1972) provides the scientific basis for an acceptable social theory. Accordingly, the development discourse presents knowledge as an obstacle to be surmounted by the ‘less developed’ and, at once, produces the knowledge that becomes their frame of reference for knowing their own selves.

## Link – Democracy

#### The focus on democracy fails to account for coloniality – the condition of possibility for colonial violence is the epistemic starting point of the aff – their democracy participates in new forms of imperialism

Conway and Singh 11 [Janet and Jakeet, Professor of Sociology at Brock University and Professor of Political Science at University of Toronto, “Radical Democracy in Global Perspective: notes from the pluriverse,” Third World Quarterly, Vol 32, Iss 4, May]

In the decade since the first World Social Forum in 2001 made it famous, the rallying cry of the global justice movement that ‘another world is possible’ has undergone a significant shift. Reflecting the influence of movements like the Zapatistas, a radical awareness of pluralism has been coupled with a widely shared desire for more popular democracy and a critique of all forms of *pensamientos únicos* to propel a pluralising of alternative visions. Many other worlds are possible, and the shared struggle is for a world in which many worlds fit. For the Zapatistas and the movements of the World Social Forum these are visions and struggles posed against the authoritarian imposition of neoliberal globalisation on every society in the world and against the new relations of imperialism it enacts. Arturo Escobar calls this process a ‘new US-based form of imperial globality, an economic–military–ideological order that subordinates regions, peoples, and economies world-wide’ One face of this imperial globality is the US-led drive to export Western-style liberal democracy as the only legitimate mode of governance globally and a precondition for recognition, aid and trade with the West (albeit highly selectively applied). As James Tully argues, ‘the dominant forms of representative democracy, self-determination and democratisation promoted through international law are not alternatives to imperialism, but, rather, the means through which informal imperialism operates against the wishes of the majority of the population of the post-colonial world’ The imbrication of democracy with the globalisation of Western capitalist modernity has enormously complicated efforts by scholars aligned with the global justice movements to theorise democracy in global perspective. Many critical theories of ‘global democracy’ unwittingly participate in the imperial globality to which Escobar refers when they fail to recognise the Western capitalist–modernist underpinnings of their proposals and knowledges, and their imbrication in furthering imperial domination of the Third and Fourth Worlds. Critical, diverse and radical discourses of democracy abound on the ground in oppositional movements around the world. Self-sufficiency, autonomy and territory are among the latter's new political demands, marking a significant sea-change in the terms of emancipatory politics as it has been imagined by oppositional movements arising within the modern West and contesting hegemony within the parameters of Western capitalist modernity. In this article we problematise one articulation of ‘radical democracy’ from within Western political theory and look towards alternative approaches to theorising democracy and difference in global perspective, grounded in an appreciation of the struggle of subaltern peoples' movements to defend their life spaces, their local economies and their ways of life. Our project is theoretically informed by the Latin American ‘modernity/coloniality’ perspective,[3](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2011.570029#EN0003) which holds that coloniality has been constitutive of the modern world system from its inception in 16th century European conquest of the Americas into the present. Coloniality is the constitutive underside of modernity and is a condition of its possibility; there is no modernity without coloniality. ‘Colonial difference’ is that which has been invalidated, shunned, suppressed, and thus been ‘disappeared’ from world history through the global hegemony of discourses centred on Western civilisation; it is, in other words, that which has been rendered inferior or invisible through the coloniality of power. Western-centric forms of knowledge have silenced the colonial other through their peculiar claims to universality, their systematic rejection of their own historical–geographical particularity, their discrediting of other knowledges as unscientific, and their narratives of the emergence of modernity as a process internal to Europe. This ‘epistemic ethnocentrism’, including of the left, makes inclusive political philosophies grounded solely in Western traditions virtually impossible.[4](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2011.570029#EN0004) Those working within this framework contend that solutions to the problems created by the modern/colonial world system cannot be generated strictly from within the traditions of Western knowledge nor, indeed, from within modernity.[5](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2011.570029#EN0005) The alternative knowledges and practices that carry some possibility of redressing conditions of coloniality are those which have been suppressed by modernity and which expose Western cosmologies and rationalities as limited, particular and geographically and historically specific. In this framework ‘colonial difference’ is an alternative standpoint and privileged basis for knowing. This is not a move to essentialise non-Western cultures but to recognise, in Escobar's words: [the] articulation of global forms of power with place-based worlds. In other words, there are practices of difference that remain in the exteriority (again, not outside) of the modern/colonial world system, incompletely conquered and transformed, if you wish, and also produced partly through long-standing place-based logics that are irreducible to capital and imperial globality.[6](http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01436597.2011.570029#EN0006)

#### Eurocentrism works through the spread of market ideals, whether they be neoliberal or socialist. Expansion of US market intervention into Latin America is part a colonial process meant to civilize and eradicate brown bodies present in Latin America.

Mignolo et al 2008 ( Marina Gržinić and Walter D., semiotician and professor at Duke University, USA, who has published extensively on semiotics and literary theory, and has worked on different aspects of the modern and colonial world, exploring concepts such as global coloniality, the geopolitics of knowledge, transmodernity and pluriversality, Marina Gržinić (interviewer), “DE-LINKING EPISTEMOLOGY FROM CAPITAL AND PLURI-VERSALITY – A CONVERSATION WITH WALTER MIGNOLO, part 2”, 2008, Interview transcript, <http://www.reartikulacija.org/?p=157>) RQ

The colonial matrix of power, or in a more common parlance, the expansion of Western civilization to control the economy, authority, gender and sexuality, subjectivity and knowledge, has been gradual since the 16th century, and has encountered many different local histories, languages, religions, economies, epistemologies etc. The responses to Western expansion were and are variegated. There are the promoters in different parts of the world of Western civilization (lately modeled on the US), there are anti-Westerns responses from manifestations to armed violence responding to the violence of Western incursion (in all the spheres mentioned above), and de-colonial. **De-colonial responses have, of necessity, to be founded on border epistemology**. Imagining that Western political economy and political theory (in their right or left versions) will be helpful in imagining and creating the future of, say, Bolivia or Iraq is, in my view, an Eurocentric illusion. When the government of Evo Morales, as well as Bolivian intellectuals (and also in Ecuador) talk about the decolonization of the state and of the economy, of the re-foundation of the state, they are already enacting border epistemology. That is to say, Western political theory and economy is there, has been there since the foundation of the republic. But Bolivia and Ecuador are colonial states, and not modern states like France or England. Thus, liberal democracy has a tradition in Bolivia, for sure. And also the ayllu (indigenous ways of life, political and economic organization, knowledge grounded in Aymara and Quechua language). There is no reason, except imperial reason, to argue that liberal democracy is the way to go and Indians have nothing to say. That said, it is not a question of going back to the past or of transforming Bolivia into a big ayllu (as Felipe Quispe, El Mallku would like to do). For the same reason, it is no longer sustainable to imagine Bolivia as big liberal-colonial state. Simultaneously, and since there is around 60% of indigenous population, it is no longer possible to have a liberal (even less neo-liberal) state. Just analyze this case: the conflict between Ronald Larsen (an American rancher in Bolivia) and the government of Evo Morales (http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/09/world/americas/09bolivia.html?pagewanted=all). This is not a conflict between liberals and Marxists. It is a conflict between liberal and ayllu democracy. Thus, border thinking (or epistemology) and inter-culturality implies the epistemic leadership of Indigenous epistemology in conflict with White (European descent) modern/colonial epistemology in which economy, politics, education, subjectivity, etc. is formulated and enacted.1 And let me offer another example of the inevitability of border epistemology as creative response to Western intrusion and the global reproduction of capitalism. Much has been written about Sun Yat-sen. He has been portrayed as pro-communist and pro-capitalist, as conservative and traditionalist, as close to the Jesuits, etc. No one thought that what Sun Yat-sen was doing was to think in the borders of Western liberalism and Marxism on the one hand, and Chinese long lasting history and civilization on the other. At the point he was thinking, it was – like in Bolivia – impossible and imaginable to pretend that China could go back to its past, before the Opium War. On the other hand, it was unthinkable also to get a blue print of liberalism or communism; to erase Chinese past and supplant it with the history of the Western world from Greece and Rome until the Western capitalist imperialism and the aftermath of Industrial Revolution. He had then to theorize by dwelling in the borders. He himself was not yet ready to imagine that it was possible to detach from the duality between theory and facts, so that he opted for facts instead of theory to frame and argue for the three principle of livelihood as a vision for China. Given space constraint here I just want to underline his “fundamental difference between the Principle of Livelihood and capitalism.” Since the principle of livelihood is also used within the economic principles of capitalist economy (e.g. profit at the expenses of life in genera l and not only human life), Sun Yat-sen’s Principle of Livelihood points toward a different direction. Like Evo Morales’ distinction between “buen vivir” and “vivir mejor que otros” (to live well rather than to live better than the other), Sun Yat-sen sees capitalism as a civilization of death: “The fundamental difference between the Principle of Livelihood and capitalism is this: capitalism makes profit its sole aim, while the Principle of Livelihood makes the nurture of the people its aim.” Unfortunately, it is not in this direction that the history of China, in the past 60 years, seems to be heading. The lesson seems to be that there is no way out of capitalism without de-linking from Western epistemology (in its variety) and from all pretense of achieving a “new abstract uni-versal” that will correct all the errors and limitations of previous ones and will be good for the planet and its six billions plus people. And the lesson seems to be also that the desire for wealth, accumulation and control is stronger than the desire for “vivir bien” and Sun Yat-sen’s principles of livelihood. The modest claim of de-colonial thinking is that without de-colonizing knowledge and being (e.g., non-consumerist subjectivities), reading Lenin and cheering the global multitude will not take as very far.

## Link – Environment

#### Universal truth claims about the environment ignore particular histories and particular epistemologies which privileges the material world and colonizes both people and the environment in the sake of perfection.

Molyneux and Steinberg 1995 [Maxine and Deborah Lynn, Mies and Shiva’s Ecofeminism: a new testament? Published Feminist Review Spring 1995 no. 49]

As the opening quote of this paper suggests, narratives are essential to the way we know and understand the world in which we live. That is, narratives describe the ontological structure of the world in which we live and provide guidelines for how we know that world. Epistemological and ontological foundations are often hidden in narratives. These hidden foundations within narratives deny differences and devalue the interrelated, ongoing process of all creation if the particularity of the narrative is forgotten. That is, their (ideal) epistemological claims lose touch with the (material) ontological context in which they are made. When knowledge claims no longer claim particularity, but universality, they deny their contextuality and claim a knowledge boundary beyond which no one can see and which must be assumed rather than critically engaged.2 They then lead to hegemonic knowledge claims that centralize knowledge, agency, and the capacity for truth in the claimer of an assertion.3 In other words, they idealize the material world and all life therein and colonize that world with their own truth claims.4 Both idealism and materialism are in this sense, “idealistic”: all reality is made to fit one, human, eco-socially located explanation. Or, put another way, both are reductionistic: they try to reduce all reality to a human idea(l). Contrarily, epistemological and ontological narratives that recognize the postfoundational, contextual nature of knowledge often recognize and respect differences and particularity precisely because they focus on the contexts of knowledge (thereby exposing “foundations” as partial rather than universal).5 These epistemologies are more conducive to knowledge claims about ontology that recognize agency (and thus value) in the other and lead to understandings of truth as a communicative and dialogical process (rather than a monological claim). That is, through a dialogical process, these claims remain open to the evolving material world and “others’” knowledge claims therein. They value both the material and the ideal aspects of life. Furthermore, by acknowledging the tentative nature between knowing and reality, these postfoundational knowledge claims require us to take responsibility for our knowledge assertions and our actions based on these knowledge assertions.6 These narratives, then, have implications for anthropology and ethics. Many postcolonial, feminist, mujerista, latina/o, womanist, and other critical discourses share in this form of epistemological/ontological respect of diversity and taking responsibility for knowledge claims. These critical discourses have uncovered the hidden assumptions about race, class, gender, in hegemonic narratives. Why, then, do I focus on social/ist ecofeminism?7 Social/ist ecofeminist epistemologies/ontologies inherently focus on the relationships among human beings (gender, race, class, etc.), and on the relationships between humans and the rest of the natural world. That is, they see humans as part of the rest of the natural world and not as an exception to the rest of the natural world. Although the ecofeminists whose work I examine can be grouped under the category of “social/ist” ecofeminism, they are by no means a homogeneous group of thinkers. What does unite them is a respect for the agential capacities and value of all life on the planet along with respect for the inherent diversity of life on the planet. Likewise, they claim that nature-culture, self-other, conscious-matter are co-constitutive, constructed categories. “A view of nature can be seen as a projection of human perceptions of self and society onto the cosmos. Conversely, theories about nature have historically been interpreted as containing implications about the way individuals or social groups behave or ought to behave.”8 For humans, there is no getting outside the textof nature-culture.9 These social/ist ecofeminists challenge foundationalism that asserts a one-to-one relationship between thought and reality, and nonfoundationalism that claims that all reality is made through language systems alone. “In layers of history, layers of biology, layers of natureculture, complexity is the name of our game.”10 Rather than a Platonic (and in many cases Christian) valuing of the ideal over the material or a physicalist reduction of the ideal to the material (which is also an idealism, if one considers that reality is idealmaterial), these ecofeminists assert that nature-culture, ideal-material, mindbody, spirit-flesh, are the starting points for reflection on the world in which we humans live. This is the exact type of starting point, for instance, that Rosemary Ruether suggests in the title (and content) of her book Gaia (earth/material) and God (ideal/prophetic).11 It is what I am referring to in this article as a social/ist ecofeminist eco-ontology. Far from being relativists, these ecofeminists argue that human beings must take responsibility for our beliefs about the world and the actions that ensue from those beliefs. Neither universality (a form of hyperidealism) nor relativity (also a form of hyperidealism) allow for this type of epistemic responsibility. “Relativism and totalization are both ‘god tricks’ promising vision from everywhere and nowhere equally and fully.”12 Both universality and relativity lead to a denial of the eco-social contextual subject. If one posits no “foundation,” then neither relativity nor universality makes any sense; rather, contextuality is the name of the game. For ecofeminists, the ecological is just as important as the social/historical when talking about epistemological locatedness: “There is no epistemic process to which we have access that is not a matter of embodiment within an ecological niche.”13

#### Attempts to correct for environmental catastrophe without taking into account colonial oppression risks serial policy failure and further ensures coloniality endures.

Smith 97 [Andy Smith, Ecofeminism through an anti-colonial framework, published in Ecofeminism: Women, Culture, Nature, pgs. 21-47]

For Native American women, sexism oppression often seems secondary to colonial oppression. As Lorelei Means states, We are American Indian women, in that order. We are oppressed, first and foremost, as American Indians, as peoples colonized by the United States of America, not as women. As Indians, we can never forget that. Our survival, the survival of every one of us­man, woman and child­as Indians depends on it. Decolonization is the agenda, the whole agenda, and until it is accomplished, it is the only agenda that counts for American Indians.5 Many Native women completely dismiss feminism in light of colonization.6 I do not necessarily see one oppression as more important than others. However, most Native women probably feel the impact of colonization on our everyday lives more than other forms of oppression. One reason why colonization seems to be the primary issue for Native women is that most forms of oppression did not exist in most Native societies prior to colonization.7 As Paula Gunn Allen and Annette Jaimes have shown, prior to colonization, Indian societies were not male dominated. Women served as spiritual, political, and military leaders. Many societies were matrilineal and matrilocal. Violence against women and children was unheard of. Although there existed at division of labor between women and men, women's labor and men's labor were accorded similar status. Environmental destruction also did not exist in Indian societies. As Winona LaDuke states, Traditionally, American Indian women were never subordinate to men. Or vice versa, for that matter. What native societies have always been about is achieving balance in all things, gender relations no less than any other. Nobody needs to tell us how to do it. We've had that all worked out for thousands for years. And, left to our own devices, that's exactly how we'd be living right now.8 With colonization begins the domination of women and the domination of nature. As Allen argues, subjugating Indian women was critical in our colonizers' efforts to subjugate Indian societies as a whole: "The assault on the system of woman power requires the replacing of a peaceful, nonpunitive, nonauthoritarian social system wherein women wield power by making social life easy and gentle with one based on child terrorization, male dominance and submission of women to male authority."9 Other women, particularly white women, may not experience colonization as a primary form of oppression to the degree that Native women do. However, I do believe it is essential that ecofeminist theory more seriously grapple with the issues of colonization, particularly the colonization of Native lands, in its analysis of oppression. One reason why this is necessary is because Native lands are the site of the most environmental destruction that takes place in this country. About 60 percent of the energy resources (i.e., coal, oil, uranium) in this country are on Indian land. 10 In addition, 100 percent of uranium production takes place on or near Indian land.11 In the areas where there is uranium mining, such as Four Corners and the Black Hills, Indian people face skyrocketing incidents of radiation poisoning and birth defects.12 Many Navajo traditionalists are speculating that the "mystery virus" that is afflicting people in Arizona may be related to the uranium tailings left by mining companies. They think that the uranium has poisoned rats in the area.13 Children growing up in this area are developing ovarian and testicular cancers at fifteen times the national average.14 Indian women on Pine Ridge experience a miscarriage rate six times higher than the national average.15 Native reservations are often targeted for toxic waste dumps, since companies do not have to meet the same EPA standards that they do on other lands.16 Over fifty reservations have been targeted for waste dumps.17 In addition, military and nuclear testing takes place on Native lands. For instance, there have been at least 650 nuclear explosions on Shoshone land at the Nevada test site. Fifty percent of the underground tests have leaked radiation into the atmosphere.18 At the historic People of Color Environmental Summit held in October 1991 in Washington, D.C., Native people from across the country reported the environmental destruction taking place on Indian lands through resource development. The Yakima people in Washington State stated that nuclear wastes coming from the Hanford nuclear reactor had been placed in such unstable containers that they were now leaking, and they believed that their underground water was contaminated. They said it would cost $150 billion to clean up these wastes,19 and plans were being made to relocate the wastes to a repository on Yucca Mountain, where the Shoshone live, at a cost of $3.25 billion. Yucca Mountain is on an active volcanic zone. Kiloton bombs are also exploded nearby, thus increasing the risks of radioactive leakage.20 The Inuit of Canada reported that NATO war exercises had been wreaking environmental havoc where they live. The 8,000 low­level flights that had already taken place over Inuit land had created so much noise from sonic booms that it had disrupted the wildlife and impaired the hearing of the Inuit. Furthermore, oil falling from the jets had poisoned the water supply. The Shoshone reported that low­level flying also takes place over their land. One man was killed when his horse threw him because it was frightened by the noise of the jets. They reported that the flying had been scheduled to take place over the cattle range until the Humane Society interceded, saying this would be inhumane treatment of the cattle. Consequently, the war exercises were redirected to take place over Indian people instead. The delegates all reported that they were having an exceedingly difficult time in getting the U.S. government to acknowledge the effects of radiation on their people, despite the obvious and widespread effects in the region. If the United States recognizes one case of radioactive poisoning, it will have to recognize thousands. 21 Because Native people suffer the brunt of environmental destruction, it is incumbent upon ecofeminist theorists to analyze colonization as a fundamental aspect of the domination of nature. This is true not just because we should all be concerned about the welfare of Native people but also because what befalls Native people will eventually affect everyone. Radiation will not stay nicely packaged on Indian land; it will eventually affect all of the land.

## Link - Biopolitics

#### Theories of Biopolitics are still centered on European understanding of the state and mechanisms of control. Decoloniality escapes the Eurocentric trap and provides a better knowledge base for developing countries to escape modernity.

Mignolo 2011 (Walter D., is William H. Wannamaker Professor of Literature and Romance Studies and Director of the Center for Global Studies and the Humanities, at Duke University, “Geopolitics of Sensing and Knowing On (De)Coloniality, Border Thinking, and Epistemic Disobedience,” eipcp.net, 2011, <http://eipcp.net/transversal/0112/mignolo/en>) RQ

(De)Coloniality**[[1]](http://eipcp.net/transversal/0112/mignolo/en/" \l "_ftn1)** is, in the first place, a concept whose point of origination was the Third World. Better yet, it emerged at the very moment in which the three world division was collapsing and the celebration of the end of history and a new world order was emerging. The nature of its impact was similar to the impact produced by the introduction of the concept of “biopolitics,” whose point of origination was Europe. Like its European counterpart, “coloniality” moved to the center of international debates in the non-European world as well as in “former Eastern Europe.” While “biopolitics” moved to center stage in “former Western Europe” (cfr., the European Union) and the United States, as well as among some intellectual minorities of the non-European followers of ideas that originated in Europe, but who adapt them to local circumstances, “coloniality” offers a needed sense of comfort to mainly people of color in developing countries, migrants and, in general, to a vast quantitative majority whose life experiences, long and short-term memories, languages and categories of thoughts are alienated to life experience, long and short-term memories, languages and categories of thought that brought about the concept of “biopolitics” to account for mechanisms of control and state regulations.[[2]](http://eipcp.net/transversal/0112/mignolo/en/" \l "_ftn2) **Modernity, postmodernity and altermodernity have their historical grounding in the Enlightenment and the French Revolution**. Decoloniality has its historical grounding in the Bandung Conference of 1955, in which 29 countries from Asia and Africa gathered. The main goal of the conference was to find a common ground and vision for the future that was neither capitalism nor communism. That way was “decolonization.” It was not “a third way” à la Giddens, but a delinking from the two major Western macro-narratives. The conference of the Non-Aligned countries followed suit in 1961, and took place in Belgrade. On that occasion, several Latin American countries joined forces with Asian and African countries. Frantz Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth was also published in 1961. Thus, the political and epistemic foundations of decoloniality had been established in fifty-five years. From then until now and from now to the future, it will be decoloniality all the way down – not as a new universal that presents itself as the right one that supersedes all the previous and existing ones, but as an option. By presenting itself as an option, the decolonial opens up a way of thinking that delinks from the chronologies of new epistemes or new paradigms (modern, postmodern, altermodern, Newtonian science, quantum theory, the theory of relativity, etc.). Epistemes and paradigms are not alien to decolonial thinking. They cannot be, but are no longer the point of reference and of epistemic legitimacy. While the Bandung Conference pronounced itself in the political terrain as neither capitalism nor communism but as decolonization, today, thinking decolonially is concerned with global equality and economic justice, but it also asserts that Western democracy and socialism are not the only two models to orient our thinking and our doing. Decolonial arguments promote the communal as another option next to capitalism and communism. In the spirit of Bandung, Aymara intellectual, Simon Yampara, makes clear that Aymaras are neither capitalist nor communist. They promote decolonial thinking and communal doing.[[3]](http://eipcp.net/transversal/0112/mignolo/en/" \l "_ftn3) Because decoloniality’s point of origination was the Third World, in its diversity of local histories and different times and Western imperial countries that first interfered with those local histories – be it in Tawantinsuyu in the sixteenth century, China in the nineteenth century or Iraq from the beginning of the twentieth (France and England) to the beginning of the twenty-first century (the US) – border thinking is the epistemic singularity of any decolonial project. Why? Because border epistemology is the epistemology of the *anthropoi,* who do not want to submit to *humanitas,* but at the same time cannot avoid it. Decoloniality and border thinking/sensing/doing are then strictly interconnected since decoloniality couldn’t be Cartesian or Marxian. In other words, decoloniality’s point of origination in the Third World connects to “immigrant consciousness” in Western Europe and the US today. “Immigrant consciousness” is located in the routes of dispersion of decolonial and border thinking.

# Impacts

## Impact – Militarism and Environment

#### **Crowding out indigenous knowledge is a violently dangerous proposition that risks extinction through militarism and environmental destruction**

Darder 2010 [Antonia Distinguished Professor of Education University of Illinois, Critical Pedagogy, Ecoliteracy, and Planetary Crisis, Preface]

The Western ethos of mastery and supremacy over nature has accompanied, to our detriment, the unrelenting expansion of capitalism and its unparalleled domination over all aspects of human life. This hegemonic worldview has been unmercifully imparted through a host of public policies and practices that conveniently gloss over gross inequalities as commonsensical necessities for democracy to bloom. As a consequence, the liberal democratic rhetoric of “we are all created equal” hardly begins to touch the international pervasiveness of racism, patriarchy, technocracy, and economic piracy by the West, all which have fostered the erosion of civil rights and the unprecedented ecological exploitation of societies, creating conditions that now threaten our peril, if we do not reverse directions. Cataclysmic disasters, such as Hurricane Katrina, are unfortunate testimonies to the danger of ignoring the warnings of the natural world, especially when coupled with egregious governmental neglect of impoverished people. Equally disturbing, is the manner in which ecological crisis is vulgarly exploited by unscrupulous and ruthless capitalists who see no problem with turning a profit off the backs of ailing and mourning oppressed populations of every species—whether they be victims of weather disasters, catastrophic illnesses, industrial pollution, or inhumane practices of incarceration. Ultimately, these constitute ecological calamities that speak to the inhumanity and tyranny of material profiteering, at the expense of precious life. The arrogance and exploitation of neoliberal values of consumption dishonor the contemporary suffering of poor and marginalized populations around the globe. Neoliberalism denies or simply mocks (“Drill baby drill!”) the interrelationship and delicate balance that exists between all living beings, including the body earth. In its stead, values of individualism, competition, privatization, and the “free market” systematically debase the ancient ecological knowledge of indigenous populations, who have, implicitly or explicitly, rejected the fabricated ethos of “progress and democracy” propagated by the West. In its consuming frenzy to gobble up the natural resources of the planet for its own hyperbolic quest for material domination, the exploitative nature of capitalism and its burgeoning technocracy has dangerously deepened the structures of social exclusion, through the destruction of the very biodiversity that has been key to our global survival for millennia. Kahn insists that this devastation of all species and the planet must be fully recognized and soberly critiqued. But he does not stop there. Alongside, he rightly argues for political principles of engagement for the construction of a critical ecopedagogy and ecoliteracy that is founded on economic redistribution, cultural and linguistic democracy, indigenous sovereignty, universal human rights, and a fundamental respect for all life. As such, Kahn seeks to bring us all back to a formidable relationship with the earth, one that is unquestionably rooted in an integral order of knowledge, imbued with physical, emotional, intellectual, and spiritual wisdom. Within the context of such an ecologically grounded epistemology, Kahn uncompromisingly argues that our organic relationship with the earth is also intimately tied to our struggles for cultural self-determination, environmental sustainability, social and material justice, and global peace. Through a carefully framed analysis of past disasters and current ecological crisis, Kahn issues an urgent call for a critical ecopedagogy that makes central explicit articulations of the ways in which societies construct ideological, political, and cultural systems, based on social structures and practices that can serve to promote ecological sustainability and biodiversity or, conversely, lead us down a disastrous path of unsustainability and extinction. In making his case, Kahn provides a grounded examination of the manner in which consuming capitalism manifests its repressive force throughout the globe, disrupting the very ecological order of knowledge essential to the planet’s sustainability. He offers an understanding of critical ecopedagogy and ecoliteracy that inherently critiques the history of Western civilizationand the anthropomorphic assumptions that sustain patriarchy and the subjugation of all subordinated living beings—assumptions that continue to inform traditional education discourses around the world. Kahn incisively demonstrates how a theory of multiple technoliteracies can be used to effectively critique the ecological corruption and destruction behind mainstream uses of technology and the media in the interest of the neoliberal marketplace. As such, his work points to the manner in which the sustainability rhetoric of mainstream environmentalism actually camouflages wretched neoliberal policies and practices that left unchecked hasten the annihilation of the globe’s ecosystem. True to its promise, the book cautions that any anti-hegemonic resistance movement that claims social justice, universal human rights, or global peace must contend forthrightly with the deteriorating ecological crisis at hand, as well as consider possible strategies and relationships that rupture the status quo and transform environmental conditions that threaten disaster. A failure to integrate ecological sustainability at the core of our political and pedagogical struggles for liberation, Kahn argues, is to blindly and misguidedly adhere to an anthropocentric worldview in which emancipatory dreams are deemed solely about human interests, without attention either to the health of the planet or to the well-being of all species with whom we walk the earth. Important to the contributions of this volume is the manner in which Kahn retains the criticality of the revolutionary project in his efforts to dialectically engage the theories of Paulo Freire and Ivan Illich, in ways that significantly pushes Freire’s work toward a more ecologically centered understanding of human liberation and that demonstrates Illich’s continued relevance on these matters. Key to his argument is the recognition of planetary sustainability as a vital and necessary critical pedagogical concern. In a thoughtful and effective manner (which has been long coming), Kahn counters spurious criticisms railed against the integrity of critical pedagogy and its proponents. Instead, he highlights both the radical underpinnings of critical theoretical principles and the historicity of its evolution— acknowledging both its significant contributions to the field, as well as its shortcomings in past articulations. Rather than simply echo denouncements of “beyond critical pedagogy,” Kahn intricately weaves possibilities drawn from Freire and Illich, neither essentializing the work of these theorists nor ignoring the problematic instances of their formulations. This discussion brings a mature and refreshing sense of both political grace and sober critique, which supports the passion of our pedagogical traditions, while simultaneously chastising our slowness in taking up the mantle of ecological responsibility. Through the reformulation of Herbert Marcuse’s contributions to critical theories of society, Kahn gives voice to a North American ecopedagogy that thoughtfully seizes the power of radical environmental activists, while simultaneously opposing and calling for the remaking of capitalist ecological practices, as a key component to any critical pedagogical project. By so doing, critical pedagogy is forcefully challenged to step up to the demands and needs of a world in ecological crisis, in the hopes of transforming itself into a counter-hegemonic resistance movement imbued with ecological consciousness, respect for beauty in all life, and a serious commitment to preserving the multifarious nature of our humanity. In the process, Kahn propels us beyond the debilitating theoretical posturing of the left in ways that liberate our political sensibilities and guide us toward alternative pedagogies of knowledge construction and new technopolitics of education necessary for our future sustainability. Similar to revolutionary ecologists before him, Kahn urges for a critical shift in our worldview from one that is dominated by the instrumentalization of ethnocentrism, xenophobia, militarism, and the fetishizing of all living functions, to one that acknowledges unapologetically and wholeheartedly the deep intimacy and organic connection at work in all forms of existence. In the spirit of Vandana Shiva’s “earth democracy,” Kahn also argues for a ecopedagogy that demands we “remove our blinders, imagine and create other possibilities,” reminding us that “Liberation in our genocidal times, is, first and foremost, the freedom to stay alive.”1 True to this dictum, Kahn unambiguously demands that the survival of the planet (and ourselves!) underscore our political and pedagogical decisions, despite the fact that seldom have questions of ecological concern been made central to the everyday lives of teachers and students or to the larger context of movement work, save for the liberal agenda of the Sierra Club or the wellmeaning discourse on population control for poor and racialized women, espoused by people of all ideological stripes. Perhaps, it is this “missing link” in the curriculum of both public schools and political movements that is most responsible for the historically uncritical and listless response to the global suffering of human beings subjected to imperial regimes of genocide, slavery, and colonialism. In truth, a deeper analysis exposes sharply a legacy that persists today in the shrouded values and attitudes of educators from the dominant class and culture who expect that all oppressed populations and living species should acquiesce to the dominion and hegemonic rule of the wealthy elite. It is precisely such a worldview of domination that perpetuates the extinction of whole species, as it does the cultural and linguistic destruction of peoples and nations outside of a “first-world” classification. As a consequence, our biodiversity is slipping away, despite scientific findings that clearly warn of the loss of hardiness and vitality to human life, as a direct consequence of the homogenization of our differences. It is equally ironic to note here how repression of the body itself is manifested within the capitalist fervor to commodify or colonize all forms of vital existence. Schools, unfortunately, are one of the most complicit institutions in the exercise of such ecological repression, generally carried out through the immobilization of the body and the subordination of our emotional nature, our sexual energies, and spiritual capacities. In response, Kahn eloquently argues for a critical ecopedagogy and ecoliteracy that supports teachers in engaging substantively students’ integral natures, in an effort to forge an emancipatory learning environment where all can thrive amid everyday concerns. As such, he makes clear that, although important, it is not enough to rely solely on abstract cognitive processes, where only the analysis of words and texts are privileged in the construction of knowledge. Such an educational process of estrangement functions to alienate and isolate students from the natural world around them, from themselves, and one another. This, unwittingly, serves to reinforce an anthropocentric reading of the world, which denies and disregards the wisdom and knowledge outside Western formulations. In contrast, an ecopedagogy that sustains life andcreativity is firmlygroundedin a material and social understanding of our interconnected organic existence, as a starting place for classroom practice and political strategies for reinventing the world. Also significant to Kahn’s notion of ecopedagogy is an engagement with the emancipatory insights and cultural knowledge of indigenous populations, given that the majority of the social and political problems facing us today are fundamentally rooted in mainstream social relations and material conditions that fuel authoritarianism, fragmentation, alienation, violence, and greed. Such anti-ecological dynamics are predicated on an ahistorical and uncritical view of life that enables the powerful to abdicate their collective responsibility to democratic ideals, while superimposing a technocratic and instrumental rationality that commodifies and objectifies all existence. Such a practice of education serves to warp or marginalize diverse indigenous knowledge and practices, by privileging repetitive and unimaginative curricula and fetishized methods. Anchored upon such a perspective of schooling, classroom curriculum socializes students into full-blown identities as entitled consuming masters and exploiters of the earth, rather than collective caretakers of the planet. In contrast, Kahn explores the inherent possibilities at work within indigenous knowledge and traditions, in ways that enhance our capacity to not only critique conditions of ecological crisis, but to consider ways in which non-Western societies and peoples have enacted ecologically sustaining practices within the everyday lives of their communities. He turns the false dominion of the West on its head, offering alternative ways of being that hold possibilities for the reconstruction of institutional culture, the transformation of how we view technology and science, and thus the reformulation of public policy. As critical educators and revolutionary activists across communities of difference, we are encouraged to turn to the wisdom of our own historical survival, in serious and sustained ways, in order to work toward the abandonment of colonizing values and practices that for centuries have denigrated our cultural ways and attempted to disable our life-sustaining capacities. Moreover, to contendeffectively with issues of racism, sexism, homophobia, disablism, and other forms of inequalities, a life-affirming ecological praxis is paramount. That is, one that encompasses a refusal to adhere to political, economic, and philosophical disconnections, which falsely separate humankind from those ecological dynamics thatshape local, global, regional, rural, and urban landscapes.Instead, static views of humanityand the planet, which inadvertently serve the commodifying interests of capital andits penchant to divide and conquer, are challenged and dismantled through an integral political solidarity of heart, mind, body, and spirit. Accordingly, a critical ecopedagogy must then encompass those philosophical principles that are at home with ambiguity, dissonance, difference, and heterogeneity, as an ever-present phenomenon. Such an ethos supports a world where crossspecies concerns are both commonplace and valued for their creative potential in the making of a truly democratic, just, and peaceful world.

## Impact - Racism

#### Colonial modernity is predicated upon racial differences that marks non-white knowledge as useless and crowds out effective local solutions.

Mignolo- 2010 (Walter D., Department of Romance Studies, Duke University, “The geopolitics of knowledge and the colonial difference,” Praxis Publica, October 2010, <http://praxispublica.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/WALTER-MIGNOLO-GEOPOLITICS-OF-KNOWLEDGE-DUKE-UNIVERSITY.pdf>) RQ

The irreducible colonial difference that I am trying to chart, starting from Dussel's dialogue with Vattimo, was also perceived by Robert Bernasconi in the challenge that African Philosophy puts forward to Continental Philosophy. Simply put, Bernasconi notes that "Western philosophy traps African philosophy in a double bind: either African philosophy is so similar to Western philosophy that it makes no distinctive contribution and effectively disappears; or it is so different that its credentials to be genuine philosophy will always be i n doubt (Bernasconi 1998, 188)." This double bind is the colonial difference and it creates the condition for what I have elsewhere called "border thinking". I have defined border thinking as an epistemology from a subaltern perspective. Although Bernascon i describes the phenomena in a different terminology, the problem we are dealing with here is the same. Furthermore, Bernasconi makes his point with the support of Afro - American philosopher Lucius Outlaw in an article entitled "African 'philosophy': decons tructive and reconstructive challenges". Emphasizing the sense in which Outlaw uses the concept of "deconstruction", Bernasconi at the same time underlines the limits of Derrida's deconstructive operation and the closure of Western metaphysics. Derrida, ac cording to Bernasconi, offers no space in which to ask the question about Chinese, Indian, and especially African philosophy. Latin and Anglo - American philosophy should be added to this. After a careful discussion of Derrida's philosophy, and pondering pos sible alternatives for the "extension" of deconstruction, Bernasconi concludes by saying: "...even after such revisions, it is not clear what contribution deconstruction could make to the contemporary dialogue between Western philosophy and African philosoph y" (1998, 187). Or, if a contribution could be foreseen, it has to be from the perspective that Outlaw appropriates and which "denaturalizes" deconstruction of Western metaphysics from inside (and maintains the totality, a la Derrida). That is to say, it h as to be a "deconstruction" from the "exteriority" of Western metaphysics, from the Walter D. Mignolo perspective of the double bind that Bernasconi detected in the interdependence (and power relations) between Western and African philosophy. However, if we invert the persp ective, we are located in a particular deconstructive strategy that I would rather name the "decolonization of philosophy" (or of any other branch of knowledge, natural sciences, social sciences, and the humanities). Such a displacement of perspective was already suggested by Moroccan philosopher Abdelkhebir Khatibi, which I have discussed at length elsewhere (Mignolo 1999a). However, certainly Bernasconi will concur with Khatibi in naming decolonization as the type of deconstructive operation proposed by O utlaw, thus maintaining and undoing the colonial difference from the colonial difference itself. "The existential dimension of African philosophy's challenge to Western philosophy in general and Continental philosophy in particular is located in the need to decolonize the mind. This task is at least as important for the colonizer as it is for the colonized. For Africans, decolonizing the mind takes place not only in facing the experience of colonialism, but also in recognizing the precolonial, which established the destructive importance of so - called ethnophilosophy (Bernasconi 1998, 191). The double bind requires also a double operation from the perspective of African philosophy: an appropriation of Western philosophy and at the same time a rejection of it grounded in the colonial difference. Bernasconi recognizes that these, however, are tasks and issues for African philosophers. What would be similar issues for a Continental philosopher? For Europeans, Bernasconi adds, "decolonizing the colonial mind nece ssitates an encounter with the colonized, where finally the European has the experience of being seen as judged by those they have denied. The extent to which European philosophy championed colonialism, and more particularly helped to justify it through a philosophy of history that privileged Europe, makes it apparent that such a decolonizing is an urgent task for European thought" (Bernasconi 1998, 192)

#### The Racialization of Africa and the Americas took place with no input from the persons involved. The colonial matrix of power rests upon its ability to categorize without consent and divide the world along broad sweeping lines with no regards for the individuality of cultures involved

Mignolo 2006 [Walter D. Mignolo, Professor of Cultural studies at Duke University, Islamophobia/Hispanophobia: The (Re)Conﬁguration of the Racial Imperial/Colonial Matrix, Human Architecture, 2006]

Thus, the point of departure of my argument is that current debates about whether “race” is an eighteenth and nineteenth-century discourse, or whether in the sixteenth century “caste” was the proper system of classiﬁcation, both assume that the classiﬁcations concocted by Renaissance men of letters or Enlightenment “philosophies” were universal. My point of departure is that the system of classiﬁcation and hierarchies during the Renaissance or during the Enlightenment was a local one in this precise sense: people in India, China, Ottoman, Tawantinsuyu, Anahuac, etc., certainly were part of the classiﬁcation but none of them, except Christian theologians, had any say in the classiﬁcation. The only possibility to those who did not participate in the imperial organization of knowledge was either to accept how they were classiﬁed or to reclassify themselves for their own pride but with little effect on the organization of world power that was at stake. Let me explain. Discourses of difference in the European Renaissance went hand in hand with discourses of fear.1 There is plenty of evidence about Christians in Spain but also in England. British travelers to the Hapsburg or Austro-Hungarian Empires expressed their strangeness and the discomfort vis-à-vis the Turks. The European Renaissance could be taken as a reference period in which several “empires” (a general name extended after the name of the Roman Emperor instead, for example, of Sultan or Tzar) coexisted; although the discourses of Christianity and later on of political theory and political economy emerged as the dominant imperial discourses of Western capitalist empires. Racism went hand in hand with the historical foundation of capitalism as we know it today. Take the Black Legend as a good and early example of the propagation of the Muslim “menace” from the Iberian Peninsula to the Atlantic countries, north of the Pyrenees. The Black Legend is, ﬁrst and foremost, an internal conﬂict in Europe and for that reason I will describe it as the imperial internal difference. But the Black Legend, initiated and propelled by England, shared with the Spaniards the Christian cosmology that distinguished itself from the Muslim, the Turks and the Russian Orthodox. That is, the Black Legend contributed to the reinforcement of an imperial divide that was already carried out by the Spanish Kingdom of Charles I and the Spanish Empire under Philip II. We all know it: in1492, the Moors and the Jews were prosecuted in the Iberian Peninsula; Indians were “discovered” in the New World and massive contingents of African slaves were transported through the Atlantic. The “discovery” of the New World posed a different problem for Western Christians dealing with Muslims, Jews and Turks: if Jews and Moors were classiﬁed according to their belief in the wrong God, Indians (and later on Black Africans), had to be classiﬁed assuming that they had no religions. Thus, the question of “purity of blood” acquired in the New World a meaning totally different from the one it had in the Iberian Peninsula. Nonetheless, the fact remains that with the double expulsion of Moors and Jews from the Iberian Peninsula, the New World brought a different dimension to the classiﬁcatory and hierarchical system. While in Spain Jews and Muslims identiﬁed themselves with those racialized labels, there were no “Indians” in the New World. To become “Indian” was a long and painful process for the diversity of peoples, the diversity of languages, and the diversity of memories and rituals from today’s Southern Chile to Canada. And there were no “Blacks” either. Africans transported to the new World from different regions of the continent had different languages, memories and religions, but now all of them became Blacks in the New World. In other words, whatever the system of classiﬁcation in the Iberian Peninsula and in the New World, that system of classiﬁcation was controlled by Christian Theology as the overarching and hegemonic frame of knowledge. Neither the “Turks,” nor the Mughal, nor the Christian Orthodox in Russia had any say in it—even less, of course, Indians and Blacks.

## Impact – Epistemic Violence

#### **Colonialism’s violence is not just physical violence, but a genocide of both the body and the mind through the erasure of non-European cultures.**

Mignolo and Tlostanova 9 [Walter D., Doctor of semiotics and literary theory, prof of decoloniality at Duke University, Madina, Doctor of literature and postcolonial studies, professor at People’s Friendship University of Russia, “Times for re-thinking, re-learning and networking, February, Interview, http://kristinabozic.wordpress.com/decolonization-interview/]

What if any is the difference between colonization and genocide? Prof Mignolo: There is a difference, though I never really thought of it. The first thing that comes to mind is that genocide is a consequence of colonialism. Another question is can this be claimed for all genocides? Prof Tlostanova: Holocaust, for example. Prof Mignolo: Ooh. Let’s start the other way round. One of the features of coloniality is its connection to economy based on dispensability of human life, which is seen as a commodity: you sell sugar or you sell slaves. Genocide means we do not care. Therefore, genocide is possible because certain human lives are dispensable. Iraqi lives are more dispensable than American lives. Holocaust, however was based on stripping human life of legal rights, as Hannah Arendt writes. So it was not about the dispensability of human life in terms of economy but it presented bareness of life in relation to the state and law. For white European bourgeoisie Christians the really horrible part of holocaust was not the crime itself but the fact that it was committed against white people using the technique Europe learned in its colonies. Economic dispensability of human life that build the system of the economy liberals and Marxists call capitalism came back on the level of the state. Jews were internally inferior. I will not say that all genocides have been a consequence of coloniality, but I would make these two connections. The third one could be Rwanda. There colonialists, especially of the second wave after the Enlightenment created the idea of national identity. Before there existed communities of faith, not of birth. Genocide there was therefore a consequence of conditions colonialists left behind. We could think of other genocides … How can we think Stalin’s genocide? Prof Tlostanova: I was just thinking about it. It was not framed in racial terms, though many scholars today question this. They ask if Stalin’s genocides were connected with people’s ethnic origins and race or only with class. There was no racial discourse in Soviet Union but crimes were often committed on racial grounds – nobody has ever put Russian in jail for nationalistic reasons while all other nationals were imprisoned, if their belief in the Soviet idea was not strong enough. I think it was based on race although it was masked as a class fight. Prof Mignolo: So there is the underlying notion of dispensability of human life as an economic category, while genocide on the level of the state also includes the idea of elimination of an enemy. Be it Hitler’s Aryan state or Stalin’s communist state. Prof Tlostanova: But Hitler tried to make Jews economically efficient as well. In concentration camps there was the McDonald’s logic – before Jews were killed they took everything of use and value from them – clothes, hair, teeth … Stalin made enemies build things, sometimes useless. They have built the Moscow State university. **What about the genocide as a tool for eradication of culture or religion?** Prof Mignolo: I think this in included in the notion of dispensability of the human life – be it organs or something else. Another thing is if these are used to present the enemy you want to eradicate. Islam or the criminal inside the society, or the Communists in the US during the Cold War. There seem to be two types of genocide – one motivated by economics – and here we do not have the notion of an enemy … it is just a tool. Prof Tlostanova: You do not kill on purpose, it is a consequence of use. Prof Mignolo: Yes, you have a horse to work or you have a slave to work. He is not your enemy – on the contrary, it is useful – it is a tool. You buy it, sell it, use it. A different kind of genocide is when you have to eradicate. However, eradication does not necessarily imply genocide. In colonial Peru there was eradication of ideology. They did not kill, they just converted to Christianity. They wanted to conquer souls. Prof Tlostanova: That is why I think coloniality is wider and deeper than genocide. You can leave people alive but you wipe everything out of their minds to put something else there. In a way this is also a genocide – you leave them their physical lives but you take away their inside … Prof Mignolo: We call it epistemic lobotomy. Now that I think of, the cleaning of ideology might had been a fore-runner of Hitler’s work. Except that Indians of the time were not the menace for Christian theologians like Jews were for Hitler. Christians are very clear of who their enemies are – at that moment in history it was Islam and Protestants. Catholics controlled the game but they wanted a dangerous enemy eager to destroy them – this was also the Bush discourse after the 9/11. Prof Tlostanova: This is a very American discourse. It is the only way how to keep America together and form its national identity. To be together against someone. In Europe I think there is bigger common base of religion, roots, culture …

## Impact: Genocide

#### Colonial identity production has reduced Natives to a constant state of near-death. The ability of the biopolitical to mandate the relevance of Native culture produces a violent racism that seeks to erase Native thought and life.

Smith 3 [Andrea, “Not an Indian Tradition: The Sexual Colonization of Native Peoples”, Hypatia, Volume 18, Number 2, Spring, pp. 70-85]

Ann Stoler argues that racism, far from being a reaction to crisis in which racial others are scapegoated for social ills, is a permanent part of the social fabric. “[R]acism is not an effect but a tactic in the internal fission of society into binary opposition, a means of creating ‘biologized’ internal enemies, against whom society must defend itself” (1997, 59). She notes that in the modern state, the constant purification and elimination of racialized enemies within that state ensures the growth of the national body. “Racism does not merely arise in moments of crisis, in sporadic cleansings. It is internal to the biopolitical state, woven into the web of the social body, threaded through its fabric” (1997, 59). Similarly, Kate Shanley notes that Native peoples are a permanent “present absence” in the U.S. colonial imagination, an “absence” that reinforces at every turn the conviction that Native peoples are indeed vanishing and that the conquest of Native lands is justified. Ella Shoat and Robert Stam describe this absence as “an ambivalently repressive mechanism [that] dispels the anxiety in the face of the Indian, whose very presence is a reminder of the initially precarious g rounding of the American nation-state itself . . . In a temporal paradox, living Indians were induced to ‘play dead,’ as it were, in order to perform a narrative of manifest destiny in which their role, ultimately, was to disappear” (1994, 118–19). This “absence” is effected through the metaphorical transformation of Native bodies into a pollution of which the colonial body must purify itself. As white Californians described in the 1860s, Native people were “the dirtiest lot of human beings on earth.” They wear filthy rags, with their persons unwashed, hair uncombed and swarming with vermin” (Rawls 1984, 195). The following 1885 Proctor & Gamble ad for Ivory Soap also illustrates this equation between Indian bodies and dirt: We were once factious, fierce and wild, In peaceful arts unreconciled Our blankets smeared with grease and stains From buffalo meat and settlers’ veins. Through summer’s dust and heat content From moon to moon unwashed we went, But IVORY SOAP came like a ray Of light across our darkened way And now we’re civil, kind and good And keep the laws as people should, We wear our linen, lawn and lace As well as folks with paler face And now I take, wherever we go This cake of IVORY SOAP to show What civilized my squaw and me And made us clean and fair to see. (Lopez n.d, 119) In the colonial imagination, Native bodies are also immanently polluted with sexual sin. Alexander Whitaker, a minister in Virginia, wrote in 1613: “They live naked in bodies, as if their shame of their sinne deserved no covering: Their names are as naked as their bodies: They esteem it a virtue to lie, deceive and steale as their master the divell teacheth them” (Berkhofer 1978, 19). Furthermore, according to Bernardino de Minaya: “Their [the Indians’] marriages are not a sacrament but a sacrilege. They are idolatrous, libidinous, and commit sodomy. Their chief desire is to eat, drink, worship heathen idols, and commit bestial obscenities” (cited in Stannard 1992, 211). Stoler’s analysis of racism in which Native peoples are likened to a pollution that threatens U. S. security is indicated in the comments of one doctor in his attempt to rationalize the mass sterilization of Native women in the 1970s: “People pollute, and too many people crowded too close together cause many of our social and economic problems. These in turn are aggravated by involuntary and irresponsible parenthood . . . We also have obligations to the society of which we are part. The welfare mess, as it has been called, cries out for solutions, one of which is fertility control” (Oklahoma 1989, 11). Herbert Aptheker describes the logical consequences of this sterilization movement: “The ultimate logic of this is crematoria; people are themselves constituting the pollution and inferior people in particular, then crematoria become really vast sewerage projects. Only so may one understand those who attend the ovens and concocted and conducted the entire enterprise; those “wasted”—to use U. S. army jargon reserved for colonial hostilities—are not really, not fully people” (1987, 144). Because Indian bodies are “dirty,” they are considered sexually violable and “rapable.” That is, in patriarchal thinking, only a body that is “pure” can be violated. The rape of bodies that are considered inherently impure or dirty simply does not count. For instance, prostitutes have almost an impossible time being believed if they are raped because the dominant society considers the prostitute’s body undeserving of integrity and violable at all times. Similarly, the history of mutilation of Indian bodies, both living and dead, makes it clear to Indian people that they are not entitled to bodily integrity, as these examples suggest: I saw the body of White Antelope with the privates cut off, and I heard a soldier say he was going to make a tobacco-pouch out of them. (cited in Wrone and Nelson 1982, 113) Each of the braves was shot down and scalped by the wild volunteers, who out with their knives and cutting two parallel gashes down their backs, would strip the skin from the quivering [ esh to make razor straps of. (cited in Wrone and Nelson 1982, 90) One more dexterous than the rest, proceeded to [ ay the chief’s [Tecumseh’s] body; then, cutting the skin in narrow strips . . . at once, a supply of razor-straps for the more “ferocious” of his brethren. (cited in Wrone and Nelson 1982, 82) Andrew Jackson . . . supervised the mutilation of 800 or so Creek Indian corpses—the bodies of men, women and children that he and his men massacred—cutting off their noses to count and preserve a record of the dead, slicing long strips of [ esh from their bodies to tan and turn into bridle reins. (Stannard 1992, 121) Echoing this mentality was Governor Thompson, who stated in 1990 that he would not close down an open Indian burial mound in Dickson, Illinois, because of his argument that he was as much Indian as are current Indians, and consequently, he had as much right as they to determine the fate of Indian remains.1 He felt free to appropriate the identity of “Native,” and thus felt justified in claiming ownership over both Native identity and Native bodies. The Chicago press similarly attempted to challenge the identity of the Indian people who protested Thompson’s decision by stating that these protestors were either only “part” Indian or were only claiming to be Indian (Hermann 1990).2 The message conveyed by the Illinois state government is that to be Indian in this society is to be on constant display for white consumers, in life or in death. And in fact, Indian identity itself is under the control of the colonizer, subject to eradication at any time. As Aime Cesaire puts it, “colonization = ‘thingi> cation’” (1972, 21). As Stoler explains this process of racialized colonization: “[T]he more ‘degenerates’ and ‘abnormals’ [in this case Native peoples] are eliminated, the lives of those who speak will be stronger, more vigorous, and improved. The enemies are not political adversaries, but those identified as external and internal threats to the population. Racism is the condition that makes it acceptable to put [certain people] to death in a society of normalization” (1997, 85). Tadiar’s description of colonial relationships as an enactment of the “prevailing mode of heterosexual relations” is useful because it underscores the extent to which U. S. colonizers view the subjugation of women of the Native nations as critical to the success of the economic, cultural, and political colonization (1993, 186). Stoler notes that the imperial discourses on sexuality “cast white women as the bearers of more racist imperial order” (1997, 35). By extension, Native women as bearers of a counter-imperial order pose a supreme threat to the imperial order. Symbolic and literal control over their bodies is important in the war against Native people, as these examples attest: When I was in the boat I captured a beautiful Carib women . . . I conceived desire to take pleasure . . . I took a rope and thrashed her well, for which she raised such unheard screams that you would not have believed your ears. Finally we came to an agreement in such a manner that I can tell you that she seemed to have been brought up in a school of harlots. (Sale 1990, 140) Two of the best looking of the squaws were lying in such a position, and from the appearance of the genital organs and of their wounds, there can be no doubt that they were first ravished and then shot dead. Nearly all of the dead were mutilated. (Wrone and Nelson 1982, 123) One woman, big with child, rushed into the church, clasping the alter and crying for mercy for herself and unborn babe. She was followed, and fell pierced with a dozen lances . . . the child was torn alive from the yet palpitating body of its mother, first plunged into the holy water to be baptized, and immediately its brains were dashed out against a wall. (Wrone and Nelson 1982, 97) The Christians attacked them with buffets and beatings . . . Then they behaved with such temerity and shamelessness that the most powerful ruler of the island had to see his own wife raped by a Christian officer. (Las Casas 1992, 33) I heard one man say that he had cut a woman’s private parts out, and had them for exhibition on a stick. I heard another man say that he had cut the fingers off of an Indian, to get the rings off his hand. I also heard of numerous instances in which men had cut out the private parts of females, and stretched them over their saddle-bows and some of them over their hats. (Sand Creek 1973, 129–30) American Horse said of the massacre at Wounded Knee: The fact of the killing of the women, and more especially the killing of the young boys and girls who are to go to make up the future strength of the Indian people is the saddest part of the whole affair and we feel it very sorely. (Stannard 1992, 127)

## Impact – Environment

#### **Ignoring the basis of colonialism in the climate crisis dooms managerial solutions to serial policy failure – epistemic engagement is crucial to solve environmental crisis**

Manuel-Navarrete 10 [David, Research Staff, King’s College, London. BA, Environmental Sciences, ecological economics, and geography. “Power, realism, and the ideal of human emancipation in a climate of change” WIREs Climate Change Vol. 1, November/December 2010]

Climate change is often portrayed as a management and policy problem.10 This positioning outside the evolution of sociopolitical structures has the advantage of discussing mitigation and adaptation as unproblematically carried out from, and by, these structures, without challenging them in any significant fashion. This implies an abstraction of climate change as an external threat to social stability, and an object of study that can then be elegantly compartmentalized into different types of risk. In addition, mitigation and adaptation can be neatly defined as strategies to reduce overall threat and cope with risks so that humanity’s development can continue unaffected. Leaving the messiness of politics outside the equation allows for the emphasis on technologies, targets, indexes, accounting schemes, and strategies that can be translated into explicit policies or actions. The ‘human dimension’ of climate change can then be studied by singling-out the parts of the social fabric that need to be ‘adapted’ or ‘proofed’, so that the system as a whole, more or less in its current state, can weather climate challenges. Unfortunately, this simplistic view fails to acknowledge the increasing penetration of climate change into all the dimensions of human life.11 In fact, a growing body of empirical work reveals a more complicated picture than that portrayed by apolitical policy approaches.12 WILL POLITICAL REALISM DO THE JOB? A realist agenda to study climate change politics is consolidating around the notions of global environmental governance and regimes.13 Governance refers to the wielding of power and authority by both government institutions, and other social actors in order to influence and enact public decisions and actions. Indeed, the notion of governance stretches Montesquieu’s ‘checks-and-balances’ thesis beyond the three powers of democratic government (executive, legislative, and judiciary) to include the role of private actors or markets, and civil society. These ‘new’ political actors are then reified as ‘stakeholders’ who have particular interests, resources, values, and cultures. Accordingly, politics can be conveniently represented as stakeholders’ negotiation and accommodation toward solving specific problems such as emission reductions or shielding development from disasters. This approach to accounting for politics may advocate adjustments of governance structures and the emergence of new regimes, but these adjustments are justified in terms of problem-solving performance. Thus, the ethical dimension of power distribution is brought to the background, so that attention can be directed toward goal setting, problem solving, and policy outcomes. As noted above, political realism assumes a pessimistic stance of human nature. Authority is needed to control people’s egoistic nature and prevent the harming of others and the environment. As a consequence, coercion, and/or legitimation through consent are preconditions for order and security. The success of political systems is measured in terms of stability and consensus between rulers and ruled, rather than ideals of fairness, justice, or freedom. Corruption and oppression from rulers can be avoided through appropriate ‘checks and balances’, or good governance. This realist position is particularly convenient in validating the liberal state, law, and the institution of property as grantors of order. In fact, in the present historical moment, this realist stance often leads to neoliberal economic rationalities, which are commonly assumed to provide the basis for co-ordinating conflicting interests in modern capitalist societies. At the core of realism is the assumption that society is politically in a ‘close to equilibrium’ state, orbiting around a liberal democratic attractor. The notion of an attractor evokes a sense of final destination, the end of political history toward which Western societies perceive themselves to have been tending during the last centuries. This semi-equilibrium politics allows for the conceptualization of power as an intrinsic quality of prototypical actors and institutions, rather than an outcome of unstable historical processes and social struggles. As a result climate politics can be represented as the negotiation between a given set of social actors who, in the light of new scientific findings and technological breakthroughs, rearrange markets, norms, institutions, regulations, or decision-making procedures. Justice and fairness belong to the policy process, rather than being intrinsic to social structures. Thus, ‘unrealistic’ idealist aspirations for universal justice or emancipation can be reoriented toward pragmatic targets such as the implementation of transparent, inclusive, and accountable policies, even if carried out in a context of inequality and mere representative democracy. The staging of international climate negotiations is a case in point. Developed countries, developing countries, corporations, scientists, and nongovernmental organizations are to follow pre-assigned roles and bargain our way out, without even discussing the possibility of altering power or pursuing any form of social transformation. Instead, the debate is centered on national emission targets, technological incentives, setting a price for carbon, and the transfer of economic resources to compensate those who will bear the highest costs.

## Impact – Sovereignty

#### The alternative is critical to fashioning new models of sovereignty

Taylor 2013 [Lucy, Department of International Politics, Aberystwyth University, Wales, UK, 2013, Southside-up: imagining IR through Latin America, <http://millenniumjournal.files.wordpress.com/2010/09/taylor-lucy-southside-up-imagining-ir-through-latin-america.doc>.]

There are many implications for IR from this position, most of which I have yet to think-through, but perhaps the most important is the question of sovereignty. The colonial encounter between indigenous people and the conquistadores did not take place between states – the indigenous polities were complex systems but they weren’t states in the Westphalian sense, and Cristobal Colón was an adventurer backed by a royal family and the Catholic Church, while the slave trade was a commercial enterprise in the main, among both Africans and Europeans. At present, these engagements are invisible to IR. Yet if we are to accord these encounters with the portent and impact that they deserve, we need to find a way to think of these as encounters between social agents acting in coherent groups – as being polities. This involves separating ‘sovereignty’ from the idea of the state. Here, some IR scholars have paved my way by exploring the particular origins of state sovereignty and in revealing the cultural particularity of the ‘hegemonologue’, to quote Marshall Beier[[7]](#footnote-7). Native Americanists in particular reveal its use as a power-tool of oppression and provide insight into alternative cosmologies of sovereignty. Thus Peter d’Errico’s work demonstrates how the legalistic device of sovereignty-as-fenceable-property in the USA dispossessed native peoples of land which was theirs and confined them to state-appointed places[[8]](#footnote-8). Soren Larsen, on the other hand, reveals an alternative notion of sovereignty within the Dakelh people of British Columbia who understand ‘our territory’ (or *keyah*) as ‘the area in which one walks’, linking it to a physical and emotional belonging to the landscape associated with the tasks of maintaining trails, trap-lines and shelters[[9]](#footnote-9). Contesting the boundaries of the sovereign state, as well as the empisteme which is woven into its very identity and institutional fabric, is also a central goal for many indigenous movements in the southern Americas. The struggle for autonomy, the ascendance of non-European languages, legal systems and religions, and the denunciation of oppressive and racist practices at the heart of Latin America’s nation states challenges their existence as territorial and institutional entities which claim the legitimacy of sovereignty. This clearly has significant implications for the theory and practice of international relations.

# Framework

## 2nc Framework block

**They say framework - we have links to the plan text and don’t defend the alternative as a PIC – defend your aff epistemology.**

**2.. Counter-interpretation –**

This debate has a prior question of methodology and epistemic starting points that predetermines discussions of the outcomes of the plan.

#### Refuse the affirmative’s framework – creating new notions of acceptability of knowledge are critical to challenging the basis of western hegemony in thinking

Baker 2009 [Michael, [University of Rochester](http://rochester.academia.edu/), [Warner Graduate School of Education and Human Development](http://rochester.academia.edu/Departments/Warner_Graduate_School_of_Education_and_Human_Development), Graduate Student, Situating Modern Western Education within the Modern/colonial World System, Unpublished Paper ,June 2009 , academia.edu]

The modern/colonial world system perspective is part of an alternative macronarrative of the contemporary world that reframes the ways the modern world is interpreted and lived. This essay argues that western consciousness and western education are largely contained within a universalistic, hierarchical, racialized narrative of civilization and that these universalistic assumptions are obstacles to the recognition of the ontological and epistemic equality of other ways of being human. As a central institution within this ongoing western civilizational project, “modern” education possesses a natural, tacit, or taken for granted relationship with the project of Eurocentric modernity. A more critically conscious historical-theoretical interpretation of “modern” education requires a planetary and relational understanding of modernity, beyond the western civilizational projection. The emergence and expansion of western civilization from the sixteenth century to the present day involves the formation and successive transformations of a pedagogical project aimed at civilizing humanity through language indoctrination, instructional discipline, and the imposition of ways of knowing and being, all contained within universalized presumptions of “man.” The conceptualization and practice of western education has been and continues to be one of the primary institutions in the “building of Western civilization” (Butts, 1967, 1973). As modern/colonial institutions, state education systems are part of a long history of redemptive-civilizing missions within the expansion of Eurocentric modernity (Mignolo, 2000a). The histories, ideologies, organization, practices, contents, and consequences of modern schooling around the world are profoundly interrelated (Swaan, 1988). The modern/colonial world-system perspective provides a geo-historically grounded critique of the way western knowledge and education systems continue to serve the processes of cultural colonization in both metropolitan and postcolonial nation-states. Seemingly universal and neutral processes of teaching and learning are profoundly embedded within western colonial discourses that acculturate and stratify individuals according to a universalized system of difference constructed from a homogenous and disguised cultural center. This essay argues that the modern/colonial world system perspective provides a more adequate framework for interpreting and teaching about modern education than does the framework of Eurocentric modernity. As an intellectual and social movement to think and live beyond Eurocentric modernity, the modern/colonial world system perspective is not presented as a new paradigm for social science in the linear and progressive “history” of modernity. The modern/colonial world system perspective is an alternative (decolonial) paradigm for interpreting and understanding the world in opposition to the dominant “imperial paradigm.” … the imperial paradigm imposes and maintains the dominant view (which all students learn from elementary to high school and which is disseminated in popular culture and the media). The decolonial paradigm struggles to bring into intervening existence an-other interpretation that brings forward, on the one hand, a silenced view of the event and, on the other, shows the limits of imperial ideology disguised as the true (and total) interpretation of events. (Mignolo, 2005, p. 33) The “imperial paradigm” is a regime of truth that constructed the ways in which the world and societies are known and understood through the categories of knowledge embedded in modern/imperial European languages rooted in Greek and Latin (Mignolo, 2005, p. xviii). The modern/colonial world system perspective interprets western modernity as a civilizational complex established in part through a Eurocentric model of power/knowledge relations that emerged in the sixteenth century. Eurocentric modernity is interpreted as a universalized civilizational project that centrally involves western educational institutions and the imposition of Eurocentric forms of knowing and being. Until modernity is interpreted from the perspective of coloniality, western education (conservative and liberal) will remain embedded within the tacit presuppositions of Eurocentric modernity. The modern/colonial world system perspective offers a critique of Eurocentric education and points toward an educational theory and practice that is no longer contained within the rhetoric of modernity and the logic of coloniality. Alternatives to Eurocentric modernity are necessary today in the face of the interrelated neo-liberal and neo-conservative projects to reassert the colonial power/knowledge relations of Eurocentric modernity through the formation of a global market civilization (Brown, 2003, 2006; Gill, 2003). Creating alternatives to Eurocentric modernity involves breaking out of and resituating the hegemony of Eurocentric knowledge production and learning, through the recognition and revaluation of the epistemological diversity of the world.

**3 – no impact to your framework argument – this is a predictable literature base situated around the question of market economics which is better education than plan-focus education because the concepts of governance and knowledge production undergird the rest of the debates.**

## Framework – Debate Key

#### It is important to analyze colonialism at the university level due to the outputs of knowledge produced by the university as an output of imperialism in the name of excellence and efficiency

[Mignolo](http://muse.uq.edu.au.vortex3.ucok.edu:2050/journals/nepantla/v004/4.1mignolo.html" \l "authbio) 2003 [Walter D. Mignolo, Globalization and the Geopolitics of Knowledge: The Role of the Humanities in the Corporate University Nepantla: Views from South 4.1 (2003) 97-119 ]

Before going into more detail about the Universidad Intercultural, let's look at the internal colonial transformation of the colonial Renaissance university into the colonial Enlightenment one, that is, at the first temporal epistemic fracture in the history of the university within Western civilization. Toward the end of the eighteenth century, secularization and the French revolution, together with a redistribution and reconceptualization of knowledge, led to the emergence of what is known in the history of learning as the Kantian-Humboldtian university; that is, the university at the service of the emerging nation-states. The nineteenth century witnessed the birth of the social sciences—required by the need to organize government and civil society—and also the consolidation of political economy. Wilhelm Dilthey, at the end of the nineteenth century, conceptualized the distinction between the natural and the human sciences, between the nomothetic and the ideographic forms of knowledge, between explanation and understanding. Knowledge of nature became detached from knowledge of society and of human beings. Such a conception of knowledge is alien to the indigenous histories in the Americas, as well as to concepts of knowledge and understanding beyond European modernity. The transition, across the Americas, from the colonial to the national period implied the transformation of both the colonial Renaissance university into the colonial Kantian-Humboldtian university and the colonial provinces into nation-states. The colonial elites that controlled the economy, the church, and the government were not bourgeois elites as in Europe. There were significant differences between the Anglo- and the Spanish-American revolutionary elites; in both cases, however, coloniality was a physically invisible but always present force among the Creoles in both Anglo- and Spanish America. **[End Page 106]** While this transformation was under way in the Americas, the British in India were beginning their version of a process that the Spanish and Portuguese had started in the “New World” almost three centuries earlier, and the Anglo-Americans a century after that with the foundation of Harvard and other early universities in what would become the United States (see Viswanathan 1989, Prakash 2000, Gortari 1979, and Jardine 1999). A similar process would unfold in the nineteenth century in other places in Asia, Africa, and the Caribbean where the British and French empires extended their colonial administration. These processes were part of the second modernity, the Enlightenment. In the ex-colonies, the story evolved somewhat differently depending on whether the metropole was Spain, Portugal, France, or England. Between 1776 and 1831, approximately, these colonies became independent from their former masters and began the process of building themselves into nations. The colonial-Renaissance university founded in the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries had to transform itself under new social demands and a New World order. New universities were created. The University of North Carolina, the first state university in the United States, was chartered in 1789 and opened its doors in 1795. The point here is that while the model of the Kantian-Humboldtian university was that of higher education under new forms of colonialism, in the emerging nation-states of the Americas the same type of university began to replace the model established during the Renaissance. But, of course, the process in the Americas, particularly in South or Latin America, was not the same as the process in Europe. Europe and the Americas were separated by the colonial difference (“the colonial difference” meaning not only that people in the colonies are “different” but that they are “inferior” and need to be “civilized,” “modernized,” or “developed”), a difference that is in place today, although their histories have followed divergent paths. The university, in other words, played a fundamental role in nation building. However, while for England and France, and of course for Germany, nation building was part of Western expansion and the civilizing mission in the Americas, it was linked to nation building and the articulation of a new form of colonialism, “internal colonialism.” In India, as well as other places in Asia and Africa, the university was instead part of the colonial regime. This was also the period in which philology, in the European universities, contributed to the creation of the idea and the images of the “Orient,” as well as the idea of the “South” of Europe (see, e.g., Dainotto 2000). The Kantian-Humboldtian university was, in other words, the university in what Hegel labeled as “the heart of Europe” **[End Page 107]** (Germany, England, and France), while the Renaissance university was, mainly, the university in what became the “South” (Italy, Spain, Portugal). And now, at the intersection of the two histories (the colonial and the modern), we come to the period after World War II. The United States started to assume the role played until then by England, France, and Germany. This was the era of the Cold War and the Cold War university (Wallerstein 1997), the era in which the social sciences, in the United States, gained preeminence over the humanities. It was also the era of decolonization in Asia and in Africa, and the era of the Cuban revolution and of dictatorship in various Latin American countries. The social sciences in the United States were associated with the materialization of “area studies.” Even if there were conflicts between those who defended the purity and rigor of the disciplines and those who became experts in the “content” of certain areas, the fact remains that “area studies” was an affair of the social sciences as much as “Orientalism” was an affair of the humanities. It was also the heyday of the social sciences in the sense that they were part of the project of the “development and modernization” of the third world. In Latin America the social sciences are a recent addition. Although there were *cátedras* of sociology before 1950, the social sciences as a branch of knowledge were introduced in or after the late fifties. Interestingly enough, the report of the Gulbenkian Foundation, *Open the Social Sciences* (Wallerstein et al. 1996), emphasized the crisis of these disciplines not only in the “central countries” where they were born and prospered, but also in the third world. The “Gulbenkian report” was followed by thirteen small volumes in which the future of the social sciences in various regions of the former third world was discussed. But this was also the period when the corporate university began to displace the Kantian-Humboldtian model. The more technologically oriented social sciences (economics, political science, and sociology) remained the exemplars of rigorous and useful knowledge, while the humanities and the interpretive social sciences (history, cultural anthropology, and interpretive sociology) lost their previous standing in the hierarchy of efficient knowledge required by corporate values associated with knowledge. The consequences of the corporate university's emergence became apparent after the end of the Cold War. In the former third world, including Latin America, the principles of “excellence” and “efficiency” became guiding tenets of knowledge production. Parallel to these processes, the large state universities in various Latin American countries started a process of disintegration (see Chomsky et al. 1997 and NACLA 2000). The *fuga de cerebros*, **[End Page 108]** or “brain drain,” accelerated in various countries, as well-regarded intellectuals, scholars, and scientists migrated to Europe and the United States. Scientists in former third-world nations also voiced their discomfort with the deprived and meager conditions under which they had to do their jobs. The “network society” (i.e., the world society connected through the Internet more than by means of transportation), as Catalan sociologist Manuel Castells calls it, doesn't have the same intensity in the South as in the North. Until 1996 or so, Africa and Latin America were not yet on the map of this society. “Excellence” and “efficiency” turned against the scientific and scholarly production of the third world. And, once again, the possibilities for technological expansion have been restricted by the demands and expectations of economic designs.

#### **Debater’s position in the university has to be accounted for as part of the maintenance of the status quo. The role of the ballot is to academically align our positions to refuse the hegemonic Eurocentric basis of economic engagement. Students are trained to believe and enact certain understandings of the world – pedagogy is a foundational aspect of race.**

Ortiz 2012 [Michael; Taking Henry Giroux's Borderless Pedagogy to Our Institutions of Higher Learning; Aug 4; truth-out.org/opinion/item/10549-continuing-toward-girouxs-borderless-pedagogy;]

Additionally, colleges and universities (both public and private) also exist as sites that are meant to primarily develop and train minds and bodies to maintain the dominant and structural status quo. One of the growing contradictions in American higher education today is the fact that institutions continue to adopt corporate models for themselves, while simultaneously claiming to be centers for equitable multiculturalism and student empowerment. Since universities exist as institutions - like any other American institution - they follow the neoliberal trend of "employing deception by seizing a stripped-down language of choice, freedom, [empowerment and equality]."As Giroux puts it, "[Since] the educational force of the culture [has become] a powerful ideological tool for legitimating market-driven values and social relations, based on omissions, deceptions, lies, misrepresentations and falsehoods,"then we must assume that the goal of these institutions is not to produce critically thinking students who can expect structural equality within their schools. Rather, we can assume that institutions of higher education have a primary interest in increasing enrollment and retention rates for the purpose of developing a larger constituency of "trained" people who will uphold current power systems through "market driven values," social relations and a fixed knowledge that is limited to the rationalization of the dominant structure that it serves.So, how do we confront this reality?We must move away from accepting the structural and ideological constraints that maintain current systems of domination. We must come to understand exactly how the gated pedagogical process works to limit our knowledge about ourselves and the world. We must make a transition toward a critical pedagogy that aims to always examine the environment in which we are being educated. As Giroux describes,"There is a need to develop what I call a project of democratization and borderless pedagogy that moves across different sites - from schools to the alternative media - as part of a broader attempt to construct a critical formative culture in the United States that enables Americans to reclaim their voices, speak out, exhibit moral outrage and create the social movements, tactics and public spheres that will reverse the growing tide of authoritarianism in the United States."In particular, institutions of higher education can better serve their students if they were to philosophically and institutionally adopt the idea of borderless pedagogy. Instead of developing college students as "highly trained" wage laborers in different specific fields (and by making billions of dollars of profit in the process), why don't colleges take the same amount of time and energy to develop college students who are highly educated in critical thinking and borderless thought? At all top administrative levels, colleges and universities need to actually make a commitment to student well-being (with "well-being" being defined by well-informed, conscious and analytic student thinkers themselves) and set the precedent for all staff and faculty members as well. Faculty members should be taught and shown just how race, class and gender are indeed playing out in their classrooms even if they don't know it. Gated universities and gated intellectuals may need to take a step back and realize that a large period of time might need to be dedicated to deconstructing the pedagogy of their field (since many of their disciplines were created and developed through the influence of all sorts of social conditions). Faculty members themselves may want to critique dominant structures and ideologies in their classrooms, thus setting an example for their students. And lastly, if college administrations and faculty members are not willing to acknowledge their blatant failure in helping their students become self-thinking, conscious agents of action who have the capacity to realize their own borderless potential, then they must continue to be challenged on all fronts (through scholarly critique by professors, through vocal displeasure by all community members and by the continued attempt to raise the consciousness of everyone involved even without administrative support).

## Framework – Epistemology First

#### Evaluating the epistemology of the affirmative plan is a prerequisite to understanding its outcomes and ethics

Grosfoguel in 2005 [Ramon, associate professor in the department of ethnic studies at the university of California at Berkeley, Critical Globalization Studies, edited by Richard Appelbaum and William Robinson 288-89 ]

So far, the history of the modern—colonial capitalist patriarchal world-system has privileged the culture, knowledge, and epistemology produced by the West (Spivak, 1988; Mignolo, 2000). No culture in the world remained untouched by European modernity. There is no absolute outside to this system. The monologism and mono-topic global design of the West relates to other cultures and peoples from a position of superiority and is deaf toward the cosmologies and epistemologies of the non-Western world. The imposition of Christianity in order to convert the so-called savages • and barbarians in the sixteenth century, followed by the imposition of "white man's burden" and "civilizing mission" in the eighteenth and nineteenth century, the imposition of the "developmentalist project" in the twentieth century and, more recently, the imperial project of military interventions under the rhetoric of democracy and human rights in the twenty-first century, have all been imposed by militarism and violence. Two responses to the Eurocentric colonial imposition are Third World nationalisms and fundamentalisms. Nationalism provides Eurocentric solutions to a Eurocentric global problem. It reproduces an internal coloniality of power within each nation-state and reifies the nation-state as the privileged location of social change (Grosfoguel, 1996). Struggles above and below the nation-state are not considered in nationalist political strategies. Moreover, nationalist responses to global capitalism reinforce the nation-state as the political institutional form per excellence of the modern—colonial capitalist patriarchal world-system. In this sense, nationalism is complicit with Eurocentric thinking and political structures. On the other hand, Third World fundamentalisms of different kinds respond with an essentialist "pure outside space" or "absolute exteriority" to modernity. They are antimodern forces that reproduce the binary oppositions of Eurocentric thinking. They respond to the imposition of Eurocentric modernity with an antimodernity that is as hierarchical, authoritarian, and antidemocratic as the former. A plausible solution to the Eurocentric vs. fundamentalist dilemma is what Walter Mignolo, following Chicana thinkers such as Gloria Anzaldua (1987), calls "critical border thinking" (Mignolo, 2000). Critical border thinking is the epistemic response of the subaltern to the Eurocentric project of modernity. Instead of rejecting the institutions of modernity and retreat into a fundamentalist absolutism, border epistemologies redefines modernity from the cosmologies and epistemologies of the subaltern, located in the oppressed and exploited side of the colonial difference. What border thinking produces is a redefinition of citizenship, democracy, human rights, and humanity, beyond the narrow definitions imposed by European modernity. Border thinking is not antimodern; it is the modern response of the subaltern to Eurocentric modernity

# Alt

## Alt – Negativity solvency

#### The plan replicates the conservative utopia of neoliberalism – the alternative generates a utopia out of negativity and refusal of the status quo neoliberal utopia

Santos 2004 [Boaventura de Sousa, professor of sociology, scho of economics, university of Coimbra, distinguished legal scholar law school, university of Wisconsin-madison, “the world social forum: a user’s manual, http://www.ces.uc.pt/bss/documentos/fsm\_eng.pdf]

The utopian dimension of the WSF consists in claiming the existence of alternatives to neoliberal globalization. As Franz Hinkelammert says, we live in a time of conservative utopias whose utopian character resides in its radical denial of alternatives to present-day reality. The possibility of alternatives is discredited precisely for being utopian, idealistic, unrealistic. All conservative utopias are sustained by a political logic based on one sole efficiency criterion that rapidly becomes a supreme ethical criterion. According to this criterion, only what is efficient has value. Any other ethical criterion is devalued as inefficient. Neoliberalism is one such conservative utopia for which the sole criterion of efficiency is the market or the laws of the market. Its utopian character resides in the promise that its total fulfillment or application cancels out all utopias. As Hinkelammert says, “this ideology derives from its frantic anti-utopianism, the utopian promise of a new world. The basic thesis is: whoever destroys utopia, fulfills it” (2002: 278). What distinguishes conservative utopias from critical utopias is the fact that they identify 9 themselves with the present-day reality and discover their utopian dimension in the radicalization or complete fulfillment of the present. Moreover the problems or difficulties of present-day reality are not the consequence of the deficiencies or limits of the efficiency criteria, but result rather from the fact that the application of the efficiency criteria has not been thorough enough. If there is unemployment and social exclusion, if there is starvation and death in the periphery of the world system, that is not the consequence of the deficiencies or limits of the laws of the market; it results rather from the fact that such laws have not yet been fully applied. The horizon of conservative utopias is thus a closed horizon, an end to history. This is the context in which the utopian dimension of the WSF must be understood. The WSF signifies the reemergence of a critical utopia, that is to say, the radical critique of present-day reality and the aspiration to a better society. This occurs, however, when the anti-utopian utopia of neoliberalism is dominant. The specificity of the utopian content of this new critical utopia, when compared with that of the critical utopias prevailing at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth century, thus becomes clear. The anti-utopian utopia of neoliberalism is grounded on two presuppositions: the illusion of total control over present-day reality by means of extremely efficient powers and knowledges; and the radical rejection of alternatives to the status quo. The WSF puts in question the totality of control (whether as knowledge or power) only to affirm credibly the possibility of alternatives. Hence the open nature, vague if you will, of alternatives. In a context in which the conservative utopia prevails absolutely, it is more important to affirm the possibility of alternatives than to define them. The utopian dimension of the WSF consists in affirming the possibility of a counter-hegemonic globalization. In other words, the utopia of the WSF asserts itself more as negativity (the definition of what it critiques) than as positivity (the definition of that to which it aspires).

#### This utopia creates practical and ethical politics – it is not a vague opening, but a method to create consolidation of agents against neoliberalism

Santos 2004 [Boaventura de Sousa, professor of sociology, scho of economics, university of Coimbra, distinguished legal scholar law school, university of Wisconsin-madison, “the world social forum: a user’s manual, http://www.ces.uc.pt/bss/documentos/fsm\_eng.pdf

The utopia of the WSF is a radically democratic utopia. It is the only realistic utopia after a century of conservative utopias, some of them the result of perverted critical utopias. This utopian design, grounded on the denial of the present rather than the definition of the future, focused on the processes of intercourse among the movements rather than an assessment of the movements’ political content, is the major factor of cohesion of the WSF. It helps to maximize what unites and minimize what divides, celebrate intercourse rather than dispute power, be a strong presence rather than an agenda. This utopian design, which is also an ethical design, privileges the ethical discourse, quite evident in the WSF’s Charter of Principles, aimed at gathering consensuses beyond the ideological and political cleavages among the movements and organizations that compose it. The movements and organizations put between brackets the cleavages that divide them, as much as is necessary to affirm the possibility of a counter-hegemonic globalization. The nature of this utopia has been the most adequate for the initial objective of the WSF: to affirm the existence of a counter-hegemonic globalization. This is no vague utopia. It is rather a utopia that contains in itself the concretization that is adequate for this phase of the construction of counter-hegemonic globalization. It remains to be seen if the nature of this utopia is the most adequate one to guide the next steps, should there be any next steps. Once the counter-hegemonic globalization is consolidated, and hence the idea that another world is possible is made credible, will it be possible to fulfill this idea with the same level of radical democracy that helped formulate it? I shall come back to this.

#### The alternative’s viewpoint is critical to a recognition of agency for latin america

Taylor 2013 [Lucy, Department of International Politics, Aberystwyth University, Wales, UK, 2013, Southside-up: imagining IR through Latin America, <http://millenniumjournal.files.wordpress.com/2010/09/taylor-lucy-southside-up-imagining-ir-through-latin-america.doc>]

It is this unsettling of this supposedly settled settler society – the raising of questions about its colonialist relationships and the acknowledgement of its contingency – which is Latin America’s most powerful critique of its dominant neighbour. Latin America exposes the frailty of the USA not through an attack on its imperialist pretentions, then, but by revealing its coloniality within. The profound critique of sovereignty which emerges from engagement with Native American history and philosophy, strikes at one of the foundations of ‘actually existing’ IR in many of its formats, as the incisive work of Beier and Inayatullah and Blaney so ably demonstrates. Opening up the USA as a place of curiosity and contingency, as a place that is uneven and highly contested, serves to challenge many of the normative assumptions found on the pages of IR textbooks and the policy documents of international politics. If I might take for granted – here at the Millennium conference – that puncturing the discursive armour of oppressive universalist thinking is an important political project, then Latin America is not a peripheral actor in this struggle, but rather occupies a vital strategic location from which to critique IR precisely because of its close relationship to IR’s heartland – the USA. At the very least, looking past the dazzling power of the US helps us to catch a glimpse of the other global stories of this mighty, colonial place.

## Alt – Refuse Neoliberal Expansion

#### Our alternative is to refuse the logic of neoliberal expansion. This is a fracturing of the logic of economic singularity of neoliberal expansion by recognizing the possibility for other forms of noncapitalist economy – this refusal is competitive as it substantiates a material rejection of US economic inevitability onto the rest of the world

Santos 2004 [Boaventura de Sousa, professor of sociology, scho of economics, university of Coimbra, distinguished legal scholar law school, university of Wisconsin-madison, “the world social forum: a user’s manual, http://www.ces.uc.pt/bss/documentos/fsm\_eng.pdf

t he ecology of productivities. Finally, in the domain of the fifth logic, the monoculture of capitalist productivity, the sociology of absences consists in recuperating and valorizing alternative systems of production, popular economic organizations, workers’ cooperatives, self-managed enterprises, solidarity economy, etc., which have been hidden or discredited by the capitalist orthodoxy of productivity. This is perhaps the most controversial domain of the sociology of absences, for it confronts directly both the paradigm of development and infinite economic growth and the logic of the primacy of the objectives of accumulation over the objectives of distribution that sustain global capitalism. Peasant movements for access to land, land tenure, agrarian reform or against mega-development projects, urban movements for housing rights, informal economy and popular economy movements, indigenous movements to defend or to regain their historical territories and the natural resources found in them, low caste movements in India to protect their land and local forests, all these movements base their claims and their struggles on the ecology of productivities. In each of the five domains, the objective of the sociology of absences is to disclose and to give credit to the diversity and multiplicity of social practices and confer credit to them in opposition to the exclusive credibility of hegemonic practices. The idea of multiplicity and nondestructive relations is suggested by the concept of ecology: ecology of knowledges, ecology of temporalities, ecology of recognitions, ecology of transcales, and ecology of productivities. Common to all these ecologies is the idea that reality cannot be reduced to what exists. It amounts to an ample version of realism that includes the realities rendered absent by silence, suppression, and marginalization. In a word, realities that are actively produced as nonexistent. In conclusion, the exercise of the sociology of absences is counterfactual and takes place by confronting conventional scientific commonsense. To be carried out it demands, both epistemological imagination and democratic imagination. Epistemological imagination allows for the recognition of different knowledges, perspectives and scales of identification, analysis and evaluation of practices. Democratic imagination allows for the recognition of different practices and social agents. Both the epistemological and the democratic imagination have a deconstructive and a reconstructive dimension. Deconstruction assumes five forms, corresponding to the critique of the five logics of hegemonic rationality, namely un-thinking, de-residualizing, de- racializing, de-localizing, and de-producing. Reconstruction is comprised of the five ecologies mentioned above.

## Alt – Epistemological Praxis

#### Our alternative opens an epistemological praxis for the creation and motivation of alternative ethical coutnermovements against neoliberalism

Santos 2004 [Boaventura de Sousa, professor of sociology, scho of economics, university of Coimbra, distinguished legal scholar law school, university of Wisconsin-madison, “the world social forum: a user’s manual, http://www.ces.uc.pt/bss/documentos/fsm\_eng.pdf]

Confronted with this situation, the epistemological alternative proposed by the WSF is that there is no global social justice without global cognitive justice. This alternative is grounded on two basic ideas. First, if the objectivity of science does not imply neutrality, science and technology may as well be put at the service of counter-hegemonic practices. The extent to which science is used is in general arguable inside the movements, and it may vary according to circumstances and practices. Second, whatever the extent to which science is resorted to, counter-hegemonic practices are mainly practices of nonscientific knowledges, practical, often tacit knowledges that must be made credible to render such practices credible in turn. This second point is more polemical because it confronts the hegemonic concepts of truth and efficiency directly. The epistemological denunciation that the WSF engages in consists in showing that the concepts of rationality and efficiency presiding over hegemonic technical-scientific knowledge are too restrictive to capture the richness and diversity of the social experience of the world, and specially that they discriminate against practices of resistance and production of counter-hegemonic alternatives. Hegemonic rationality and efficiency thus bring about a contraction of the world by concealing or discrediting all the practices, agents, and knowledges that are not accounted for by their criteria. The concealment and discrediting of these practices constitute a waste of social experience, both social experience that is already available but not yet visible, and social experience not yet available but realistically possible. The epistemological operation carried out by the WSF consists of two processes that I designate as sociology of absences and sociology of emergences (Santos, 2002a). I mean sociologies built against hegemonic social sciences and upon alternative epistemological presuppositions. I speak of sociologies because my aim is critically to identify the conditions that destroy nonhegemonic and potentially counter-hegemonic social experience. Through the sociology of absences and the sociology of emergences, social experience that resists destruction is unconcealed, and the space-time capable of identifying and rendering credible new counter-hegemonic social experiences is opened up.

## Alt – Uniqueness

#### The alternative is an ethical imperative – the crisis of modernity is becoming bankrupt and decoloniality is emerging all around us. The question of this debate is whether you ought to ethically epistemologically align yourself with decoloniality or try to uphold the failures of the neoliberal market of modernity.

Mingolo and He 12 [Walter Mignolo, Professor of Decolonial Studies at Duke University, Weihua He, Ph.D. from Tsinghua University in Beijing. He is currently teaching in Shanghai and spent a year at Duke University while finishing his dissertation. The Prospect of Harmony and the Decolonial View of the World, published in Decolonial Thoughts, Interviews. September 2012]

Two things.Neo-liberalism is now in bankruptcy. You can see it all over the places, in the financial crisis, the end-road to find solutions, the proliferations of unhappy people expressing it all over, organized communities in South America stopping the corporations from destroying the environment and poisoning the lands and the water with transgenic and cyanide in open pit mining. And secondly, we shall not confuse neo-liberalism with market economy and the fetishization of commodities. Certainly, neo-liberalism contributed to that, but neo-liberalism wants a weak state and a free invisible hand. China, Singapore, Japan are on the contrary, strong states regulating the economy. That is not neo-liberalism and that chiasm is one aspect of dewesternization. The questions of delinking shall not, on the other hand, be limited to the State and continue to hope that States will do what people want States to do. What we are seeing at in the sphere of the States is dewesternization. And that is a form of delinking, delinking from Western scripts and from transnational institutions, like IMF and the World Bank, still controlled by the West but already under heavy scrutiny from the rest of the world. [4] [5] What is surprising in this respect is that the politization of the civil society (you know the civil society was not politicized, was civil). I have been in the Rhodes Public Forum in October of 2011. About 600 scholars, religious figures, officers of the states, journalists, mainly from Russia, India and the Middle East agreed in the failure of the neoliberal doctrine and the Washington Consensus. My panel on “Post-Secularism” was one day but the conference occupied three and a half days. So I attended the opening and closing panels, and several other panels. Among the opening panelist speakers was Johan Galtung. Interestingly enough the consensus was that the neoliberal doctrine and the Washington Consensus have failed. The next week I was in Santo Domingo, in the Biarritz Forum, lead French institutions with the support and collaboration of Latin American and Caribbean countries. More or less the same kind of people and the same amount and about 12 ex-Presidents attended the Forum. There was a consensus that the neo-liberal doctrine and the Washington Consensus failed. So, then, neo-liberalism is no longer the dominant “structure of feeling.” The “structure of feeling” is a growing rage from the politization of the civil society. For what you have in those Fora is nothing else that the civil society at its best, not the political society. Rage and disenchantment was the consensus. They are of course, dewesternizer, nor decolonial or even Marxists. So, what connect the world is capitalism, but not neo-liberalism. The politicized civil society is not denying capitalism, it is denying neo-liberalim. Delinking is first of all an epistemic question: without thinking otherwise is difficult to imagine global futures beyond Western structure of thoughts and structure of feelings (that is, epistemology, ontology and aiesthesis—sensing). Now, in the same way that we cannot con-fuse economy with capitalism, we cannot con-fuse capitalism with neo-liberalism. China is capitalist, but I will not say for a second that is neo-liberal. That is why in China Confucianism is being re-articulated. If you do not re-articulate Confucianism, or something that is in your history, you run the risk of into neo-liberalism or being convinced that you have to start with Machiavelli, Locke, Rousseau etc. Chinese leaders and intellectuals need Confucius rather than Milton Friedman, which was the economist behind Reagan-Thatcher duo promoting neo-liberal ideals.Dewesternization is already a way of delinking, not from capitalism but from neo-liberal global design. And dewesternization is the politics of China, of Singapore, of Russia, of Brazil and not sure yet but in part at least India. This politico-economic delinking is one aspect of dewesternization.

## Alt solves aff

#### The alternative is not some inflexible refusal of all change but is an acceptance of the positivity of status quo countermovements to neoliberal expansion – plan shuts these down in favor of economic efficiency – only the alternative can resolve the aff’s concern with the area

Werner 2012 [Marion, Department of Geography University at Buffalo, SUNY Contesting power/knowledge in economic geography: Learning from Latin America and the Caribbean, New Companion to Economic Geography (Barnes, T., Peck, J., Sheppard, E., eds.), published july 2012]

During the long decades of neoliberal counter-reforms in the region, these theoretical traditions were in retreat institutionally, and faced strong criticism from a transforming Left. Social movements and activist scholars challenged not only neoliberalism, but also the developmentalism that pervaded structuralist and dependency thinking (Chavez et al. 2008; Escobar and Alvarez 1992; Slater 2004). Social movements emerging in the wake of market reforms reflected the uneven territoriality of states and capital accumulation, and the historical legacies of racism and colonialism that structured this unevenness (Quijano 2000). Movements created spaces of counter- hegemonic theory-making, renewing critiques of Latin American and Caribbean positionality from feminist, indigenous, African-descent, urban migrant, and peasant subject positions, and their combinations. From these hybrid subject positions, they opposed deepening forms of neoliberal capitalism, as evident, for example, in free trade agreements that privileged market agendas of the North and the sectors of capital that could capture returns from these reforms in the South. The Zapatistas in southern Mexico, for example, created and defended autonomous non-market spaces, notions of radical democracy, and indigenous subjectivity in the face of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and its emboldened assault on already imperiled forms of collective land tenure and public goods. In diverse ways, movements against the privatization of water in Bolivia, mobilizations by the unemployed, or piqueteros, pauperized by currency crises in Argentina, and the landless people’s movement in Brazil, signaled the growth of resistance to dispossession wrought by neoliberalism. Since the late 1990s, extensive organizing and resistance to neoliberalism in Latin America and the Caribbean have brought political parties and leaders with strong reformist agendas to power through democratic elections across the region. In Brazil, Venezuela, Bolivia, Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Ecuador, the locus of enunciation of counter-hegemonic thought and practice is now, in part, being assumed by the state. Many governments are seeking ways to either reverse or rework the neoliberal paradigm, and, especially in Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador (at the time of writing), to address the legacies of racism and colonialism that have structured the national state through the marginalization and exclusion of indigenous and African-descent peoples. Turning the tide of dispossession and reconstructing urban and rural livelihood possibilities are all on the agenda of a political opening some have called “post-neoliberalism” (Sader 2008). States and social movements face the task of re-making economic and political geographies through new and renewed paradigms of sovereignty, autonomous development, solidarity, and radical democracy. Programs of social and economic change under new banners such as neostructuralism, Amazonic-Andean capitalism and 21st century socialism draw their lineages in part from the region’s tradition of counter- hegemonic thought (Bielschowsky 2006; Romo 2007; Leiva 2008; Ferrer 2010). The contradictions and complexities of these projects are all the more reason to engage with these transformations and ask what can be learned about de-centering economic geography from these experiences.

# Answers to aff Answers

## **AT: Perm**

#### **The permutation fails because it does not call into question who is in control of knowledge.**

Mignolo -2009 (Walter D, William H. Wannamaker Professor of Romance Studies and Literature at Duke University and Director of the Center for Global Studies and the Humanities, “Epistemic Disobedience, Independent Thought and De-Colonial Freedom, waltermignolo.com, 2009, <http://waltermignolo.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/01/epistemicdisobedience.pdf>) RQ

The introduction of geo-historical and bio-graphical configurations in processes of knowing and understanding allows for a radical re-framing (e.g. de-colonization) of the original formal apparatus of enunciation. 2 I have been supporting in the past those who maintain that it is not enough to change the content of the conversation, that it is of the essence to change the terms of the conversation. Changing the terms of the conversation implies going beyond disciplinary or interdisciplinary controversies and the conflict of interpretations. As far as controversies and interpretations remain within the same rules of the game (terms of the conversation), the control of knowledge is not called into question. And in order to call into question the modern/colonial foundation of the control of knowledge, it is necessary to focus on the knower rather than on the known. It means to go to the very assumptions that sustain locus enunciations.

## A2: Predictions

#### Predictions good is not responsive to our argument – predicting the future is possible, but assuming that Eurocentric predictions are objective and neutral is violent. They base their advantages off of incomplete knowledge from biased institutions. All of our links are reasons to disregard their predictions in favor of embracing the possibility of other knowledge existing.

Grosfoguel 2007 [Ramon, UC Berkeley, FORTHCOMING IN RAMÓN GROSFOGUEL, JOSÉ DAVID SALDÍVAR AND NELSON MALDONADO TORRES (EDS.) UNSETTLING POSTCOLONIALITY: COLONIALITY, TRANSMODERNITY AND BORDER THINKING (DUKE UNIVERSITY PRESS; 2007). DECOLONIZING POLITICAL-ECONOMY AND POST-COLONIAL STUDIES: TRANSMODERNITY, BORDER THINKING, AND GLOBAL COLONIALITY, <http://www.afyl.org/descolonizingeconomy.pdf>]

The first point to discuss is the contribution of racial/ethnic and feminist subaltern perspectives to epistemological questions. The hegemonic Eurocentric paradigms that have informed western philosophy and sciences in the “modern/colonial capitalist/patriarchal world-system” (Grosfoguel 2005; 2006b) for the last 500 hundred years assume a universalistic, neutral, objective point of view. Chicana and black feminist scholars (Moraga and Anzaldua 1983; Collins 1990) as well as thirdworld scholars inside and outside the United States (Dussel 1977; Mignolo 2000) reminded us that we always speak from a particular location in the power structures. Nobody escapes the class, sexual, gender, spiritual, linguistic, geographical, and racial hierarchies of the “modern/colonial capitalist/patriarchal world-system”. As feminist scholar Donna Haraways (1988) states, our knowledges are always situated. Black feminist scholars called this perspective “afro-centric epistemology” (Collins 1990) (which is not equivalent to the afrocentrist perspective) while Latin American Philosopher of Liberation Enrique Dussel called it “geopolitics of knowledge” (Dussel 1977) and following Fanon (1967) and Anzaldua (1987) I will use the term “body-politics of knowledge.” This is not only a question about social values in knowledge production or the fact that our knowledge is always partial. The main point here is the locus of enunciation, that is, the geo-political and body-political location of the subject that speaks. In Western philosophy and sciences the subject that speaks is always hidden, concealed, erased from the analysis. The “ego-politics of knowledge” of Western philosophy has always privilege the myth of a non-situated “Ego”. Ethnic/racial/gender/sexual epistemic location and the subject that speaks are always decoupled. By delinking ethnic/racial/gender/sexual epistemic location from the subject that speaks, Western philosophy and sciences are able to produce a myth about a Truthful universal knowledge that covers up, that is, conceals who is speaking as well as the geo-political and body-political epistemic location in the structures of colonial power/knowledge from which the subject speaks. It is important here to distinguish the “epistemic location” from the “social location.” The fact that one is socially located in the oppressed side of power relations, does not automatically mean that he/she is epistemically thinking from a subaltern epistemic location. Precisely, the success of the modern/colonial world-system consist in making subjects that are socially located in the oppressed side of the colonial difference, to think epistemically like the ones on the dominant positions. Subaltern epistemic perspectives are knowledge coming from below that produces a critical perspective of hegemonic knowledge in the power relations involved. I am not claiming an epistemic populism where knowledge produced from below is automatically an epistemic subaltern knowledge. What I am claiming is that all knowledges are epistemically located in the dominant or the subaltern side of the power relations and that this is related to the geo- and body-politics of knowledge. The disembodied and unlocated neutrality and objectivity of the ego-politics of knowledge is a Western myth.

## AT: Cede the Political

#### The focus on politics proper ignores the ability of the alternative to have effects across the political spectrum and misunderstands the need for new types of political organization

Misoczky and Flores 2012 [Ceci Misoczky Professora Adjunta no Programa de Pós-Graduação em Administração da Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul and Rafael Kruter Flores, Doutorando em Administração no Programa de Pós-Graduação em Administração da Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, Contributions of Latin American revolutionary intellectuals for the study of the organization of liberating struggles REBELA, v. 2, n. 1, jun. 2012

In a different direction, we are convinced that the focus on the organization of social anti-capitalist struggles is a relevant academic praxis, because it opposes the hegemonic definition of organization (as a synonym of enterprise) in a context of worldwide dominance of the managerial discourse. The aim is to produce counter-hegemonic knowledge in the very space where the hegemonic managerial discourse is produced and reproduced, and to contribute for the emancipation of OS (or at least ofe the parts of OS which intend to be critical) from the hegemony of management. We believe, with Neuhaus and Calello (2006, p. 2), that researches may “be critical interventions, both in the spaces where they are done - where potential forces of resistance to the hegemonic power are concentrated; and in the researchers themselves”. The first step to widen the ways in which we study requires the abandonment of restrictive understandings of organization as a unit of analysis (Cooke, 2004 and 2010; Dar, 2008). Cooper and Burell (1988, p. 106) and Böhm (2005) had already indicated the direction of an expanded conception of organization as an ongoing process “that occurs within the wider ‘body’ of society”. In our research group, we have been exploring alternative ways of defining organization in order to deal with our focus of interest - the organization of social struggles. Organizations have been conceived as the collective inter-subjective act which is, simultaneously, a means for the praxis of liberation and a learning space for the experimentation of organizational practices compatible with liberating struggles (MISOCZKY, 2010). As part of this research project we felt the need to engage with the thought of Latin American intellectuals. The fact that the development of OS in Latina America can be understood as a distorted version of the functionalist or the critical thought of the Centre has already been recognized. Despite such dominance scholars often express the uncomfortable sense that such approaches do not really explain what happens in their countries, while acknowledging that these frameworks give them recognition in the international arena, which is another way to say that to be allowed in you must deny your own identity (IBARRA- COLADO, 2006). We can say, using the expression of Schwarz (1992), that the hegemonic version of Latin American and Brazilian OS is made of texts which do not express marks of location, which do not offer reflections about the peculiarities of our space of enunciation or about how social and institutional contexts limit and condition the production of ideas. But this is not truth concerning the wider critical (often revolutionary) intellectual Latin American production, marked by a vast and rich cultural tradition. When we mention the Latin American cultural tradition or social thought we are opposing the construction of Latin America as an object of representation. This last expression means, for Moraña (1998), an image that defines its existence through the watching eyes, as the place of the other – an exotic pre-theoretical marginal place when confronted with metropolitan discourses. Instead, we are stating the existence of a creative, original and autonomous tradition, resulting from processes of transculturation.

## AT: Util Good

#### Their emphasis on spectacles of violence enables them to accept the rules of current power structures as part of a ritualized acquiescence to white supremacy. This makes everyday forms of violence unrecognizable. Utilitarianism is the tyranny of the majority.

Martinot & Sexton 2003 [Steve & Jared, Steve is a lecturer at San Francisco State University in the Center for Interdisciplinary Programs Jared is Associate Professor African American Studies School of Humanities Associate Professor, Film & Media Studies School of Humanities at UC Irvine Ph.D., University of California, Berkeley, Comparative Ethnic Studies, “The Avant-Garde of White Supremacy, Social Identities, Volume 9, Number 2, 2003 p.171-172]

Most theories of white supremacy seek to plumb the depths of its excessiveness, beyond the ordinary; they miss the fact that racism is a mundane affair. The fundamental excess of the paradigm of policing which infuses this culture is wholly banal. Those theories overlook that fact in favor of extant extravagance, spectacle, or the ‘deep psychology’ of rogue elements and become complicit in perpetuating white supremacy. The reality is an invidious ethos of excess that, instead, constitutes the surface of everything in this society. For some time now, the intellectual quest for racism’s supposedly hidden meaning has afforded a refuge from confrontations with this banality, even its possible acknowledgement. The most egregious aspect of this banality is our tacit acquiescence to the rules of race and power, to the legitimacy white supremacy says it has, regardless of their total violation of reason and comprehensibility. Our "tacit acquiescence" is the real silent source of white supremacist tenacity and power. As William C. Harris, II wrote in the aftermath of Tyisha Miller’s murder by the police: It is heartbreaking to be an American citizen and have to say this, but I do have to say this. We have almost, and I stress almost, become accustomed to police shooting innocent, unarmed, young, black males. That in itself is bad enough, and one was at one time inclined to think it couldn't get any worse, but it gets worse…. Now we have police killing our young black females. It can't get any worse than that. Harris is right; yet he also sells himself out because he acquiesces in the process of decrying acquiescence. He does not draw the line between respect for persons and impunity. He continues: "Even if she grabbed a gun, was it necessary to shoot at her twenty-seven times? I know it’s less than 41, but *that's still too many times to shoot* at a sleeping female—black, brown, yellow or white" (emphasis added). Why isn’t one bullet too many times to shoot anybody? It is the job of the spectacular (and sensational reports about the subtle) to draw attention away from the banality of police murder as standard operating procedure. Spectacle is a form of camouflage. It does not conceal anything; it simply renders it unrecognizable. One looks at it and does not see it. It appears in disguise. Harris, for example, looks at acquiescence and cannot see it. Camouflage is a relationship between the one dissimulating their appearance and the one who is fooled, who looks and cannot see. Like racialization as a system of meanings assigned to the body, police spectacle is itself the form of appearance of this banality. Their endless assault reflects the idea that race is a social envelope, a system of social categorization dropped over the heads of people like clothes. Police impunity serves to distinguish between the racial uniform itself and the elsewhere that mandates it. They constitute the distinction between those whose human being is put permanently in question and those for whom it goes without saying. Police spectacle is not the effect of the racial uniform; rather, it is the police uniform that is producing re-racialization. Nothing better exemplifies this distinction than the structure of derogatory language. Derogatory terms do not mean; they assault. Their intention is not to communicate but to harm. Thus they are not discursive signs or linguistic statements but modes of aggression. They express a structure of power and domination, a hierarchy that contextualizes them and gives them their force. As gestures of assault they reflect their users status as a member of the dominant group. The derogatory term does more than speak; it silences. That ability to silence derives from the fact that, in turning its hegemonic position to account, it turns the racialized other into a language for whiteness itself. Those situated lower on the hierarchy have no viable means of defending themselves. This, in effect, renders the derogation unanswerable in its own terms. The derogatory term obtrudes with a small daily violence whose form is gratuitous, without motivation in the situation in which it is used, and whose content is to render that situation dominated by white supremacy. If it sits at the heart of the language of racism it is because it is banal and everyday even while symbolizing racism’s utmost violence, the verbal form of its genocidal trajectory. Those who use derogatory terms repeatedly are putting themselves in a continual state of aggression; turning their objective complicity with a structured relation of white supremacist dominance into an active investment or affirmation. Such modes of assault demonstrate a specific obsession with those denigrated that characterizes the socius of white supremacy, its demands for allegiance, its conditions of membership, its residence in viciousness. Because it is gratuitous and unanswerable, the derogatory term grants itself impunity, reiterates of the excess at the core of each racist event without calling its ethics into question. The prevalence of derogatory terms in US conversation goes unnoticed, seen simply on the margin of common sense, as opposed to an index of white supremacy. It is a small matter, when set against such things as, for instance, the legal codes of Jim Crow or the government’s assassination of Fred Hampton. Yet derogation comes in many different forms—as stories, aphorisms, discourses, legal statutes, political practices, etc. The repetition of derogation becomes the performance of white supremacist identity, over and over again. The derogatory term occupies the very center of the structure of white supremacy. The gratuitousness of its repetition bestows upon white supremacy an inherent discontinuity. It stops and starts self-referentially, at whim. To theorize some political, economic, or psychological necessity for its repetition, its unending return to violence, its need to kill is to lose a grasp on that gratuitousness by thinking its performance is representable. And therein it hides. If the hegemony of white supremacy is already (and only) excessive, its acts of repetition are its access to unrepresentability; they dissolve its excessiveness into invisibility as simply daily occurrence. We can, for example, name the fact of Albert Woodfox’s nearly 30-year solitary confinement in Angola Prison, but it exceeds the capacity of representation. (The ideological and cultural structure that conceives of and enables doing that to a person in the first place is inarticulable.) The inner dynamic of our attempts to understand its supposedly underlying meaning or purpose masks its ethic of impunity from us. White supremacy is nothing more than what we perceive of it; there is nothing beyond it to give it legitimacy, nothing beneath it nor outside of it to give it justification. The structure of its banality is the surface on which it operates. Whatever mythic content it pretends to claim is a priori empty. Its secret is that it has no depth. There is no dark corner that, once brought to the light of reason, will unravel its system. In each instance of repetition, "what is repeated is the emptiness of repetition," an articulation that "does not speak and yet has always been said" (Foucault 54). In other words, its truth lies in the rituals that sustain its circuitous contentless logic; it is, in fact, nothing but its very practices.

## AT: Realism

#### Thayer’s interpretation of how evolution affects decision making is flawed. People’s rational choices are overridden by their emotional ones and morality.

Anhart 09 [Presidential Research Professor of Political Science at [Northern Illinois University](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Northern_Illinois_University) in [DeKalb, Illinois](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DeKalb,_Illinois). “Darwin, Thucydides, and International Relations” <http://darwinianconservatism.blogspot.com/2009/10/darwin-thucydides-and-international.html>]

Any general theory of politics assumes a theory of human nature. A small but growing number of political scientists have been applying a Darwinian theory of human biological nature to various topics in political science. The final aim of such work would be to turn political science into a biopolitical science. So, for example, research in human biology and Darwinian theory can illuminate the study of international relations. One can see this in two books: Bradley Thayer's Darwin and International Relations: On the Evolutionary Origins of War and Ethnic Conflict (2004) and Stephen Rosen's War and Human Nature (2005). Although they agree on many points, Rosen and Thayer disagree on the implications of a biological approach to international relations for assessing rational choice theory. Rational choice theorists assume that human beings are by nature rational egoists who rationally maximize their interests. Applying rational choice theory to international relations means that decisions of war and peace are explained as rational calculations of interests by states competing with one another. Thayer believes that a Darwinian view of international relations confirms rational choice theory by explaining the human nature of rational egoism as ultimately caused by natural selection in the evolutionary competition of human beings for scarce resources. Rosen believes, however, that a biological understanding of human nature shows that rational choice theory is only partially true, because in stressing rational calculations of interest, it ignores the emotional dispositions of fear and honor as factors shaping human decisions in international relations. In his history of the Peloponnesian war, Thucydides has some Athenian envoys in Sparta say that the imperial policies of Athens are motivated by fear, interest, and honor. Rosen says that the aim of his book is to show "that there is a biological argument that Thucydides was right, that fear and honor play a role in human politics along with calculations of interest, but also that the other issues he analyzed, such as the nature of the political systems present in the ancient Greek world, matter as well" (2). Human beings are inclined by their biological nature to be rational egoists, and so the rational choice theorists are right about this. But that same biological nature also inclines human beings to feel social emotions that make them care about others and about their status in relation to others. So, for example, their emotional desire for honor and fear of being dishonored might move them to act contrary to their material interests. Moreover, Rosen argues, these complex motivations of human biological nature are manifested in the military and political behavior of states in international relations. Rosen applies research in neuroscience on the complex interplay of reason and emotion in the brain and endocrine system to explain the decision-making of leaders in times of international crises. Through case studies, he argues that American presidents have had to make quick decisions in complex international circumstances through emotional pattern recognition shaped by memories of emotionally charged experiences from the past. They thus employed neural pathways of information gathering and decision-making shaped by natural selection in human evolutionary history. Rosen argues that while the termination of war can result from calculated decisions about material interests, this can also result from a collapse of the will to fight among the losers, which arises from emotional distress with a neurophysiological basis. Again, Rosen's general point is that decisions about war and peace arise from the complex interaction of reason and emotion as shaped by the evolved nature of the human brain. One prominent manifestation of evolved human nature in international relations is the natural desire for status and dominance. Those who fill the highest offices for deciding issues of war and peace tend to be ambitious people who desire dominance over others. Rosen identifies such people as mostly high testosterone men who manifest a desire for dominance shaped in evolutionary history where men competed with one another for preeminence. People like Abraham Lincoln, Franklin Roosevelt, and Winston Churchill are moved by a desire for distinction--for honor and glory--that goes beyond any selfish calculation of material interests. Tyrants show a similar desire for dominance. But Rosen argues that ambitious leaders like Lincoln, FDR, and Churchill do not have the tyrannical souls of people like Hitler, Stalin, and Mao. He claims that tyrannical behavior emerges from "the personal character of tyrants combined with the institutional character of tyrannies" (178). Rosen's point here is unclear. But the idea seems to be that those of tyrannical temperaments will rise to the top in turbulent circumstances where there are few institutional checks or limits on the ruthless and opportunistic pursuit of power. One fundamental lesson that emerges from Rosen's biopolitical analysis is the need to channel the rivalry of politically ambitious people through an institutional structure of checks and balances so that ambition counteracts ambition. Here, again, Rosen agrees with Thucydides, who suggested that factional conflict in the ancient Greek cities could have been tamed by mixed regimes in which oligarchic and democratic elements balanced one another. Although Thayer agrees with Rosen in using biological science to explain international relations, Thayer sees biological explanations as apply only to the level of ultimate causes in the genes, as distinguished from social and cultural explanations as applying to the level of proximate causes in the environment. Human behavior arises from a complex interaction of ultimate and proximate causes.

#### Realism ignores war and conflict’s effect on society. This eliminates the possibilities of identifying other causes of war and possible reductions or solutions to its existence.

Roberts 08 (Adrian Bua, “Contesting Neo-Realism and Liberal Idealism; Where do Hopes for a ‘Perpetual Peace’ Lie?” e-International Relations. http://www.e-ir.info/?p=507)

Realism may not be “losing itself” in presently hegemonic ideas, a synchronic understanding of history enables its core argument to survive throughout historical periods. Howeverby extrapolating trans-historic conclusions,it loses itself in the “bigger picture”, failing to consider how different circumstances(beyond power balances)affect war and ignoring the possibility to prescribe changes for its elimination. Realism does not see the ideas prevalent in the existing organization of society as self-evident natural laws or “higher truths”, it sees a pattern which has survived changes in societal organization and produces its own “higher truths” from it, ignoring the fact that changes in societal organization affect war.This condemns realism to the conclusion that war is an inevitable and immutable part of international relations, burdening discourse with pessimism and perpetuating complacency. Scholars should aim to prescribe changes to the existing order with a view to improving it.The internal nature of states, the nature of relations amongst them and different international “ordering principles” account for variations in war and peace. Analysis of these differences- far from producing utopian prescriptions - couldprovide humanity with very real possibilities for eliminating, significantly reducing, or at least preventing the tragedy that is war.Accusations of futile utopianism will surely be made against such a claim. However, I would suggest that it is the realist who engages in a largely futile endeavour. For if realism believes its own conclusions - the necessarily power maximisingbehaviour of states, the anarchical international order and the inevitability of conflict – it eliminates the possibility for any positive contributions transcending these factors, limiting analysis of the international system to mere descriptiveness.Ultimately, realism suffocates International Relations like Creationist dogma suffocates Evolutionary Science.

# Aff Answers

## General Thoughts

Use Andy’s POSTAL model for your 2ac.

Capitalism good is responsive to all of the neoliberalism portions of this Kritik, so you can look there for impact turns if you need them.

The best way to beat this Kritik is to sufficiently defend the epistemology of your aff and then just win your case advantages, it doesn’t take a lot of fancy tricks. Win util, win epistemology not first, and case outweighs.

## Perm

#### It is important we consider the plan and alternative as a bridge for multiple vantage points of knowledge

Bortoluci and Jansen 2013 [Jose ́ H. Bortoluci and Robert S. Jansen Instructor at University of Michigan and Assistant Professor, Department of Sociology, University of Michigan TOWARD A POSTCOLONIAL SOCIOLOGY: THE VIEW FROM LATIN AMERICA, Postcolonial Sociology Political Power and Social Theory, Volume 24, 199–229 Copyright r 2013

For better or worse, many scholars of colonial and post-colonial Latin America – especially social scientists – are put off by postcolonial studies and would hesitate to have their work considered under the heading. The ongoing tendency of much of the interdisciplinary field of postcolonial studies to identify with a strong post-structuralist program (e.g., Mignolo, 2002; Young, 1990) has prompted many social scientists to criticize its lack of sociological depth – or simply to avoid it altogether. At the same time, many in postcolonial studies have remained suspicious of the social sciences, which they frequently accuse of ‘‘positivism’’ and complicity with other ‘‘colonialist’’ modes of knowledge production (e.g., Mignolo, 2002; Spivak, 1988). Yet despite such mutual distrust, we argue that there are resonances between many of the points advanced by postcolonial theorists (at least by those who have not embraced radical deconstructionism) and those suggested by sociologists devoted to the study of post-colonial societies. We propose that it is useful for sociologists to take seriously the critical questions raised by postcolonial studies; but also that postcolonial studies stands to benefit by considering recent social scientific scholarship on post- colonial societies. Our effort to foster conversation between Latin America and other world regions – as well as, inevitably, between the social sciences and the humanities – is complicated by the lack of a common conceptual vocabulary. While not employing an explicit language of ‘‘postcolonialism,’’ many scholars of Latin America have developed analyses and perspectives that are in many ways compatible with those advanced by postcolonial theorists. Thus, in order to foster dialogue, it is necessary to look beyond use of the term ‘‘postcolonial’’ and to focus instead on the ideas and phenomena under consideration. This requires specifying what we mean by a sociologically informed postcolonial perspective.8 We argue that such an intellectual project can be distilled into four main points of analytical emphasis.9

#### The permutation is best – it creates the possibility of combinging with other movements and practices

Santos 2004 [Boaventura de Sousa, professor of sociology, scho of economics, university of Coimbra, distinguished legal scholar law school, university of Wisconsin-madison, “the world social forum: a user’s manual, http://www.ces.uc.pt/bss/documentos/fsm\_eng.pdf

Reform or revolution. This cleavage carries the weight of the tradition of the western left even though it can be found elsewhere, most notably in India. It is the cleavage between those who think that another world is possible, by the gradual transformation of the unjust world in which we live, through legal reform and mechanisms of representative democracy; and those who think that the world we live in is a capitalist world which will never tolerate reforms that will question or disturb its logic of operation and that it must therefore be overthrown and replaced by a socialist world. This is also regarded as a cleavage between moderates and radicals. Either field comprises a wide variety of positions. For instance, among revolutionaries, there is a clear cleavage between the old left, that aspires to a kind of state socialism, the anarchists, that are radically anti-Statist, and some newer left rather ambivalent about the role of the State in a socialist society. Although they amount to a very minor proportion of the WSF, the anarchists are among the fiercest critics of reformism, which they claim controls the WSF’s leadership. This cleavage reverberates, albeit not linearly, in strategic options and options for political action. Among the most salient ones should be counted the strategic option between reforming/democratizing the institutions of neoliberal globalization (WTO and International Financial Institutions) or fighting to eliminate and replace them; and the option for political action between, on the one hand, constructive dialogue and engagement with those institutions, and, on the other, confrontation with them. This cleavage translates itself into opposite positions, either as regards the diagnosis of contemporary societies, or as regards the evaluation of the WSF itself. As to the diagnosis, according to one stance, contemporary societies are viewed as societies where there are multiple discriminations and injustices, not all of them attributable to capitalism. Capitalism, in turn, is not homogeneous, and the struggle must focus on its most exclusionary form – neoliberalism. According to another stance, contemporary societies are viewed as intrinsically unjust and discriminatory because they are capitalist. Capitalism is an enveloping system in which class discrimination feeds on sexual, racial and other kinds of discrimination. Hence, the struggle must focus on capitalism as whole and not against any single one of its manifestations. As to the evaluation of the WSF, the WSF is viewed now as the embryo of an efficacious contestation to neoliberal globalization, for confronting neoliberal globalization at the global scale where more social injustice has been produced, now as a movement which, because it is not grounded on the principle of the class struggle, will accomplish little beyond a few rhetorical changes in dominant capitalist discourse. What is new about the WSF as a political entity is that the majority of the movements and organizations that participate in it do not recognize themselves in these cleavages and refuse to take part in debates about them. There is great resistance to assuming rigidly a given position and even greater to labeling it. The majority of movements and organizations have political experiences in which moments of confrontation alternate or combine with moments of dialogue and engagement, in which long range visions of social change coexist with the tactical possibilities of the political and social conjuncture in which the struggles take place, in which radical denunciations of capitalism do not paralyze the energy for small changes when the big changes are not possible. Above all, for many movements and organizations, this cleavage is westcentric or northcentric, and is more useful to understand the past of the left than its future. Indeed, many movements and organizations do not recognize themselves, for the same reasons, in the dichotomy left and right.

## Cede the Political – State Key

#### We cannot abandon institutional change – the alternative is inflexible to differing conditions of the affirmative – a permutation allows flexibility in praxis

Santos 2004 [Boaventura de Sousa, professor of sociology, scho of economics, university of Coimbra, distinguished legal scholar law school, university of Wisconsin-madison, “the world social forum: a user’s manual, http://www.ces.uc.pt/bss/documentos/fsm\_eng.pdf

On the contrary, the supporters of institutional struggles assume that the “system” is contradictory, a political and social relation where it is possible to fight and where failure is not the only possible outcome. In modernity the State was the center of this system. In the course of the twentieth century the popular classes conquered important institutional spaces, of which the welfare system in the global North is a good manifestation. The fact that the welfare system is now in crisis and the “opening” that it offered the popular classes is now being closed up, does not mean that the process is irreversible. Indeed, it won’t be so if the movements and organizations continue to struggle inside the institutions and the legal system. This cleavage is not spread out at random among the movements that comprise the WSF. In general the stronger movements and organizations are those that more frequently privilege institutional struggles, whereas the less strong are those that more frequently privilege direct action. This cleavage is much livelier among movements and organizations of the North than of the South. The large majority of the movements, however, refuse to take sides in this cleavage. According to them, the concrete legal and political conditions must dictate the kind of struggle to be privileged. Conditions may actually recommend the sequential or simultaneous use of the two kinds of struggle. Historically, direct action was at the genesis of progressive juridico- institutional changes, and it was always necessary to combat the cooptation or even subversion of such changes through direct action.

## Impact Framing – Util Good

#### Inherent equality of all beings requires utilitiarianism

Cummiskey 1996 [David, Associate Professor of Philosophy at Bates College and Ph.D. from UM, “Kantian Consequentialism”, p. 145-146]

In the next section, I will defend this interpretation of the duty of beneficence. For the sake of argument, however, let us first simply assume that beneficence does not require significant self-sacrifice and see what follows. Although Kant is unclear on this point, we will assume that significant self-sacrifices are supererogatory.[11](http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/oso/private/content/philosophy/0195094530/p046.html?en=acprof-0195094530-note-183#acprof-0195094530-note-183) Thus, if I must harm one in order to save many, the individual whom I will harm by my action is not morally required to affirm the action. On the other hand, I have a duty to do all that I can for those in need. As a consequence I am faced with a dilemma: If I act, I harm a person in a way that a rational being need not consent to; if I fail to act, then I do not do my duty to those in need and thereby fail to promote an objective end. Faced with such a choice, which horn of the dilemma is more consistent with the formula of the end-in-itself? We must not obscure the issue by characterizing this type of case as the sacrifice of individuals for some abstract "social entity." It is not a question of some persons having to bear the cost for some elusive "overall social good."Instead**,** the question is whether some persons must bear the inescapable cost for the sake of other persons. Robert Nozick, for example, argues that "to use a person in this way does not sufficiently respect and take account of the fact that he is a separate person, that his is the only life he has."[12](http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/oso/private/content/philosophy/0195094530/p047.html?en=acprof-0195094530-note-184#acprof-0195094530-note-184) But why is this not equally true of all those whom we do not save through our failure to act? By emphasizing solely the one who must bear the cost if we act, we fail to sufficiently respect and take account of the many other separate persons, each with only one life, who will bear the cost of our inaction. In such a situation, what would a conscientious Kantian agent, an agent motivated by the unconditional value of rational beings, choose? A morally good agent recognizes that the basis of all particular duties is the principle that "rational nature exists as an end in itself" (GMM 429). Rational nature as such is the supreme objective end of all conduct. If one truly believes that all rational beings have an equal value, then the rational solution to such a dilemma involves maximally promoting the lives and liberties of as many rational beings as possible (chapter [5](http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/oso/private/content/philosophy/0195094530/p033.html#acprof-0195094530-chapter-5)). In order to avoid this conclusion**,** the non-consequentialist Kantian needs to justify agent-centered constraints. As we saw in chapter [1](http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/oso/private/content/philosophy/0195094530/p017.html#acprof-0195094530-chapter-1), however, even most Kantian deontologists recognize that agent-centered constraints require a non-value-based rationale. But we have seen that Kant's normative theory is based on an unconditionally valuable end. How can a concern for the value of rational beings lead to a refusal to sacrifice rational beings even when this would prevent other more extensive losses of rational beings? If the moral law is based on the value of rational beings and their ends, then what is the rationale for prohibiting a moral agent from maximally promoting these two tiers of value? If I sacrifice some for the sake of others, **I** do not use them arbitrarily, and **I** do not deny the unconditional value of rational beings. Persons may have "dignity, that is, an unconditional and incomparable worth" that transcends any market value (GMM 436), but persons also have a fundamental equality that dictates that some must sometimes give way for the sake of others(chapters [5](http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/oso/private/content/philosophy/0195094530/p033.html#acprof-0195094530-chapter-5) and [7](http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/oso/private/content/philosophy/0195094530/p041.html#acprof-0195094530-chapter-7)). The concept of the end-in-itself does not support the view that we may never force another to bear some cost in order to benefit others. If one focuses on the equal value of all rational beings, then equal consideration suggests that one may have to sacrifice some to save many.

## Impact Framing – Consequentialism First

#### Privileging ethics over political consequences dooms the alt

Isaac, 02 [Jeffrey, Professor of Political Science and director of the Center for the Study of Democracy and Public Life at Indiana University, Dissent, “Ends, Means, and Politics”, Spring, ebsco]

Power is not a dirty word or an unfortunate feature of the world. It is the core of politics. Power is the ability to effect outcomes in the world. Politics, in large part, involves contests over the distribution and use of power. To ac- complish anything in the political world, one must attend to the means that are necessary to bring it about. And to develop such means is to develop, and to exercise, power. To say this is not to say that power is beyond moral- ity. It is to say that power is not reducible to morality. As writers such as Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Hannah Arendt have taught, an unyielding concern with moral goodness undercuts political responsibility. The concern may be morally laudable, re- flecting a kind of personal integrity, but it suf- fers from three fatal flaws: (1) It fails to see that the purity of one’s intention does not ensure the achievement of what one intends. Ab- juring violence or refusing to make common cause with morally compromised parties may seem like the right thing; but if such tactics entail impotence, then it is hard to view them as serving any moral good beyond the clean con- science of their supporters; (2) it fails to see that in a world of real violence and injustice, moral purity is not simply a form of powerlessness; it is often a form of **complicity in injustice.** This is why, from the standpoint of poli- tics—as opposed to religion—pacifism is always a potentially immoral stand. In categorically re- pudiating violence, it refuses in principle to oppose certain violent injustices with any ef- fect; and (3) it fails to see that politics is as much about unintended consequences as it is about intentions; it is the effects of action, rather than the motives of action, that is most significant. Just as the alignment with “good” may engender impotence, it is often the pur- suit of “good” that generates evil. This is the lesson of communism in the twentieth century: it is not enough that one’s goals be sincere or idealistic; it is equally important, always, to ask about the effects of pursuing these goals and to judge these effects in pragmatic and histori- cally contextualized ways. Moral absolutism in- hibits this judgment. It **alienates those who are not true believers**. It promotes arrogance. And it undermines political effectiveness.

## Impact Framing – Economic Calculations good

#### Economic calculations are ethical - we requires choices between competing demands – economics creates a system for stabilizing the demands of the Other as preferences, allowing for ethical dialogue through market competition and negotiation

Aasland 2009 [Dag, Prof. of Economics @ U of Agder, Norway, Ethics and Economy: After Levinas, pgs. 65-66]

What is original in Levinas compared to other authors who also have defined being a human as being related to another human, such as, for instance, Buber and Løgstrup (mentioned in the previous chapter), and those representing the ethics of care (also presented in the previous chapter), is that Levinas acknowledges that I not only meet the Other, but also the third, as the Other. By meeting the third I am again confronted with an appeal for mercy. From this – as a result of an intention of being responsible – I am forced to evaluate, compare, reason and to seek what is just. Justice exerts violence but is still better than injustice. In my efforts towards more justice I must compare, and in this comparing I may have to count, also money; it may even be necessary to set a price for a human life, something that, from the point of view of mercy, is a scandal, but still necessary, because the third is also there. It is necessary to count; the question is why I count. Is it out of my *conatus*, which, if it is allowed to unfold freely without being questioned (or, alternatively, if I ignore the questioning), will lead to violence? Or is it out of mercy, which comes to me as an imperative in the encounter with the Other, and which, in the encounter with the third – as the Other – drives me to seek always more justice? This is not only about counting, it is about being in general – why and how I am. Levinas will insist that “To be or not to be, that is *not* the question” (Cohen in Levinas, 1985: 10). Instead, it is a question of how I am a being together with others in the world. Ethics comes before ontology. An objection to Noddings’ ethics of care is that the mother-infant- situation is not a common one. It is instead a special situation where special qualities are called forth, that are not found elsewhere in society. To believe that the good is natural can be naïve; it can even be dangerous. Looking around in the world today the opposite would be more natural to claim: we have a natural inclination towards controlling and reducing the Other, with violence, physical or psychological. But through the encounter with the Other we are told that this is wrong. It is this small ‘source of the good’ which dominates a mother when she is alone with her infant. At the moment we have to relate to more than one other we understand that we need to make some efforts to understand the situation of the other individuals, their special situations and needs, so that we can know what is just in our dealing with others. It is his discussion of the meeting with the third that makes Levinas’ philosophy so relevant to economy, although most presentations of his philosophy concentrate on the encounter with the Other, and may thus cause the misunderstanding that this is his ethics, and consequently a quite impossible one. However, as mentioned earlier, Levinas’ description of the encounter with the Other is his answer to the question of what is the meaning of ethics, or, why we at all (at least sometimes) want justice. In short, to Levinas, the task of the economy is to contribute to justice. The cause of the striving for justice is the imperative of mercy in the encounter with the Other. And as there is always more than one other my experience of the encounter with the Other cannot be directly transferred to social reality. I must perform a brutal transformation from mercy to justice (but which nevertheless is less brutal than me not caring about justice), and in doing so I need as much as I can possibly acquire of what is available of detailed knowledge of each particular situation, as well as my ability to reason logically. It is not only a fact that ethics is necessary for the economy. Economy is also necessary for ethics. Just as a house may be a concrete security for a loan, the economy is a concrete security for ethics. Without economic goods and needs and the accompanying knowledge for myself, there would have been no need for ethics. An ethics for the other can only be expressed as long as the other has specific needs competing with mine. Only then can I act for the other instead of acting for myself, and thus set the needs of the other before those of me. Or, put in another way: angels do not need ethics, because they have no needs and thus no need to help each other

## Impact Turn – Liberalism Good

#### International liberalism is true and prevents war– cooperation and interdependence will determine state behavior.

Fettweis 2006 [Christopher, Profess at the National Security Decision Making Department at US Naval War College, 'A Revolution in International Relation Theory: Or, What If Mueller Is Right?,' International Studies Review]

Most IR scholarship carries on as if such an anomaly simply does not exist. This is especially true of realists, whose theories typically leave little room for fundamental systemic change (Lebow 1994). "The game of politics does not change from age to age," argued a skeptical Colin Gray (1999:163), "let alone from decade to decade." Indeed, the most powerful counterargument to Mueller—and one that is ultimately unanswerable—is that this period of peace will be temporary and that someday these trends will be reversed. Neorealists traditionally contend that the anarchic structure of the system stacks the deck against long-term stability, which accounts for "war's dismal recurrence throughout the millennia," in the words of Kenneth Waltz (1989:44). Other scholars are skeptical about the explanatory power of ideas, at least as independent variables in models of state behavior (Mearsheimer 1994/1995; Brooks and Wohlforth 2000/2001; Copeland 2003). However, one need not be convinced about the potential for ideas to transform international politics to believe that major war is extremely unlikely to recur. Mueller, Mandelbaum, Ray, and others may give primary credit for the end of major war to ideational evolution akin to that which made slavery and dueling obsolete, but others have interpreted the causal chain quite differently. Neoliberal institutionalists have long argued that complex economic interdependence can have a pacifying effect upon state behavior (Keohane and Nye 1977, 1987). Richard Rosecrance (1986, 1999) has contended that evolution in socio-economic organization has altered the shortest, most rational route to state prosperity in ways that make war unlikely. Finally, many others have argued that credit for great power peace can be given to the existence of nuclear weapons, which make aggression irrational(Jervis 1989; Kagan et al. 1999). With so many overlapping and mutually reinforcing explanations, at times the end of major war may seem to be overdetermined (Jervis 2002:8–9). For purposes of the present discussion, successful identification of the exact cause of this fundamental change in state behavior is probably not as important as belief in its existence. In other words, the outcome is far more important than the mechanism. The importance of Mueller's argument for the field of IR is ultimately not dependent upon why major war has become obsolete, only that it has. Almost as significant, all these proposed explanations have one important point in common: they all imply that change will be permanent. Normative/ideational evolution is typically unidirectional—few would argue that it is likely, for instance, for slavery or dueling to return in this century. The complexity of economic interdependence is deepening as time goes on and going at a quicker pace. And, obviously, nuclear weapons cannot be uninvented and (at least at this point) no foolproof defense against their use seems to be on the horizon. The combination of forces that may have brought major war to an end seems to be unlikely to allow its return. The twentieth century witnessed an unprecedented pace of evolution in all areas of human endeavor, from science and medicine to philosophy and religion. In such an atmosphere, it is not difficult to imagine that attitudes toward the venerable institution of war may also have experienced rapid evolution and that its obsolescence could become plausible, perhaps even probable, in spite of thousands of years of violent precedent. The burden of proof would seem to be on those who maintain that the "rules of the game" of international politics, including the rules of war, are the lone area of human interaction immune to fundamental evolution and that, due to these immutable and eternal rules, war will always be with us. Rather than ask how major war could have grown obsolete, perhaps scholars should ask why anyone should believe that it could not.

#### Their arguments are hype – they romanticize the past and ignore empirical evidence

Fettweis 2006 [Christopher, Profess at the National Security Decision Making Department at US Naval War College, 'A Revolution in International Relation Theory: Or, What If Mueller Is Right?,' International Studies Review]

Mueller (1995:14) described the tendency of people to romanticize the past, elevating prior ages over the present, even if today for the first time there is no danger of major, cataclysmic war. Human beings have a tendency to look backward with misty eyes, to see the past as much more benign, simple, and innocent than it really was. … That is, no matter how much better the present gets, the past gets better in reflection, and we are, accordingly, always notably worse off than we used to be. Golden ages, thus, do happen, but we are never actually in them: they are always back there somewhere (or, sometimes, in the ungraspable future). "As big problems … become resolved," Mueller (1995:8) argues, "we tend to elevate smaller ones, sometimes by redefinition or by raising standards, to take their place." Today a golden age of peace may well be dawning, but human nature might make it impossible for both citizens and scholars to appreciate its benefits. Widespread recognition of fundamental changes in state behavior often occurs slowly—after all, long-held beliefs take time to change. Too many analysts have made deep emotional and intellectual investments based upon assumptions of static and unchanging behavior across regions and eras for there to be much rapid evolution in IR theory. In this case, the international system may be demonstrating a potential to change greater than that of the scholars who spend their lives observing it. But one point seems incontrovertible: if, indeed, major war has become obsolete, then the field of IR cannot remain simultaneously unchanged and accurate. The implications of great power peace would be hard to overestimate. In fact, only a few observers inside and outside the academy seem to have grasped the possibility that the world stands at the edge of such a golden age, terrorist incidents notwithstanding. "Here at the end of the 20th century," the late historian Stephen Ambrose (1999) argued toward the end of his life, "we once again live in a time where it is possible to believe in progress, to believe that things will get better." "Things" have gotten better for the vast majority of the world's people, a higher percentage of whom live in peace than at any time in history. And most importantly, **none** are experiencing **major war.** For the first time in history, it is possible to believe **they never will.**

## Impact – No impact/Liberalism solves

#### Institutional liberalism is distinct – doesn’t link to your intervention Ks

Cerny 2005 [Susanne Soederberg, Professor in International Development Studies @ Queen's University, Georg Menz, Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Pittsburgh, BA in International Relations, and Philip G. Cerny, Prof of Global Political Economy, pg 21, CH1: “ Different Roads to Globalization: Neoliberalism, the Competition State, and Politics in a More Open World,” Internalizing Globalization: The Rise of Neoliberalism and the Decline of National Varieties of Capitalism, PALGRAVE MACMILLAN: Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire]

In international relations and international political economy liberalism – and, today, neoliberalism – can also be seen as having two distinct meanings. The first of these originally derives from the quasi-idealist tradition of ‘liberal internationalism’ that was associated with the legacy of Woodrow Wilson and the League of Nations. Liberal internationalism involved the construction of international – intergovernmental – institutions made up of sovereign states, the provision of ‘collective security’, and the expansion of international law along relatively liberal lines. The United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights is seen as a key document in this tradition, along with UN sponsorship of development, health, food and housing programs, and the like.

The establishment of the Bretton Woods system of international economic institutions at the end of the Second World War is also seen to represent international economic liberalism – what John Gerard Ruggie called the postwar system of ‘embedded liberalism’. However, Ruggie’s analysis went much further, linking international economic liberalism with Americanstyle domestic liberalism (or European-style social democracy) through Keynesian macroeconomic policies, the welfare state, German-style neocorporatism, French-style indicative planning, the Bretton Woods system, and elements of the postwar consensus (Ruggie, 1982). It is this latter sort of domestic, interventionist liberalism that today’s neoliberalism opposes.

## Alt Solvency - Liberalism Inevitable

#### The liberal international order will persist indefinitely – multiple reasons the alt can’t solve

Ikenberry 2010 [G. John, Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University and a Global Eminence Scholar at Kyung Hee University, Korea“The Liberal International Order and its Discontents,” Millennium – Journal of International Studies 2010; 38; 509]

There are also reasons to think that this liberal order will persist, even if it continues to evolve. Firstly, the violent forces that have overthrown international orders in the past do not seem to operate today. We live in the longest period of ‘great power peace’ in modern history. The great powers have not found themselves at war with each other since the guns fell silent in 1945. This non-war outcome is certainly influenced by two realities: nuclear deterrence, which raises the costs of war, and the dominance of democracies, who have found their own pathway to peace. In the past, the great moments of order-building came in the aftermath of war when the old order was destroyed. War itself was a ratification of the view that the old order was no longer sustainable. War broke the old order apart, propelled shifts in world power and opened up the international landscape for new negotiations over the rules and principles of world politics. In the absence of great power war it is harder to clear the ground for new ‘constitutional’ arrangements. Secondly, this order is also distinctive in its integrative and expansive character. In essence, it is ‘easy to join and hard to overturn’. This follows most fundamentally from the fact that it is a liberal international order – in effect, it is an order that is relatively open and loosely rulebased. The order generates participants and stakeholders. Beyond this, there are three reasons why the architectural features of this post-war liberal order reinforce downward and outward integration. One is that the multilateral character of the rules and institutions create opportunities for access and participation. Countries that want to join in can do so; Japan found itself integrating through participation in the trade system and alliance partnership. More recently, China has taken steps to join, at least through the world trading system. Joining is not costless. Membership in institutional bodies such as the WTO must be voted upon by existing members and states must meet specific requirements. But these bodies are not exclusive or imperial. Secondly, the liberal order is organised around shared leadership and not just the United States. The G-7/8 is an example of a governance organisation that is based on a collective leadership, and the new G-20 grouping has emerged to provide expanded leadership. Finally, the order also provides opportunities for a wide array of states to gain access to the ‘spoils of modernity’. Again, this is not an imperial system in which the riches accrue disproportionately to the centre. States across the system have found ways to integrate into this order and experience economic gains and rapid growth along the way. Thirdly, rising states do not constitute a bloc that seeks to overturn or reorganise the existing international order. China, India, Russia, Brazil, South Africa and others all are seeking new roles and more influence within the global system. But they do not constitute a new coalition of states seeking global transformation. All of these states are capitalist and as such are deeply embedded in the world economy. Most of them are democratic and embrace the political principles of the older Western liberal democracies. At the same time, they all have different geopolitical interests. They are as diverse in their orientations as the rest of the world in regard to energy, religion and ideologies of development. They are not united by a common principled belief in a post-liberal world order. They are all very much inside the existing order and integrated in various ways into existing governance institutions. Fourthly, the major states in the system – the old great powers and rising states – all have complex alignments of interests. They all are secure in the sense that they are not threatened by other major states. All worry about radicalism and failed states. Even in the case of the most fraught relationships – such as the emerging one between the United States and China – there are shared or common interests in global issues related to energy and the environment. These interests are complex. There are lots of ways in which these countries will compete with each other and seek to push ‘adjustment’ to problems onto the other states. But it is precisely the complexity of these shared interests that creates opportunities and incentives to negotiate and cooperate – and, ultimately, to support the open and rule-based frameworks that allow for bargains and agreements to be reached. Overall, these considerations suggest that the leading states of the world system are travelling along a common pathway to modernity. They are not divided by great ideological clashes or emboldened by the potential gains from great power war. These logics of earlier orders are not salient today. Fascism, communism and theocratic dictatorships cannot propel you along the modernising pathway. In effect, if you want to be a modern great power you need to join the WTO. The capitalist world economy and the liberal rules and institutions that it supports – and that support it – are foundational to modernisation and progress. The United States and other Western states may rise or fall within the existing global system but the liberal character of that system still provides attractions and benefits to most states within it and on its edges.

## Framework - Realism

#### Evolutionary biology proves realism is inevitable

Thayer 2004 [Bradley, Associate Professor for the Department of Defense & Strategic Studies and a former Fellow @ the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, Darwin and International Relations: On the Evolutionary Origins of War and Ethnic Conflict]

Evolutionary theory allows realists to advance offensive realist arguments without seeking an ultimate cause in either the anarchic international state system or in theological or metaphysical ideas. Realism based on evolutionary theory reaches the same conclusions, but the ultimate causal mechanism is different: human evolution in the anarchic and perilous conditions of the late-Pliocene, Pleistocene, and most of the Holocene epochs. Specially, evolutionary theory explains why humans are egoistic, strive to dominate others, and make in-group/out-group distinctions. These adaptations in turn serve as a foundation for offensive realism. The central issue here is what causes states to behave as offensive realists predict. Mearsheimer advances a powerful argument that anarchy is the fundamental cause of such behavior. The fact that there is no world government compels the leaders of states to take steps to ensure their security, such as striving to have a powerful military, aggressing when forced to do so, and forging and maintaining alliances. This is what neorealists call a self-help system: leaders of states are forced to take these steps because nothing else can guarantee their security in the anarchic world of international relations. I argue that evolutionary theory also offers a fundamental cause for offensive realist behavior. Evolutionary theory explains why individuals are motivated to act as offensive realism expects, whether an individual is a captain of industry or a conquistador. My argument is that anarchy is even more important than most scholars of international relations recognize. The human environment of evolutionary adaptation was anarchic; our ancestors lived in a state of nature in which resources were poor and dangers from other humans and the environment were great-so great that it is truly remarkable that a mammal standing three feet high-without claws or strong teeth, not particularly strong or swift-survived and evolved to become what we consider human. Humans endured because natural selection gave them the right behaviors to last in those conditions. The environment produced the behaviors examined here: egoism, domination, and the in-group/out-group distinction. These specific traits are sufficient to explain why leaders will behave, in the proper circumstances, as offensive realists expect them to behave. That is, even if they must hurt other humans or risk injury to themselves, they will strive to maximize their power, defined as either control over others (for example, through wealth or leadership) or control over ecological circumstances (such as meeting their own and their family’s or tribe’s need for food, shelter, or other resources). Evolutionary theory explains why people seek control over environmental circumstances-humans are egoistic and concerned about food-and why some, particularly males, will seek to dominate others by maintaining a privileged position in a dominance hierarchy. Clearly, as the leaders of states are human, they too will be influenced by evolutionary theory as they respond to the actions of other states and as they make their own decisions.

#### And - no other theory explains the world accurately

Mearsheimer 2001 [John J., Professor of Political Science @ the University of Chicago, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, Pg. 1-3]

The optimists’ claim that security competition and war among the great powers has been burned out of the system is wrong. In fact, all of the major states around the globe still care deeply about the balance of power and are destined to compete for power among themselves for the foreseeable future. Consequently, realism will offer the most powerful explanations of international politics over the next century, and this will be true even if the debates among academic and policy elites are dominated by non-realist theories. In short, the real world remains a realist world. States still fear each other and seek to gain power at each other’s expense, because international anarchy-the driving force behind great-power behavior-did not change with the end of the Cold War, and there are few signs that such change is likely any time soon. States remain the principal actors in world politics and there is still no night watchman standing above them. For sure, the collapse of the Soviet Union caused a major shift in the global distribution of power. But it did not give rise to a change in the anarchic structure of the system, and without that kind of profound change, there is no reason to expect the great powers to behave much differently in the new century than they did in previous centuries. Indeed, considerable evidence from the 1990s indicates that power politics has not disappeared from Europe and Northeast Asia, the regions in which there are two or more great powers, as well as possible great powers such as Germany and Japan. There is no question, however, that the competition for power over the past decade has been low-key. Still, there is potential for intense security competition among the great powers that might lead to a major war. Probably the best evidence of that possibility is the fact that the United States maintains about one hundred thousand troops each in Europe and in Northeast Asia for the explicit purpose of keeping the major states in each region at peace.

## Framework – Epistemology not First

#### Epistemic focus bad - our specific truth claims outweigh.

Owen 2002 [David, Reader in Political Theory at the University of Southampton, Reorienting International Relations: On Pragmatism, Pluralism and Practical Reasoning”, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 31, No. 3, <http://mil.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/31/3/653>

The first danger with the philosophical turn is that it has an inbuilt tendency to prioritise issues of ontology and epistemology over explanatory and/or interpretive power as if the latter two were merely a simple function of the former. But while the explanatory and/or interpretive power of a theoretical account is not wholly independent of its ontological and/or epistemological commitments (otherwise criticism of these features would not be a criticism that had any value), it is by no means clear that it is, in contrast, wholly dependent on these philosophical commitments. Thus, for example, one need not be sympathetic to rational choice theory to recognise that it can provide powerful accounts of certain kinds of problems, such as the tragedy of the commons in which dilemmas of collective action are foregrounded. It may, of course, be the case that the advocates of rational choice theory cannot give a good account of why this type of theory is powerful in accounting for this class of problems (i.e., how it is that the relevant actors come to exhibit features in these circumstances that approximate the assumptions of rational choice theory) and, if this is the case, it is a philosophical weakness—but this does not undermine the point that, for a certain class of problems, rational choice theory may provide the best account available to us. In other words, while the critical judgement of theoretical accounts in terms of their ontological and/or epistemological sophistication is one kind of critical judgement, it is not the only or even necessarily the most important kind. The second danger run by the philosophical turn is that because prioritisation of ontology and epistemology promotes theory-construction from philosophical first principles, it cultivates a theory-driven rather than problem-driven approach to IR. Paraphrasing Ian Shapiro, the point can be put like this: since it is the case that there is always a plurality of possible true descriptions of a given action, event or phenomenon, the challenge is to decide which is the most apt in terms of getting a perspicuous grip on the action, event or phenomenon in question given the purposes of the inquiry; yet, from this standpoint, ‘theory-driven work is part of a reductionist program’ in that it ‘dictates always opting for the description that calls for the explanation that flows from the preferred model or theory’.5 The justification offered for this strategy rests on the mistaken belief that it is necessary for social science because general explanations are required to characterise the classes of phenomena studied in similar terms. However, as Shapiro points out, this is to misunderstand the enterprise of science since ‘whether there are general explanations for classes of phenomena is a question for social-scientific inquiry, not to be prejudged before conducting that inquiry’.6 Moreover, this strategy easily slips into the promotion of the pursuit of generality over that of empirical validity. The third danger is that the preceding two combine to encourage the formation of a particular image of disciplinary debate in IR—what might be called (only slightly tongue in cheek) ‘the Highlander view’—namely, an image of warring theoretical approaches with each, despite occasional temporary tactical alliances, dedicated to the strategic achievement of sovereignty over the disciplinary field. It encourages this view because the turn to, and prioritisation of, ontology and epistemology stimulates the idea that there can only be one theoretical approach which gets things right, namely, the theoretical approach that gets its ontology and epistemology right. This image feeds back into IR exacerbating the first and second dangers, and so a potentially vicious circle arises.

## Framework -- focus on politics good

#### We must not abandon focused political studies of latin America, their link arguments don’t prove why disregarding the examination of the affirmative is good – we must still focus on the study of the aff

Bortoluci and Jansen 2013 [Jose ́ H. Bortoluci and Robert S. Jansen Instructor at University of Michigan and Assistant Professor, Department of Sociology, University of Michigan TOWARD A POSTCOLONIAL SOCIOLOGY: THE VIEW FROM LATIN AMERICA, Postcolonial Sociology Political Power and Social Theory, Volume 24, 199–229 Copyright r 2013]

This article proposes a tentative frame for a creative integration between the social sciences and postcolonial studies, with a particular focus on Latin American societies. Building on earlier strains of Latin American critical thought, the postcolonial scholarship on Latin America has attended to the specificities of the colonial and post-colonial histories of Latin American societies in its engagement with postcolonial theory. It has argued that the analysis and critique of a colonial, Eurocentric imagination should be pushed further back in time, from the 18th to the 16th century – to when Iberian colonial officials first came into contact with the indigenous peoples of Latin America and introduced modern forms of slavery. It has also argued that Latin America is an important site for examining the representational and discursive practices that were developed for and through the operation of early European colonialism. Following this observation, it has shown that – much more than simply fueling the primitive accumulation of capital for European industrialization – Iberian colonialism acted as a proving ground for the development of the modern techniques of control that accompanied capitalist development. Further, Latin American postcolonial scholarship has illustrated how the distinct Latin American colonial experience shaped particular identities on the parts of both Iberian colonizers and colonial subjects in the region. And finally, it has been at the forefront of new attempts to ‘‘decolonize thinking,’’ through the consideration of the distinct historical trajectories of Latin American states and societies. These contributions are themselves incredibly significant and deserve to be taken seriously by postcolonial studies, as well as by other scholars interested in developing a new sociology of colonialism and post- colonialism. But in addition to these advances made by overtly postcolonial strands of Latin Americanist thought, the sociology of Latin America has provided examples of how comparative critical insights might be better incorporated into the social sciences. For more than 60 years, there have been important traditions in sociology (albeit often at the margins of the discipline) that have critiqued modernization theory, worked through the challenges of regional comparison, transnationalism, and historicization, and taken culture quite seriously. These traditions have informed much of the sociological work on Latin America, by Southern and Northern scholars alike. Such work stands to contribute a great deal to a new program of postcolonial sociology – a program that we have made preliminary efforts to sketch here. Finally, this article also suggests a few ways in which a postcolonial sociology might inform new scholarship on Latin America. Substantively, it encourages scholars of cultural politics at the micro-level to attend to the broader social relations and institutions in which these are embedded – both at the national and international levels. Historically, it echoes recent suggestions by Latin Americanist historians and historical sociologists that understanding 19th century structures and events is critical if we want to comprehend adequately the region’s post-colonial historical trajectories. And methodologically, it highlights the usefulness of adopting a compara- tive perspective. This means continuing to compare Latin American countries with those of Europe and North America; but equally important is to compare Latin American with other post-colonial cases, and to pursue innovative comparisons within the region. Overall, the strongest Latin Americanist scholarship has been moving in these directions for some time now. But a reinvigoration and broadening of this effort would go a long way toward the eventual development of a mature program of postcolonial sociology.

## Link Turn – Cuba

#### Cuba is historically situated to combine elements of capitalist and anticapitalist struggles through their social policy. Little risk of an impact for the k, net benefit is the aff

Mazzei 2012 , Julie Mazzei Department of Political Science, Kent State University, USA, Negotiating domestic socialism with global capitalism: So-called tourist apartheid in Cuba, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Volume 45, Issues 1–2, March–June 2012, Pages 91–103, In Search of Legitimacy: Post-Soviet De Facto States Between Institutional Stabilization and Political Transformation

The policies constructing the dual economy in Cuba were an attempt at a barrier between socialism and capitalism, akin functionally to a digital “firewall.” Global capitalism was granted regulated entrée inside the country's borders, yet the government intended to keep the capitalist elements outside of its domestic socio-political reality. Thus as with any firewall the policies served as a filter, allowing specific, regulated transactions while prohibiting others. The government permitted interactions in which hard currency was funneled to the state, and regulated or prohibited transactions in which Cuban individuals could capitalistically earn or spend, allegedly limiting capitalist inequities. The “gatekeeper” state erected a firewall. Subsequent reforms, which may seem to introduce elements of capitalism, have been made nonetheless with an eye towards maintaining state control over the economy, a point highlighted by Raúl Castro who, while advocating economic reforms, insists that the economy will continue to be one driven by “[p]lanning, and not free market” ([Castro, 2010](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.ou.edu/science/article/pii/S0967067X12000049?np=y#bib18)). As early as 2008, Raúl Castro was openly advocating efficiency in labor practices, insisting that economic reform needed to include “pressure,” which would drive people “to work in order to cover their necessities” rather than rely upon the state “giv[ing] things for free here and there” ([Castro, 2008](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.ou.edu/science/article/pii/S0967067X12000049?np=y#bib19)). As much as some want to see such reforms as capitalist in nature, in a 2010 speech Castro noted that “modifications that need to be introduced to the updating of the economic model are aimed at the preservation of socialism by strengthening it and making it truly irrevocable” ([Castro, 2010](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.ou.edu/science/article/pii/S0967067X12000049?np=y#bib18)). Some of these reforms have included a gradual end to food rations ([Verma, 2011](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.ou.edu/science/article/pii/S0967067X12000049?np=y#bib59)); this was part of Castro's move to eliminate inefficiencies in the economy. He argued in 2011 that the ration book “ha[d] become in the course of the years an intolerable burden to the economy and discouraged work” ([Castro, 2011b](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.ou.edu/science/article/pii/S0967067X12000049?np=y#bib17)). Similarly, the new economic “Guidelines of the Economic and Social Policy of the Party and the Revolution” adopted in 2011 ([Castro, 2011a](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.ou.edu/science/article/pii/S0967067X12000049?np=y#bib16)) “includ[e] the expansion and easing of labor in the non-public sector” and a disciplined tax structure, in order to improve the “efficiency of the basic means of production,” as Castro put it ([Castro, 2011b](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.ou.edu/science/article/pii/S0967067X12000049?np=y#bib17)). However, those who might mistake these for an economic opening are admonished by Raúl Castro, who insists that these reforms are intended to “facilitat[e] the construction of socialism” ([Castro, 2011b](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.ou.edu/science/article/pii/S0967067X12000049?np=y#bib17)), not open the system to free market forces. It is a continuation of the reform process intended to maintain state control while also growing the economy. Indeed, Raúl Castro's closing speech at the 6th Party Congress left no doubt about the commitment to socialism, nor about the continuing role of the FAR in that project ([Castro, 2011a](http://www.sciencedirect.com.ezproxy.lib.ou.edu/science/article/pii/S0967067X12000049?np=y#bib16)). In the post-Cold War era of neoliberal economics and globalization, the delicate negotiation between domestic and international economic principles is nearly required of non-capitalist states. The Cuban regime has been able to successfully use the international system, and tourists, to sustain some domestic objectives, but the efforts to do so came at a cost. The fact that Cuba's policies designed to mitigate capitalism-induced inequality seem to have instead facilitated state designed inequity indicates that this negotiation is not an easy one. Nonetheless, if the period since the Cuban Revolution is indicative of anything, it is that the regime will continue to modify in degrees, reforming policies in an attempt to survive and even thrive within the international system while remaining committed to domestic socialism.

## Link Turn - Cuba

#### The Cuban embargo is counterproductive and wastes hundreds of millions of dollars. Neoliberalism offers a better model than status quo blockade

Hanson Batten & Ealey 2013 [Daniel Hanson is an economics researcher at the American Enterprise Institute.  Dayne Batten is affiliated with the University of North Carolina Department of Public Policy.  Harrison Ealey is a financial analyst]¶ It's Time For The U.S. To End Its Senseless Embargo Of Cuba¶ 1/16/2013 ¶ <http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2013/01/16/its-time-for-the-u-s-to-end-its-senseless-embargo-of-cuba/>]

For the first time in more than fifty years, Cuban citizens can travel abroad without permission from their government. The move, part of a broader reform package being phased in by Raul Castro, underscores the irrationality of America’s continuation of a five-decade old embargo.¶ While the embargo has been through several legal iterations in the intervening years, the general tenor of the U.S. position toward Cuba is a hardline not-in-my-backyard approach to communism a la the[Monroe](http://www.forbes.com/places/mi/monroe/) Doctrine. The official position is outdated, hypocritical, and counterproductive.¶ The Cuban embargo was inaugurated by a Kennedy administration executive order in 1960 as a response to the confiscation of American property in Cuba under the newly installed Castro regime. The current incarnation of the embargo – codified primarily in the Helms-Burton Act – aims at producing free markets and representative democracy in Cuba through economic sanctions, travel restrictions, and international legal penalties.¶ Since Fidel Castro abdicated power to his brother Raul in 2008, the government has undertaken more than 300 economic reforms designed to encourage enterprise, and restrictions have been lifted on property use, travel, farming, municipal governance, electronics access, and more. Cuba is still a place of oppression and gross human rights abuse, but recent events would indicate the 11 million person nation is moving in the right direction.¶ Despite this progress, the U.S. spends massive amounts of money trying to keep illicit Cuban goods out of the [United States](http://www.forbes.com/places/united-states/). At least 10 different agencies are responsible for enforcing different provisions of the embargo, and according to the Government Accountability Office, the U.S. government devotes hundreds of millions of dollars and tens of thousands of man hours to administering the embargo each year.¶ At the [Miami](http://www.forbes.com/places/fl/miami/) [International](http://www.forbes.com/international/) Airport, visitors arriving from a Cuban airport are seven times more likely to be stopped and subjected to further customs inspections than are visitors from other countries. More than 70 percent of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control inspections each year are centered on rooting out smuggled Cuban goods even though the agency administers more than 20 other trade bans. Government resources could be better spent on the enforcement of other sanctions, such as illicit drug trade from [Columbia](http://www.forbes.com/places/sc/columbia/), rather than the search for contraband cigars and rum. At present, the U.S. is largely alone in restricting access to Cuba. The embargo has long been a point of friction between the United States and allies in Europe, South America, and Canada. Every year since 1992, the U.S. has been publically condemned in the United Nations for maintaining counterproductive and worn out trade and migration restrictions against Cuba despite the fact that nearly all 5,911 U.S. companies nationalized during the Castro takeover have dropped their claims.¶ Moreover, since Europeans, Japanese, and Canadians can travel and conduct business in Cuba unimpeded, the sanctions are rather toothless. The State Department has argued that the cost of conducting business in Cuba is only negligibly higher because of the embargo. For American multinational corporations wishing to undertake commerce in Cuba, foreign branches find it easy to conduct exchanges.¶ Yet, estimates of the sanctions’ annual cost to the U.S. economy range from $1.2 to $3.6 billion, according to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Restrictions on trade disproportionately affect U.S. small businesses who lack the transportation and financial infrastructure to skirt the embargo. These restrictions translate into real reductions in income and employment for Americans in states like Florida, where the unemployment rate currently stands at 8.1 percent.

## Link Turn - Venezuela

#### The aff is a reversal of a focus on military strategy – net better than the squo or the alt

Petras 2010 [James Petras, Global Policy Forum author, US-Venezuela: The Empire Strikes Back (and Loses), published August 2010 <http://www.globalpolicy.org/us-military-expansion-and-intervention/venezuela/49400.html>]

Washington's multi-track policy directed at destabilizing the Venezuelan government has by and large been counter-productive, suffering major failures and few successes. The hardline toward Venezuela has failed to "line up" any support in the major countries of Latin America, with the exception of Colombia. It has isolated Washington not Caracas. The military threats may have radicalized the socio-economic measures adopted by Chavez not moderated them. The threats and accusations emanating from Colombia have strengthened internal cohesion in Venezuela, except among the hard-core opposition groups. They have also led to Venezuela's upgrading its intelligence, police and military operations. The Colombian provocations have led to a break in relations and an 80% decline in the multi-billion dollar cross border trade, bankrupting numerous Colombian firms, as Venezuela substitutes Brazilian and Argentine industrial and agrarian imports. The effects of the policies of tension and the "war of attrition" are hard to measure, especially in terms of their impact on the forthcoming crucial legislative elections on September 26, 2010. No doubt, Venezuela's failure to regulate and control the multi-million flow of US funds to its Venezuelan collaborators has made a significant impact on their organizational capability. No doubt the economic downturn has had some effect in limiting public spending on new social programs. Likewise, the incompetence and corruption of several top Chavista officials, especially in public food distribution, housing and public safety will have an electoral impact. It is likely that these "internal" factors are much more influential in shaping the alignment of Venezuela's electoral outcome, than the aggressive confrontational politics adopted by Washington. Nevertheless, if the pro-US opposition substantially increases its legislative presence in the September 26 elections - beyond one-third of the Congress people - they will attempt to block social changes and economic stimulus policies. The US will intensify its efforts to pressure Venezuela to divert resources to security issues in order to undermine social-economic expenditures which sustain the support of the lower 60% of the Venezuelan population. Up to now, White House policy based on greater militarization and virtually no new economic initiatives has been a failure. It has encouraged the larger Latin American countries to increase regional integration, as witnessed by new custom and tariff agreements taken at the MERCOSUR meeting in early August of this year. It has not led to any diminuation of hostilities between the US and the ALBA countries. It has not increased US influence. Instead Latin America has moved toward a new regional political organization UNASUR (which excludes the US), downgrading the Organization of American States which the US uses to push its agenda. Ironically, the only bright lights, favoring US influence, comes from internal, electoral processes. Rightist candidate Jose Serra is running a strong race in the upcoming Brazilian Presidential elections. In Argentina, Paraguay and Bolivia the pro-US right is regrouping and hoping to return to power. What Washington fails to understand is that across the political spectrum from the left to the center-right, political leaders are appalled and opposed to the US push and promotion of the military option as the centerpiece of policy. Practically all political leaders have unpleasant memories of exile and persecution from the previous cycle of US backed military regimes. The self-proclaimed extra-territorial reach of the US military, operating out of its seven bases in Colombia, has widened the breach between the centrist and center-left democratic regimes and the Obama White House. In other words, Latin America perceives US military aggression toward Venezuela as a "first step" southward toward their countries. That, and the drive for greater political independence and more diversified markets, have weakened Washington's diplomatic and political attempts to isolate Venezuela. Colombia's new President Santos, made out of the same rightist mold as his predecessor Alvaro Uribe, faces a difficult choice - continuing as an instrument of US military confrontation and destabilization of Venezuela at the cost of several billion dollars in trade losses and isolation from the rest of Latin America or lessening border tensions and incursions, dropping the provocative rhetoric and normalizing relations with Venezuela. If the latter takes place, the US will lose its last best instrument for its external strategy of "tensions" and psych warfare. Washington will be left with two options: a unilateral direct military intervention or funding of political warfare through its domestic collaborators. In the meantime President Chavez and his supporters would do well to concentrate on pulling the economy out of recession, tackling state corruption and monumental inefficiency and empowering the community and factory-based councils to play a greater role in everything from increasing productivity to public safety. Ultimately Venezuela's long term security from the long and pervasive reach of the US Empire depends on the strength of the organized mass organizations sustaining the Chavez government.

1. Walter Mignolo, *The Idea of Latin America,* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), pp.51-82. Inayatullah and Blaney explain that the figure of the ‘Wild man’ of the Americas was a central metaphor deployed during the intellectual battles of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Walter Mignolo, *Local Histories/Global Designs: Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges and Border Thinking* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), pp.58-59. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Danielle VaVaque-Manty “There are Indians in the Museum of Natural History” (*Wicazo Sa Review* Vol.15, No.1, 2000, pp.71-89). [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference,* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000). [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. I have developed these arguments in much greater depth in a draft article submitted to the Review of International Studies “Seeing Latin America: coloniality and the politics of representation in IR”. For the discussant: during that study, I consulted around thirty textbooks focused on a range of topics and aimed at various levels. Of especial relevance were: John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens, (eds.), *The Globalization of World Politics, 4 ed.,* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); Antony Best, Jussi Hanhimäki, Joseph A. Maiolo and Kirsten E. Schulze, *An International History of the Twentieth Century,* (London: Routledge, 2003); Michael E. Brown, (ed.), *Grave New World: Security Challenges in the Twentieth Century,* (Georgetown: Georgetown University Press, 2003); Bruno Bueno de Mesquite, *Principles of International Politics, 2 ed*., (Washington: CQ Press, 2000); Peter Calvocoressi, *World Politics since 1945,* 7 *ed.,* (London: Longman, 2000); John L. Gaddis, *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History,* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); K.H.Holsti, *International Politics: a Framework for Analysis, 7 ed.,* (London: Prentice Hall, 1995); Robert Jackson, *The Global Covenant: Human Conduct in a World of States,* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Charles Kegley and Eugene Wittkopf, *World Politics: Trends and Transformations, 8 ed.,* (Boston: Bedford St Martins, 2001); William Keylor, *The Twentieth Century World and Beyond: an International History since 1900,* 5 *ed.,* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); Richard Mansbach and Kirsten Rafferty, *Introduction to Global Politics,* (London: Routledge, 2007); Anthony McGrew and Paul Lewis, *Global Politics,* (Cambridge: Polity, 1992); Bruce Russett, Harvey Starr and David Kinsella, *World Politics: the Menu for Choice, 7 ed.,* (London: Wadsworth, 2004); Trevor Salmon and Mark Imber, (eds.), *Issues in International Relations, 2 ed.,* (London: Routledge, 2008); Jan Aart Scholte, *Globalization: a Critical Introduction,* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2000); Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield and Tim Dunne, *Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases,* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); Peter Sutch and Juanita Elias, *International Relations: The Basics,* (London: Routledge, 2007); Paul R. Viotti and Mark V, Kauppi, *IR and World Politics: Security, Economy, Identity, 2 ed.,* (London: Prentice Hall, 2001); Odd Arne Westad, *Global Cold War,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Brian White, Richard Little and Michael Smith, (eds.), *Issues in World Politics,* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2005); John Young and John Kent, *International Relations since 1945: a Global History,* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). I also made a closer reading of the following more critical texts: J. Marsall Beier, *International Relations in Uncommon Places: Indigeneity, Cosmology and the Limits of International Theory,* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2005); Geeta Chowdhury and Sheila Nair, *Power, Postcolonialism and International Relations: Reading Race and Gender,* (London: Routledge, 2004); Roxanne Doty, *Imperial Encounters: the Politics of Representation in North-South Relations,* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996); Jenny Edkins and Maya Zehfuss, *Global Politics,* (London: Routledge, 2009; Jim George *Discourses of Global Politics: A Critical Re-Introduction to International Relations,* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner,1994); Naeem Inayatullah and David L. Blaney, *International Relations and the Problem of Difference,* (London: Routledge, 2003); Gilbert M. Joseph, Catherine C. Legrand and Ricardo D. Salvatore, (eds.), *Close Encounters of Empire: Writing the Cultural History of US-Latin American Relations,* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1998); Sankaran Krishna, *Globalization and Postcolonialism: Hegemony and Resistance in the Twenty-first Century,* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2009); L.M.H. Ling, *Postcolonial International Relations: Conquest and Desire between Asia and the West,* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002); Karena Shaw, *Indigeneity and Political Theory: Sovereignty and the Limits of the Political,* (London: Routledge, 2008); David Slater, *Geopolitics and the Post-colonial: Rethinking North-South Relations,* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006); Cynthia Weber, *International Relations Theory: A Critical Introduction, 3 ed,.* (London: Routledge, 2009). [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Arlene Tickner, ‘Hearing Latin American Voices in International Relations Studies’, *International Studies Perspectives*, vol.4, no.4, (2003) pp.325-50. Her large research project confirms the dominance of Western IR: Arlene B. Tickner, ‘Latin America: Still policy dependent after all these years?’, in Arlene B. Tickner and Ole Waever, (eds), *International Relations Scholarship Around the World,* (London: Routledge, 2009). [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. J. Marshall Beier *International Relations in Uncommon Places: Indigeneity, Cosmology and the Limits of International Theory* (New York: Palgrave/Macmillan, 2005); Karena Shaw *Indigeneity and Political Theory: Sovereignty and the Limits of the Political* (London: Routledge, 2008). [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Peter d’Errico “Native Americans in America: A Theoretical and Historical Overview” in Frederick E. Hoxie, Peter C. Mancall and James H. Merrell (eds) *American nations: Encounters in Indian Country, 1850 to the Present* (New York: Routledge, 2001). [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Soren C. Larsen “The Future’s past: Politics of Time and Territory among Dakelh First Nations in British Columbia” (Geografiska Annaler: Series B, 88, No.3: 311-321). [↑](#footnote-ref-9)